Nzioka John Mosu2026-04-212026-04-212024Nzioka, J. M. (2024). Viability of empirical methods in knowledge acquisition: Critical analysis of pragmatism and the Duhem–Quine thesis (PhD dissertation, Chuka University). Chuka University.https://repository.chuka.ac.ke/handle/123456789/22551A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy of Chuka University Supervisors:Prof. Dickson Nkonge Kagema,Dr. Dynesius NyangauMost Scholars in epistemology have always considered the tripartite conditions (Belief, Justification and Truth) to be sufficient for knowledge, however, the rise of scientific empiricism has raised doubts in certain circles about the necessity and sufficiency of these conditions. In particular, arguments have been raised to demonstrate the impossibility of ever achieving truth of things as they are (correspondence), hence, rendering knowledge by empirical methods impossible. This conclusion seems a contradiction to our claims that we indeed can know by way of these methods. As such, there was need to examine if indeed knowledge of the physical world is possible. The following were the objectives of this research: to critically examine the necessity and sufficiency of Belief, Justification and Truth as conditions for knowledge; to demonstrate science‘s pragmatic adoption of truth and show how it violates the truth condition; to explore the Duhem-Quine thesis and examine its implication to knowledge; and ultimately, determine the possibility of knowledge acquisition through empirical methods. The theoretical framework proposed to address this problem was the Cartesian criterion of truth which involves establishing that propositions are clear and distinct, and the relevance of establishing logical correctness in arguments. The research methodology for this study was qualitative and it involved an examination of texts relevant to the investigation. The findings of the study were that: Firstly, the tripartite conditions are individually and collectively necessary for knowledge, but collectively sufficient for knowledge; secondly, scientific investigation adopts the pragmatic conception of truth. Thirdly, the Duhem-Quine thesis presents a challenge to knowledge acquisition using empirical methods because its theories are under-determined by evidence. As such, the evidence available to researchers is never sufficient to warrant falsification of a theory. Ultimately, the research established that despite the fact that we cannot know things as they are, it is possible to have knowledge of the appearance of these things and our perspectives of them. It is also important to revise the truth condition to make reference to pragmatism and coherence as opposed to correspondence (which cannot be realized by humans). Further, the justification condition should include evidentialism and reliabilism. In conclusion, the study recommended further research examining the compatibility between ‗armchair‘ and empirical research, and how experimental philosophy revolutionizes the role played by intentionality in knowledge acquisition.enEmpirical methodsKnowledge acquisitionPragmatismDuhem–Quine thesisEpistemologyTheory of knowledgePhilosophy of scienceThesis