

**IMPLICATIONS OF HOTSPOT POLICING STRATEGIES ON CRIME
DISPLACEMENT IN NORTH-RIFT COUNTIES OF KENYA**


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**A Research Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Criminology and Security Studies of Chuka University**

**CHUKA UNIVERSITY
OCTOBER 2025**


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
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Recommendation

This Thesis has been examined, passed and submitted with our approval as the University Supervisors.

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DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to Rehema, Eugene, and Nolan. They remain my source of inspiration and a blessing from God. In memory of Dr. Othieno NYANJOM (DPhil' Sussex) (1954-2025). An exemplary scholar per excellence.

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ABSTRACT

The crimes of banditry and cattle rustling have persisted in North-Rift Kenya. To address this crime challenge, many policing initiatives summarised as hotspot policing have been implemented. While hotspot policing strategies may have had positive impact on crime in urban areas, little is known about the impact of these approaches on crime displacement especially in rural settings that have a history of banditry and cattle rustling. The purpose of this study was to analyse the implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement. The objectives of the study were to evaluate the implications of disarmament, dusk-to-dawn curfews, and increased presence of security agencies on crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya. Relevant scholarly literature were examined to understand the hotspot policing and crime displacement phenomena. This study was guided by the geometric theory of crime and the theory of state society relations; strong societies and weak states. This study employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches through a descriptive survey design. The target population was 1,360,716 residents of the counties of North-Rift Counties of Turkana, Samburu, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, and West Pokot. Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table for determining sample size was used to attain a sample population of 384 primary respondents. Purposive sampling was used to select the counties and sub counties. Random sampling was used to select two division in each sub-county. Proportionate sampling was used to distribute the sample population across all the selected divisions. The respondents were randomly selected taking into consideration gender balance while key informants were purposively selected. Structured Questionnaire was administered on primary respondents while Focus Group Discussion was administered on key respondents. Face, content, and criterion validity of the research instruments were ascertained. Reliability of the instruments were evaluated through Cronbach's Alpha, and the obtained coefficients, all above 0.7, confirmed its adequacy. Quantitative data was analysed using inferential and descriptive statistics aided by the Statistical Package for Social Science version 28 while qualitative data was analysed thematically. The study adhered to ethical standards of conducting social science research as well as other legal requirements. The result from quantitative data was illustrated using tables and figures while qualitative data was presented thematically. The study found a statistically significant and positive association between disarmament ($\chi^2=4972.584^a$, $N=378$, $p<.0001$), dusk-to-dawn curfews ($\chi^2=3332.545^a$, $N=378$, $p<.0001$), and increased presence of security agencies on crime displacement ($\chi^2=5292.000^a$, $N=378$, $p<.0001$) in North-Rift Counties of Kenya. The study concluded that all the three hotspot policing strategies significantly contributed to crime displacement across the study areas. The study recommends that the hotspot policing strategies should be well dispersed across the entire crime hotspot zones and integrated with community led policing, intelligence led policing as well socio-economic development strategies. The study's conclusions are expected to inform government, enforcement agencies, scholars, and other stakeholders in designing mechanisms to improve the hotspot policing strategies. Moreover, this study is expected to inform government, policing and security experts, and law enforcement on the dynamics associated with hotspot policing strategies as implemented in the study areas. The study extends Criminology research on the implications of hotspot policing strategies to rural crime hotspots.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACCs:	Assistant County Commissioner
AP:	Administrative Police
ASALs:	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
CAQDAS:	Computer-assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
CBD:	Central Business District
CC:	County Commissioner
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
DtD:	Dusk til' Dawn
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
GTC:	Geometric Theory of Crime
KIs:	Key Informant
KWS:	Kenya Wildlife Service
LRA:	Lord's Resistance Army
MCA:	Member of County Assembly
MPs:	Members of the National Assembly
MRC:	Mombasa Republican Council
NACOSTI:	National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation
NFD:	Northern Frontier District
NSAGs:	Non-State Armed Groups
OFP:	Offender-focused Policing
POA:	Public Order Act
SALWs:	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SQs:	Structured Questionnaires
UN:	United Nations
VE:	Village Elders
WCs:	Ward Commanders

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Hotspot policing, a strategy that focuses law enforcement resources on high-crime areas, has gained prominence globally as an effective approach to reducing crime. Crime hot spots as places with high crime intensity have arguably been the focus of law enforcement globally (Weisburd and Telep 2014). To dissipate crime concentration at the hotspots, hotspot policing strategies have demonstrated effectiveness by fostering a visible police presence, deterring potential offenders, and facilitating swift responses to criminal activity. Hotspot policing works under the law of crime concentration which asserts that crime is not evenly distributed across time and space, rather, it is disproportionately concentrated in certain pocket locations (Weisburd, 2015). Weisburd adds that if law enforcement is to achieve effective crime control and deterrence, they should focus on the hotspot areas. While its success is lauded especially in urban areas, concerns regarding crime displacement have persisted.

Hotspot policing strategies have successfully been implemented in urban centres across the United States, Europe, and Latin America. Studies in cities like New York and Los Angeles have demonstrated significant reductions in crime rates through targeted policing efforts (Braga et al., 2019b). However, the strategy has also been criticized for potentially displacing crime to neighbouring areas rather than eliminating it entirely (Weisburd et al., 2006). This phenomenon, known as crime displacement, raises critical questions about the long-term effectiveness of hotspot policing, particularly in regions with unique socio-economic and security challenges such as the North-Rift Counties of Kenya.

In post-conflict areas such as Colombia and the Balkans, hotspot policing strategies have been incorporated into broader disarmament and peacebuilding efforts. In Colombia, targeted policing in high-crime areas following disarmament campaigns led to temporary reduction in violence but also resulted in the relocation of criminal networks to less-policed regions (Dube & García-Ponce, 2013). Similarly, in the Balkans, hotspot policing strategies were employed to combat organized crime after disarmament. However, the lack of comprehensive socio-economic reforms limited

their long-term impact (Small Arms Survey, 2013). Although disarmament as a hotspot strategy aims to reduce crime by concentrating enforcement in high-risk areas, these global experiences underscore the need for context-specific approaches that address root causes and prevent displacement; accordingly, this study focuses on the North-Rift Counties of Kenya.

In Africa, hotspot policing interventions have been applied in various contexts, often as part of broader security strategies to combat organized crime, terrorism, and intercommunal violence. In South Africa, the strategies have been applied to address high rates of violent crime in urban areas such as Johannesburg and Cape Town. While these efforts have yielded short-term reductions in crime, challenges such as police corruption, resource constraints, and community mistrust have limited their effectiveness (Brogden & Nijhar, 2005). Similarly, in Nigeria, hotspot policing has been employed to combat Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast, but the strategy has often led to the displacement of insurgent activities to neighbouring countries like Cameroon and Niger (Onuoha, 2014).

In Sierra Leone and South Sudan, hotspot policing interventions have been incorporated into disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs (Aduot, 2021). In Sierra Leone, targeted policing in former conflict zones helped reduce armed violence but faced challenges in reintegrating ex-combatants, leading to sporadic resurgences of crime (Pouligny, 2004) while hotspot policing efforts have been hampered by weak governance structures and the proliferation of small arms, resulting in the displacement of violence to neighbouring regions in South Sudan (Johnson, 2014). These cases underscore the significance of addressing socio-economic and governance gaps to ensure the success of hotspot policing strategies in Africa which this study has accomplished by understanding the implications of hotspot policing on crime displacement in North-Rift Kenya.

In Kenya, hotspot policing has targeted various security threats including urban crime, terrorism, and intercommunal violence. In Nairobi, for example, hotspot policing has been used to combat high rates of robbery, carjacking, and drug-related crimes. While these efforts have led to short-term reductions in crime, challenges such as police brutality, corruption, and lack of community trust have limited their effectiveness

(Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003). Similarly, in Mombasa, hotspot policing has been employed to counter terrorism and organized crime, but the strategy has often resulted in the displacement of criminal activities to neighbouring counties (Anderson, 2017).

In the North-Eastern regions of Kenya, the hotspot policing interventions have been integrated into counter-terrorism operations targeting Al-Shabaab militants. While these efforts have been effective in reducing terrorist incidences in some areas, they have also facilitated the displacement of militant activities to less-policed regions and spurred the emergence of new criminal networks (Katumanga, 2017). Along the Coast of Kenya, the interventions have addressed illegal fishing and drug trafficking, but the lack of comprehensive socio-economic reforms have limited their long-term impact (Mwangi, 2012). These examples highlight the need for context-specific approaches to hotspot policing that address the unique security dynamics of each region.

The North-Rift Counties of Kenya, encompassing Turkana, Baringo, and West Pokot counties, have been a hotspot for intercommunal violence, cattle rustling, and resource-based conflicts. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), coupled with weak governance structures, has exacerbated insecurity in the region (Alusa & Kanyinga, 2016). Disarmament efforts have been implemented to reduce armed violence, but these initiatives have often led to the displacement of criminal activities to neighbouring regions or the emergence of alternative forms of crime, such as illegal arms trade and banditry (Mwangi, 2012).

As part of the broader security strategies to address cattle rustling, banditry and intercommunal violence, hotspot policing strategies have been enforced in the North-Rift counties of Kenya. However, the effectiveness of these efforts has been limited by challenges such as inadequate resources, lack of community trust, and the region's porous borders, which facilitate the movement of armed groups (Katumanga, 2015). Additionally, the imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfews and the increased presence of security agencies have had mixed results, with some studies suggesting that these measures have merely displaced crime rather than eliminating it (Osamba, 2000). These dynamics highlight the need for a comprehensive assessment of hotspot policing strategies and their implication in crime displacement in the North-Rift counties of Kenya to inform more effective and sustainable security interventions.

This is because, despite the growing body of literature on hotspot policing, there is a significant gap in understanding its implications on crime displacement in rural and conflict-prone regions, particularly in the context of disarmament, dusk-to-dawn curfews, and increased security presence. Existing studies have primarily focused on urban settings and conventional crimes, with limited attention to the unique challenges of pastoralist conflicts and resource-based violence. Moreover, the interplay between hotspot policing, disarmament, curfews, and increased security presence remains underexplored, particularly in the North-Rift counties of Kenya.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The North-Rift region of Kenya, encompassing Turkana, Baringo, and West Pokot counties, has long been plagued by intercommunal violence, cattle rustling, and resource-based conflicts (Marigat and Cheruiyotomo, 2022). These security challenges have been heightened by the propagation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), weak governance structures, and socio-economic marginalization. In response, the Kenyan government and security agencies have implemented various strategies, including hotspot policing, disarmament campaigns, dusk-to-dawn curfews, and an increased presence of security forces, to restore security. While these interventions have been of slight significance in reducing crime in targeted areas, there has been growing evidence that they may be displacing criminal activities to neighbouring regions or into alternative forms of crime, rather than eliminating crime entirely.

Hotspot policing, which focuses on concentration of law enforcement resources in high-crime areas was introduced to combat cattle rustling and intercommunal violence. However, its effectiveness has been limited by challenges such as inadequate resources, lack of community trust, and the region's porous borders, which facilitate the movement of armed groups. Similarly, disarmament efforts aimed at reducing the availability of small arms have often led to the relocation of criminal activities to less-policed areas or the emergence of new illicit markets. The imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfews and the increased presence of security agencies have also yielded mixed results, with some studies suggesting that these measures merely displaced crime rather than addressing its root causes.

Ideally, hotspot policing strategies should address the crime problem at the spot and further diffuse the crime reduction benefits to adjacent areas. In the North-Rift counties, lasting security has remained elusive despite the hotspot policing interventions. Crime displacement remains a significant challenge in the North-Rift region, undermining the long-term effectiveness of security strategies and perpetuating cycles of violence. This has raised critical questions about the sustainability of current approaches and their implications for regional security. There has been a lack of comprehensive research on how hotspot policing strategies such as disarmament, curfews, and increased security presence interact to influence crime displacement in the North-Rift counties. Furthermore, the challenges faced by security agencies in implementing these strategies-such as resource constraints, community mistrust, and cross-border criminal networks-have not been adequately explored. This study addressed these gaps by examining the implications of hotspot policing on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.

1.3 General Objective

This study analysed the implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

To answer the purpose of the study, this research pursued the following objectives;

- i. To evaluate the implications of disarmament on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.
- ii. To determine the implications of dusk-to-dawn curfews on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.
- iii. To investigate the implications of the continued increased presence of security agencies on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.

1.5 Hypotheses of the Study

H₀₁: There is no statistically significant relationship between disarmament programs and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.

H₀₂: There is no statistically significant relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfews and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.

H₀₃: There is no statistically significant relationship between increased presence of security agencies and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The findings of this study are expected to support law enforcement agencies in their efforts towards pacifying the North-Rift region of Kenya. By analysing the implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement, the findings inform on ways to address the insecurity in the region without displacing the crime within the regions. This way, the findings of this study seek to influence policy change as far as dealing with insecurity in the bandit-prone North-Rift is concerned. The study has suggested possible strategies that address the insecurity situation in rural disturbed areas; strategies that are alive to the social, cultural, economic, and political characterization of the study area and population. Understanding the context specific instigators of the crime of banditry and cattle-rustling in the region is critical as crime prevention practitioners seek to address the insecurity in the region. This study should also benefit crime and security scholars by contributing to the rural policing context. The findings deepen understanding of hotspot policing strategies in rural setups since hotspot policing strategies within rural contexts have been rarely examined. By investigating the implications of hot spot policing strategies on crime displacement, this study sought to address this knowledge gap.

1.7 Scope of the Study

Geographically, this study was conducted in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya which include Turkana, West Pokot, Baringo, Samburu, and Elgeyo Marakwet. Thematically, the study focused on analysing the implications of selected hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement across the counties under study. The study analysed the implications of disarmaments, dusk-to-dawn curfews, and increased security agencies presence. The study focused on all the six elements of crime displacement as espoused by Guerette and Bowers (2017). The six elements include temporal, spatial, tactical, target, functional, and perpetrator displacements. This study analysed all these forms of displacement given that they all (or any) can occur following crime control intervention mechanisms such as hotspot policing.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

This study was confronted with the challenge of poor infrastructure across the North-Rift counties of Kenya. This limitation slowed the data collection process but did not hamper the research entirely. Also, the researcher encountered insecurity during the data collection process. To overcome this challenge, the researcher liaised with the security infrastructure in the area to ensure safety of the researcher and the research assistants. Moreover, language barrier among respondents and residents in the selected counties was a challenge. Limitations in language affected the ability to fully and explicitly express the conditions faced by respondents as well as interpret the data collection tools. This was mitigated by use of translators and the selection of research assistants who could communicate effectively in the local language.

While some respondents were hesitant to participate freely by sharing information relating to cattle rustling because of the emotive nature of the crime, they were assured of their safety and security during the research or for participating in the research. Moreover, the use of the locals as research assistants further helped to mitigate this limitation.

1.9 Assumptions of the Study

This study made the following assumptions;

- i. The selected hotspot policing strategies were the most implemented strategies in the study areas.
- ii. The respondents provided factual information.

1.10 Operational Definition of Terms

The following terms and concepts have been used in this study and their operational definitions are as provided:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| Continued Increased Presence | : This refers to the act of constant maintenance of law enforcement officers by way of patrol, camps, and any other means at a place/location. In this study the term refers to the act of sustained deployment and visibility of security agencies or personnel in a specific area over an extended period to maintain law and order, prevent crime, and enhance public safety. |
| Crime Attractors | : This refers to specific locations, environments, or facilities that consistently draw a high concentration of potential offenders due to their perceived opportunities for criminal activity. In this study, the term refers to locations that criminals find attractive for their illicit activities. |
| Crime generators | : These are particular locations that are attractive to large numbers of people for various reasons such as commerce. In this study, the term is used to refer to locations that attract people for reasons that are unrelated to crime but create opportunities for criminal activities due to high population density, increased social interactions, or economic activities. |
| Crime Displacement | : Shift in crime occurrence which can be spatial, temporal, tactical, target, functional, perpetrator as a result of targeted crime prevention intervention. In this study, the term refers to relocation or shift of criminal activities from one area, time, target, method, functional or offender group to another due to hotspot policing strategies. |

Crime Hotspot	: Chronic high crime locations with large volume of crime occurring in close spatial and temporal proximity. In this study, it refers to specific geographic location or area that experiences a significantly higher concentration of the crime of banditry and cattle rustling criminal activities.
Diffusion of Crime Prevention Benefits	: The spread of the reduction in crime occurrence to adjacent places other than the targeted place. In this study, it refers to security interventions discouraging criminal activities not only in the primary focus area but also in adjacent regions.
Disarmament	: This is the act of voluntary or forced surrender of arms from civilian populations by law enforcement officers. In this study, it refers to the collection and or confiscation of weapons from communities after the issuance of a disarmament order.
Hotspot Policing	: This refers to a focused and target-based law enforcement strategy on particular high-crime areas (hotspots) to reduce criminal activities. In this study, it refers to the use of focused law enforcement interventions or strategies that target specific crimes and/or offenders.
Hot target	: A(n) subject/object that is particularly attractive to criminals. In this study, it refers to a person, object, or location that is attractive to criminals due to its perceived value, accessibility, and vulnerability.
North-Rift Counties	: The North-Rift counties of Kenya is an expanse region of 14 counties that stretch across the Northern part of Kenya. In this study, the North-Rift constitute five counties namely; Turkana, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu, and Elgeyo Marakwet.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Concept of Hotspot Policing and Crime Displacement

Hotspot policing is a law-enforcement strategy that focuses on detecting and targeting specific geographic areas with high concentrations of crime, known as "hotspots." This approach is rooted in the understanding that crime is not evenly distributed but rather clustered in certain locations (Sherman et al., 1989). By concentrating resources on these areas, law enforcement agencies aim to disrupt criminal activities and reduce overall crime rates. However, the most common and significant criticisms of hotspot policing is the likelihood for crime displacement, where criminal activities are not controlled but rather moved to other areas, times, methods, targets, or perpetrators. Literature review provides a global review of hotspot policing and crime displacement, followed by an examination of the African context, the East African context, the Kenyan context, and finally, the North-Rift region of Kenya.

One of the most persistent arguments against crime control efforts is that crime can simply shift to other parts as result of crime control efforts. While hotspot policing focuses law enforcement resources on specific crime geo-locations, the risk of crime displacement continues to exist. Several hotspot policing strategies have been implemented across several jurisdictions especially in urban places with mixed outcomes (Guerette and Aziani, 2022). Research on the long-term success (crime control) of hotspot policing strategies remain incomplete. Hotspot policing in particular, Rosenbaum (2006) argues, produces an outcome that dissipates quickly before any serious accountability on its overall effectiveness is determined. One of the problematic yet incessant concerns about hotspot policing has been crime displacement.

According to Eck (1993), there are six types of crime displacement that are possible outcomes of crime control efforts. They include; temporal, spatial/territorial, target, tactical, functional, and perpetrator displacement. These crime displacement techniques are the offender mobility tactics when there are intense crime control activities underway. Temporal displacement involves the offender changing the time of crime occurrence and it occurs when the criminal commits the offence at a different time such as during the day or night (Leong, 2014). Spatial displacement, Weisburd

and Telep (2014) argue, “is the change of crime activity from one place to the next as a result of focused crime control strategies”. Criminals relocate to places that have not received intense law enforcement intervention as their initial location. In tactical displacement, the offender varies the methods of committing the crime. Target displacement involves the offender changing their focus from one target to another easier target while functional displacement (also known as crime type displacement) involves the offender shifting to another form of crime altogether. According to Eck (1993) perpetrator displacement is the emergence of and replacement of old offenders by new ones.

Crime displacement is a negative consequence that follows crime control and prevention strategies. Guerette (2016) has argued that the nature of crime displacement can be benign or malign. When benign, Guerette notes “...that the harm caused by the displaced crime is low compared to what existed before the crime control intervention in the urban area”. Either; new forms of less serious crime emerge, the emergent crime is less impactful to society by the redistribution of the crime over a larger area thus increasing the pool of victims; the emergent crime is removed from the most vulnerable population such as children, the elderly, and women; there is relocation of the emergent crime to areas that are less impactful to society; or there is simply low volume of the crime (Bowers et al., 2011). Either way, crime displacement occurs. For rural criminality such as is the case in North-Rift counties of Kenya, displacement although highly likely, has not been investigated.

When malign, Guerette (2016) warns that the displacement effects of crime can worsen the security situation. The author points out that focused-based crime control strategies can lead to the (re)emergence of more serious crimes, with more serious consequences. The volume of crime may increase, while other criminals may begin to target victims of certain ethnicities, gender, age, social-economic and political statuses. Moreover, Guerette adds that “...some criminals may relocate and offend at places with greater impact to society such as schools or simply target vulnerable groups of the population such as children, the sick, elderly, and women.” In the North-Rift of Kenya, bandits and cattle rustlers have often targeted such vulnerable places and groups such as communal homes and schools disrupting livelihoods and learning following intense security operations.

Crime displacement is highly probable especially when cultural, historical, and political manipulations exist. According Fennelly and Perry (2018), the risk of crime displacement exists when the modus operandi of controlling the crime, and the circumstances of the crime is analysed. In this case, the social-economic, cultural, historical, and political context of the crime of banditry and cattle rustling, must thus be analysed. Guerette (2016) has since established that crime displacement will almost always occur when; the criminal remains motivated and remains familiar with the area and adjacent areas; and when the crime opportunity continues to exist even after the crime control intervention has been implemented. The counties of the North-Rift embody much of Guerettes' characterization in that majority of inhabitants are pastoralists hence continued existence of the crime opportunity; and a near similar geographical terrain hence continued familiarity with the area.

Globally, hotspot policing strategies have been enforced in several regions including the United States, Europe, and Asia, but with mixed results. Some studies have shown that hotspot policing could led to significant reductions in crime in targeted areas. For instance, a meta-analysis by Braga et al. (2019a) established that hotspot policing strategies resulted in an average crime reduction of 13% in treated areas. Similar findings were also asserted by the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (2025). However, the same study also noted that crime displacement occurred in approximately 25% of cases, with criminal activities shifting to neighbouring areas or changing in form.

Another study by Weisburd et al. (2017) found that hotspot policing in New York City led to crime reduction in targeted areas but also resulted in an increase in crime in adjacent neighbourhoods. These findings from urban settings reveal the inconclusive nature of hotspot interventions as crime control measures even as their effectiveness in controlling rural criminality has largely remained inadequately explored. Despite the potential for displacement, some studies have found evidence of a "diffusion of benefits," where crime reductions went outside the targeted areas. For example, Bowers (2023) observed that hotspot policing in London led to a reduction in crime not only in the treated areas but also in surrounding neighbourhoods. This suggests that the benefits of hotspot policing may outweigh the risks of displacement in some cases.

In Africa, hotspot policing has been undertaken in various countries to address high levels of violent crime, particularly in urban areas. However, the effectiveness of the strategies has been constrained by resource constraints, corruption, and weak institutional capacity. A study by Burger (2018) found “...that hotspot policing in South Africa led to a reduction in violent crime in targeted areas but also resulted in spatial displacement, with criminal activities shifting to informal settlements and rural areas”. Similarly, a study by Alemika (2018) on hotspot policing in Nigeria found that while the strategy was effective in reducing crime in targeted areas, it also led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions. The study also noted that lack of community participation in the design and implementation of hotspot policing strategies undermined their effectiveness and contributed to displacement.

Within East Africa, hotspot policing strategies have been enforced in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania as a response to high levels of violent crime, particularly in urban areas. However, the effectiveness of these strategies remained limited because of resource constraints, corruption, and weak institutional capacity. A study by Muwanga et al., (2020) on hotspot policing in Kampala found that while the strategy was effective in reducing crime in targeted areas, it also led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions. The study also noted that the “...lack of community involvement in the design and implementation of hotspot policing strategies undermined their effectiveness and contributed to displacement” (Muwanga et al., 2020).

In Kenya, hotspot policing has been carried out as part of broader efforts to address high levels of violent crime, particularly in urban areas such as Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. A study by Kinyanjui (2019) found that hotspot policing in Nairobi led to a reduction in crime in targeted areas but also resulted in spatial displacement, with criminal activities shifting to informal settlements and rural areas. Similarly, a study by Wachiuri (2024) found that hotspot policing in Nairobi led to a reduction in crime in targeted areas but also resulted in spatial displacement, with criminal activities shifting to informal settlements and rural areas. The study also noted that the limited levels of community involvement in the design and implementation of hotspot policing strategies undermined their effectiveness and contributed to displacement. According to Ochieng (2022), while the strategy was effective in reducing crime in targeted areas, it also led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions within

Mombasa. The study by Ochieng (2022) also noted that the lack of community involvement in the design and implementation of hotspot policing strategies undermined their effectiveness and contributed to displacement.

The North-Rift region of Kenya, have experienced high levels of violent crime, particularly cattle rustling and banditry. Hotspot policing has been implemented in the region as part of broader efforts to address these challenges. However, the effectiveness of these strategies has been constrained by resource, corruption, and weak institutional capacity. Masudi and Kipchumba (2023) found that hotspot policing in the North-Rift region led to a reduction in crime in targeted areas but recommended of a study on how hotspot policing resulted in spatial displacement, with criminal activities shifting to neighbouring counties. This highlights the need for a robust and comprehensive overview of hotspot policing and crime displacement in the North-Rift region a gap this study fulfils.

2.2 Disarmament as a Hotspot Policing Strategy and Crime Displacement

Disarmament as a hotspot policing strategy is fundamentally anchored on the assumption that states would not tolerate more than one armed group within its territory and that weapons are a major cause of instability and conflict. Levin (2015) explains that a failure by state to disarm any armed group within it may produce runaway crime, conflict, and general instability. Despite their widespread use globally, disarmament efforts are rarely successful as belligerent groups have been known to shift to other locations or simply resist the efforts.

Overall, disarmament has been adopted as a strategic measure to reduce violent crime, with particular emphasis on mitigating firearm-related offenses in identified hotspots. By targeting the availability of weapons, law enforcement agencies aim to disrupt crime and enhance public safety. However, critics argue that such strategies may inadvertently lead to crime displacement, where criminal activities are not eliminated but rather shifted in space, time, method, target, type, or perpetrator (Ochieng, 2022). The literature review in this section explores the global perspective on disarmament and crime displacement, with a focus on Africa, East Africa, and Kenya.

Globally, the various forms of disarmament ranging from voluntary weapon surrender programs to mandatory confiscation have been enforced. Studies have shown that while disarmament can reduce firearm-related crimes in targeted areas, it often leads to crime displacement. For example, Braga et al., (2019c) found that hotspot policing strategies, including disarmament, significantly reduced violent crime in high-risk areas but also caused spatial and temporal displacement in some cases. Similarly, Weisburd et al. (2017) observed that concentrated policing efforts often led to a "diffusion of benefits" but also resulted in tactical and functional displacement, as criminals adapted to new enforcement measures.

Across Latin American countries like Brazil and Colombia, disarmament programs have been met with mixed results. While firearm-related homicides decreased in targeted areas, there were noticeable increases in non-firearm-related crimes, such as knife attacks and robberies (Villarreal, 2016). This highlights the adaptability of criminals, their ability to functionally displace their crime activities and thus, the need for comprehensive strategies that address not only the availability of weapons but also the underlying causes of crime. Sanjurjo (2020) has pointed out the proliferation of arms and violence as being on the rise often emerging in different parts of countries across Latin America despite existence and implementation of strong policies on disarmament.

In Africa, disarmament efforts have been implemented in various countries to address armed conflicts, insurgencies, and urban violence (Bamidele, 2025). South Africa, with the highest rates of firearm-related violence in the world has implemented several disarmament programs, including the Firearm Control Act of 2000, which aimed to reduce the number of illegal firearms in circulation. While these efforts have led to a decline in firearm-related crimes in some areas, they have also resulted in spatial and tactical displacement. For example, a study by Burger (2018) found that criminals in urban hotspots like Johannesburg and Cape Town shifted their activities to rural areas and adopted alternative weapons, such as knives and machetes.

As Fyanka (2025) argues, Nigeria's disarmament initiatives have primarily targeted the activities of armed groups such as Boko Haram and bandits in the Northern regions. The Nigerian administration has implemented voluntary disarmament

programs, such as the Presidential Amnesty Program, which encourages militants to surrender their weapons in exchange for amnesty. However, these programs have faced criticisms due to their failure to address the root causes of violence and leading to functional displacement. For instance, a report by Okoli (2021) found that while disarmament reduced armed conflicts in some areas, it led to an increase in kidnappings and other forms of criminality.

Following decades of strife, civil unrest, and conflict, disarmament has emerged as a key component of peacebuilding in Somalia. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has implemented several disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs to reduce the proliferation of weapons (Sheikh, 2024). Despite significant milestones towards stability and security, the disarmament efforts have been hampered by the presence of armed militias and the lack of effective governance. A study by Williams (2020) found that disarmament in Mogadishu led to spatial displacement, as armed groups relocated to other regions, such as Puntland and Juba-land.

In Uganda, disarmament has been used to address armed conflicts in the Northern and Eastern regions, particularly in areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The government has implemented several disarmament programs, including the Karamoja Disarmament Program, which aimed to reduce cattle rustling and armed violence. While these efforts have reduced firearm-related crimes in some areas, they have also led to spatial and temporal displacement (Onditi, 2022). For example, a study by Mkutu and Wandera (2016) found that disarmament in Karamoja led to an increase in cattle rustling in neighbouring regions, such as Teso and Lango.

The focus of Tanzania's disarmament strategies have been directed towards curbing urban violence in notable cities such as Dar es Salaam and Mwanza. The government of Tanzania has implemented several firearm confiscations programs, which have led to a decline in firearm-related crimes in targeted areas. However, these efforts have also resulted in tactical and target displacement. For instance, a report by Kinyondo and Pelizzo (2018) found that criminals in Dar es Salaam shifted their focus from armed robberies to cybercrime and fraud.

Notable post-genocide peacebuilding efforts in Rwanda has been the disarmament of several militia groups across the country. According to Okoli (2017), the government of Rwanda has implemented several DDR programs, which have significantly reduced the proliferation of weapons. However, these efforts have also led to functional displacement, as former combatants have turned to other crime forms, such as drug trafficking and smuggling. A study by Nkurunziza (2019) found that disarmament in Rwanda led to an increase in non-violent crimes, particularly in urban areas.

In Kenya, the disarmament strategy been enforced to address both urban and rural criminality. In Nairobi County, disarmament has been used to address urban violence in informal settlements, such as Kibera and Mathare. The Kenyan government has implemented several firearm confiscation programs, which have led to a decline in firearm-related crimes in targeted areas. However, these efforts have also resulted in spatial and tactical displacement. As Mutahi and Ruteere (2019) established disarmament in Kibera led to increase in knife-related crimes and a shift in criminal activities to neighbouring areas, such as Embakasi and Ruai.

To contain the illicit activities of armed groups such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and other urban gangs, the government has implemented several voluntary disarmament programs in coast province that have reduced firearm-related crimes in some areas. However, these efforts have also led to functional crime displacement, as armed groups have turned to other forms and types of crimes, such as drug trafficking and piracy. A report by Kagwanja and Southall (2020) found that disarmament in Mombasa led to an increase in drug-related crimes, particularly in coastal towns like Malindi and Lamu.

In Western Kenya, disarmament has been used to address cattle rustling and banditry in regions such as Bungoma and Kakamega. The government of Kenya has implemented several disarmament programs, which have reduced firearm-related crimes in targeted areas. However, these efforts have also led to spatial and temporal displacement. For instance, a study by Wafula (2019) found that disarmament in Bungoma led to an increase in cattle rustling in neighbouring regions, such as Trans Nzoia and Busia.

To address cattle rustling, banditry, and ethnic conflicts in the Rift-Valley region of Kenya, the government implemented several disarmament programs, including the ‘*Operation Dumisha Amani*,’ which aimed to reduce the proliferation of weapons in regions like Baringo, Laikipia, and Samburu. While these efforts have reduced firearm-related crimes in some areas, they may have also led to spatial and tactical displacement. For example, Mkutu and Wandera (2016) found that disarmament in Baringo led to an increase in cattle rustling in neighbouring regions, such as Elgeyo Marakwet and West Pokot. Additionally, criminals have adopted alternative weapons, such as bows and arrows, to avoid detection. This hotspot policing strategy has been enforced over the years yet the crime of cattle rustling and banditry have persisted. There is limited literature on how disarmament and hotspot policing strategies in general are associated with the six types of crime displacement hence this study fills this gap.

The literature reviewed in this section show that disarmament as a hotspot policing strategy can lead to various forms of crime displacement, including spatial, temporal, tactical, target, functional, and perpetrator displacement. While disarmament initiatives have demonstrated some success in reducing firearm-related offenses within targeted urban hotspots, they have also been associated with unintended outcomes, most notably, the displacement of criminal activity to other locations (Ribeiro et al., 2024). Furthermore, the effectiveness of this strategy to control rural criminality (cattle rustling and banditry) remains underexplored within criminological scholarship. Therefore, this study has explored the relationship between disarmament, a hotspot policing strategy, and crime displacement to generate context specific crime prevention efforts.

2.3 Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Strategy and Crime Displacement

The imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew as a hotspot policing measure has been widely enforced by states and law enforcement globally. By restricting movement during the night, this strategy targets the duration of heightened criminal activity, thereby enhancing public safety and reducing the burden on law enforcement. Dusk-to-dawn curfew is therefore thought to be necessary for establishing security by extremely limiting movement at time perceived to be preferred by criminals (Bedoya et al., 2023). Law enforcement can then effectively control crime without the risk of

displacement. The literature review in this section explores the global perspectives on disarmament and crime displacement, with a focus on Africa, East Africa, and Kenya.

Globally, dusk-to-dawn curfew as a hotspot policing strategy has been enforced as part of gang suppression strategies to reduce instances of gang violence. Studies have shown that while dusk-to-dawn curfews are effective, their crime control capacity is short-lived and the risk of temporal crime displacement exists. For instance, Ratcliffe and Sorg (2017) established that dusk-to-dawn curfews, although an essential temporal restraint, fails to address the fundamental crime opportunity concept. Provided crime opportunities exist, Ratcliffe and Sorg argue that crime displacement is possible even beyond curfew restrictions. Moreover, to contain unrest that had engulfed the city of Houston in the USA following a storm, a curfew was imposed to restore order. While the curfew was effective in controlling the violence in the city, there was significant functional and temporal displacement by criminals (Haag, 2017).

Across Latin American states, dusk-to-dawn hotspot strategy has been undertaken in many countries though with mixed outcomes. While dusk-to-dawn curfews reduced street violence in urban areas, property crime and crimes against persons significantly increased (Miller, 2016; Pina, 2007). This shows how criminals were able to displace their crime to different targets (target displacement), and different crime types (functional displacement). Similarly, dusk-to-dawn curfew failed to contain surge of crime, and crime displacement across drug-prone cities in most Caribbean and South American cities (Welsh and Sebire, 2025). Importantly however, instances of abuse of the curfew by state officials have equally been documented where human rights violations have been perpetrated upon declaration of the dusk-to-dawn curfews (Gonzalez-Perez, 2013).

In Africa, dusk-to-dawn has been implemented in various countries, often in urban places just as is in most of the Americas and Europe, to contain gang violence and organised criminal groups. In Nigeria, the Islamic sectarian movement *Boko Haram* has wedged a religious and idealised war in the country's North prompting the state to impose the dusk-to-dawn curfew in much of the territories in the North. Nonetheless, the criminal group has often displaced their violent activities to vulnerable groups such as school children, the women and elderly (Akinteye et al., 2024). Although

lauded by some, Nigeria's dusk-to-dawn curfew strategy still evidently contribute to crime displacement.

The displacement of violence and crime by *Boko Haram* often goes beyond Nigeria into other neighbouring states such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. This way, *Boko Haram* has been able to integrate with other insurgent groups operating in the larger *Sahel* region, thus enabling them to wage more violence and crime. These criminal drifts have thus rendered dusk-to-dawn hotspot strategy ineffective in protecting targeted civilians and their property (Akinteye et al., 2024; Olowojolu and Ettang, 2021). Meanwhile, the crime rates across most countries within the *Sahel* region has remained high. For instance, Fellmeth (2022) has argued that the dusk-to-dawn curfew has not deterred banditry and other crimes that have ravaged the country for decades because of spatial, temporal and target crime displacement.

The South African government has been grappling with the problems of vigilantism, black segregation, and apartheid. Efforts to contain widespread violence and crime have included to imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfew across several cities (Cupido, 2021). While these efforts have led to decrease of cases of street violence, the criminals have shifted to interpersonal crimes such as murder of their victims. As Yesufu (2022) points out, there have been significant increase of homicide against foreign nationals in South Africa. The shifts have also incorporated new techniques of committing crimes against person and property crime (tactical displacement) in ways that are less detectible.

Dusk-to-dawn curfew has been enforced in the Democratic Republic of Congo to contain widespread violence and wanton looting of government and private property in Eastern DRC. Armed militia have wrecked peace and security efforts in South Kivu, North Kivu, and parts of Goma (Van der Bracht et al., 2017). The armed criminal groups have however shifted their crime targets to innocent civilians who have been attacked, assaulted, and killed as the militias wage war against government forces, UN peacekeepers and other armed groups, in quest for territory and control (Akoeda, 2024). In the end, the criminals have been able to survive despite the dusk-to-dawn policing strategy.

Within East African states, dusk-to-dawn curfew has been implemented to contain rising crime in urban neighbourhoods and to control violence and gang activities. “In Ethiopia, dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed in the Northern province of Tigray to restore law and order following the emergence of insurgencies in the region” (Wall, 2022). What followed however was pillage of vulnerable groups such as the sick, schools, and civilians (target crime displacement). Moreover, the Ethiopian government had imposed dusk-to-dawn curfew to control the destruction of major government infrastructure projects. While this strategy controlled the widespread violence in the capital Addis Ababa, it spatially displaced crime to other regions such as Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Afar (Mengistu, 2015).

Dusk-to-dawn curfew in Somalia has been imposed to contain the insecurity threats by Al-Shabaab. The curfew has been enforced in parts of the capital, Mogadishu, Harardhere, and Bardere to restore security following attacks by Al-Shabaab (Dosmo, 2024). However, the efforts to contain the activities of Al-Shabaab by state authorities and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have produced displacement of their criminal and terror activities. For example, the militant group targeted government installations, foreign nationals, and vulnerable populations (target crime displacement). Overall, the dusk-to-dawn curfews have displaced the crime and terror activities to less guarded targets.

In Kenya, dusk-to-dawn curfew hotspot strategy has been implemented to address insecurity in Tana Delta, Lamu, and in North-Rift counties of Baringo, Samburu, West Pokot, Turkana, Laikipia, and Elgeyo Marakwet. In Lamu, to contain incidences of criminal attacks that have led to the loss of lives, kidnappings, and damage to property by alleged separatist group, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) (Kithinji, 2024). In Tana Delta, dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed to contain the killing between the Orma and the Pokomo tribes, yet the destruction and violence continued (Kagira, 2012). The curfew was largely ineffective as residents of Tana River continued to experience violence, crime, and property destruction (Shaiye, 2013).

In the Rift Valley regions, dusk-to-dawn curfew have been carried out to control banditry and cattle rustling but with minimal success. As Chepyegon (2023) avers, in Baringo, the dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to shift by cattle rustlers to neighbouring

West Pokot and Turkana counties. Cattle rustling continue to persist as the criminals, being well-versed with the region, have spatially and temporally displaced their crimes in the neighbouring areas. Marigat (2023) adds that the crimes of banditry and cattle rustling have instead metamorphosed into an organized form throughout the North-Rift counties, where criminals now use sophisticated weaponry despite dusk-to-dawn curfews and other hotspot policing strategies being implemented.

In a nutshell, the literature show that dusk-to-dawn curfews have led to various types of displacement such as spatial, functional, target, perpetrator, temporal and tactical. While dusk-to-dawn curfews have contributed moderately to decrease in crime incidences in urban areas, the risk of crime displacement especially in less urban places exist. This study has determined the implications of dusk-to-dawn hotspot strategy to crime displacement with the goal of identifying strategies of reducing crime displacement within rural areas of North-Rift counties of Kenya.

2.4 Increased Presence of Security Agencies Strategy and Crime Displacement

Increasing security agencies' presence in crime hotspots is a widely used strategy to contain crime and restore law and order. As Verlaan and Ruiter (2025) argue, by increasing their presence, law enforcement can disrupt crime in the entire crime hotspot areas thus rendering impossible crime. While this strategy is lauded by many, it has been criticized for simply displacing crime to other locations that do not have sufficient law enforcement presence. This strategy, instead of combating the underlying causes of crime, only shifts crime and criminals to new locations (spatial crime displacement), times (temporal crime displacement), methods (tactical crime displacement), subjects/objects (target crime displacement), offenders (perpetrator crime displacement), and type (functional crime displacement). In this section, the study has explored the global perspectives on increased presence of security agencies and crime displacement with a focus on Africa, East Africa, and Kenya.

Globally, increasing the presence of security agencies has been used to contain crime in urban and rural places across the world. "The police, through their presence, are able to deter crime and thus have a beneficial impact on crime and disorder." (Telep et al., 2016). While this crime reductionist objective is essential, the risk of crime displacement persists. For example, Dau et al., (2023) found out that across most

European cities, increasing the presence of law enforcement reduced the cases of street crime but also led to shift into other types of crimes (functional displacement) and temporal displacement. Moreover, the scholars were quick to point out that the presence of law enforcement only decreased certain street offences such as vandalisms and theft and had no impact on other types of crime such as assaults. This raised the likelihood of crime displacement.

Across USA cities, studies have shown that the number of police officers significantly impacts crime rates. As Telep (2023) established, increasing the number of law enforcement on the streets led to a significant drop in crime cases. As MacDonald et al., (2016) observed, the effectiveness of policing improves with increase in personnel, yet the challenge of crime displacement persists across urban and rural settings. This challenge underscores the limitations of hotspot policing and the need for strategies that not only suppress crime in targeted areas but also prevent its relocation to other spaces. Ratcliffe and Breen (2011) have observed that while the target area will be marked by reduced crime, the fear of various types of crime displacement remained eminent.

Increasing the presence of law enforcement has also been a hotspot strategy implemented to restore law and order across most cities of Latin America. Latin America and the Caribbean remain the most volatile region of the world and thus this strategy has been used to contain crime in most of their cities (Ajzenman and Jaitman 2016). Despite the use of this strategy, criminals have adopted to it and have been able to “disappear” and “appear” both in the target crime hotspots and in other locations. This suggests the enduring capabilities of criminals and their adaptations. Therefore, increasing police presence, although it breaks crime concentration, it is an interim measure. This limitation highlights the need to examine this hotspot policing strategy beyond its immediate outcomes and to explore strategies that address the relocation of crime especially in rural contexts such as the North-Rift counties of Kenya.

In Africa, increasing the presence of security agencies has been used to contain crime and violence in many countries. Street crime in Ghana’s capital Accra was significantly reduced by merely increasing the number of police officers on patrol. While this decrease in crime was associated with increased police presence, the risk of

crime displacement remained un-addressed. As Dziwornu (2021) argued, spatial-temporal crime displacement, although unintended, was highly probable because of concentrating law enforcement efforts such as increasing their presence at a crime hotspot.

In South Africa, crime concentrations have been established to be stable overtime despite increasing the presence of security agencies. This resilient crime trends have been associated with target, temporal, and spatial crime displacement in most urban areas in South Africa. As illustrated by Breetzke and Edelstein (2019), criminals have been able to manoeuvre away out the hotspots that attract security agencies (spatial displacement) and focus their crime activities on less detectible crime acts. Moreover, Breetzke et al., (2014) add that increasing the presence of security agencies has been associated with the displacement of property crime from targeted areas to less targeted places.

Increasing the presence of security agencies has been implemented across several towns within East Africa. In Uganda, the police have always been increased threefold to contain dissidents and protests in the capital Kampala to control looting and violence. While the strategy has generally led to restoration of order and public safety, criminals have been driven into residential places where break-ins and house burglary have been reported (Curtice and Behlendorf, 2021). This displacement highlights the adaptability of criminals to be able to displace their criminal activities spatially, tactically, and functionally to areas that are less policed.

In Tanzania, crime rates have increased in urban places like Dares Salaam and Dodoma despite the increasing police presence. Crimes of vandalism, robbery, theft, and other property related offences have endured in major towns of Tanzania. As Michael (2014) points out, this hints at crime displacement by criminals who are adoptive and thus able to shift to a different crime type (functional displacement), crime target (target displacement), place (spatial displacement), time (temporal displacement), technique (tactical displacement), and perpetrator displacement.

Increasing police presence is a hotspot strategy that has continued to be used in Kenya. Containing urban crime in Nairobi and other major towns has seen increased

police presence in the streets. While the results have been reduced cases of street crimes, the strategy has failed to deal with the underlying causes of crime. Within the slums for instance, Wa Teresia (2023) points out that criminals displace their crime acts to new techniques (tactical displacement). Similarly, Ali (2020) points out that criminals operating in urban towns in Kenya tactically organise their criminal activities to defeat the law enforcement strategy of increasing their presence in neighbourhoods. As such, the effectiveness of this strategy is short-lived at best both for rural and urban crime hotspots.

In the North-Rift, increasing police presence has been used to contain the crime of banditry and cattle theft in Turkana, Baringo, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet, Laikipia, and Samburu. Recent declaration of curfew has been followed by increasing the number of deployed officers in the region, yet the criminals and their crimes have persisted. As Ltipalei et al., (2019) point out, the effectiveness of increasing the presence of security agencies in the North-Rift are yet to be determined. Meanwhile, criminals continue to roam across the region able to displace their crime across the expansive area and avoid the places that are experiencing increased presence of law enforcement agencies.

Overall, the literature review has revealed that most hotspot policing strategies have been conducted in urban places. Even then, crime displacement has not been eliminated. Still, it remains arguable whether the recommendations of urban-centered strategies can be implemented in rural contexts without the risk of crime displacement. This study has focused on the North-Rift Counties of Kenya, where increased presence of security agencies as a hotspot policing strategy has been central to security interventions yet concerns over displacement remain largely unexamined. There is need to establish the effectiveness of hotspot policing strategies in rural-centred places such as the North-Rift of Kenya. This research usefully fulfilled this gap in that it is being conducted in rural Kenya, a developing country in Africa. Its contribution is in hotspot policing and crime displacement in so far as addressing the crime of banditry and cattle rustling in rural parts of a developing African country is concerned.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

The implications of hotspot policing on crime displacement is a discourse that has been anchored on wide theoretical foundations. This, as Braga (2017) avers, is because of diverse scholars in the domain and as well as of the contextual variations upon which such theoretical knowledge has been applicable. This study has analysed two theories; the first, a place-based Criminology theory and the second, a socio-political theory. These theories provided conceptual foundations and interpretive lenses for the study.

2.5.1 Geometric Theory of Crime

Crime can be understood from its spatio-temporal perspective. This is the argument extended by Geometric Theory of Crime (GTC). Geometric theory of crime posits that since crime occurs in space and time; an analysing of the space and time is crucial to understanding the choices for crime and the displacement of crime. According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1998) geometric theory of crime can be traced to the works of environmental criminologists. Wortley and Townsley (2016) point out that environmental criminology seeks to understand the distribution of crime within time and space and to deepen understanding of the confluence between offenders and their targets at a particular location.

Andresen (2010) asserts that the geometric theory of crime emerged from the works of criminologist C. Ray Jeffrey. Jeffrey and Zahm (2017) conceptualized the concept of environmental Criminology that asserted the role of place in crime formation and crime deterrence. The underpinning argument of the theory is that criminal events must be understood from the influence of the crime location and the time of occurrence. Andresen (2010) describes place as a constant factor in peoples' interactions. While it is possible to change an area or location (such as by changing employment or relocating), for many people, especially those in rural setups, their locations of activities generally remain the same. The same, Andresen argues, is true for criminal groups operating in rural areas. Their areas of operation remain generally the same. Wortley and Townsley (2016) add that this creates a high degree of awareness of the location creating comfort and space identification. Individuals can demonstrate awareness of an area with so much ease including its terrains and paths. In such cases, for such people, there may be no need for coordinates or even maps.

As Brantingham and Brantingham (2017) pointed out, place constitutes activity nodes. These are spaces that contain mass human activities such as markets, shopping malls, or entertainment joints. Activity nodes are a fundamental aspect of places and may be used to define the space. Andresen and Kinney (2012) add that, for urban areas, activity nodes are fairly known such as residential areas, commercial areas, and entertainment joints. The last feature of places is the edge. According to Andresen (2018), edges may refer to the physical aspects of the place such as forests, rivers, valleys, mountains, a major road, rail line etc. However, edges can also be illusory in the sense that one may be able to detect a change especially when moving between spaces without necessarily getting out of the boundary. For instance, in urban areas, one can tell they have moved from a residential place to either a commercial space or industrial space yet still be in the same geographical boundary.

A deep understanding of the space features such as edges, pathways, and activity joints is essential towards the formation of criminogenic decisions. Brantingham et al., (2020) argue that the spatial elements are fundamental because criminals concentrate their events along such features as pathways, activity nodes, and familiar edges. Andresen (2010) adds that because places vary in terms of their edge, activity node, and pathway characteristics, the volume of crime events often vary as well. For instance, the volume of crime reported in a busy residential area may be different from the one at a commercial place, industrial place or central business district (CBD) within a similar time frame.

The environment sends cues about its various characteristics. Brantingham and Brantingham (2016) argue that since individuals have the awareness trait, they can discern and interpret the cues from the spaces. For criminals, they can use the same mechanisms to identify suitable targets. Overtime, Andresen and Malleson (2014) note that the criminal can determine with sharp accuracy the cues that are positive and constructive, and those that are negative and destructive for their conduct. Thus, they can avoid the bad cues and select the appropriate time, method, and tactic to execute their criminal activity.

This theory is particularly essential in this study as it mixes space and time which are critical components in crime displacement. Criminal operatives in the North-Rift have

mastered the pathways and terrain of their operational areas, they know the edges quite well, and focus their criminal act to the concentration of activity nodes (geography). When the time is “favourable”, using appropriate method, aiming at their target, they proceed with their criminal activity whereas when the time is “unfavourable”, they shift or wait until the appropriate time (temporal). However, the theory falls short in its attempt to explain the dynamics within crime hotspots that could make displacement of crime probable. For inhabitants of Turkana, Baringo, and West Pokot, there are social and cultural dynamics at play. To understand these, the theory of state-society relations; strong societies and weak states has been advanced.

2.5.2 The Theory of State Society Relations; Strong Societies and Weak States

The founding of post-colonial states aimed at least, at the remodelling of those societies towards socio-economic and political transformations. This transformation would be achieved by encouraging the population to abandon the so called “outmoded beliefs” in favour of social and economic changes. This transformation would create effective bureaucratic state organizations to confront myriads of challenges including social disorder. State-society relations according to Migdal (2018) “...encompass processes and multiple actors drawn from both the state as an institution, the societal groups (ethnic, cultural or local), and the nature of interactions they have in the context of limited stateness. That is, a whether the state has limited influence and ability to assert authority in certain parts of the country such as in the rural areas, hinterlands, and border regions”.

The theory of state society relations, strong societies, and weak states, was first proposed by Joel Migdal in 1984. According to Migdal (2018; 2001; 1988), “while the role of the state in social control has been almost universally acknowledged in modern societies, states, especially in developing countries, are severely constrained by their domestic insecurity challenges thus undermining their efforts at re-ordering of society, especially those in rural areas”. From the outset, states in the developing world have exuded self-confidence in their “abilities” as fundamental movers of social change. However, within, Sharaby (2022) argues that persistent internal social conflicts and insecurity have brought into question the confidence the state and its agencies have in disrupting traditional conflict frontiers.

The influence of the social state has remained largely unchanged more so in remote and rural communities. Migdal (2018) has posited that despite tremendous advancements that have been made economically, politically, and socially, fewer developing countries have fully succeeded in integrating their populations seamlessly into the so-called modernity. Part of the challenge Migdal argues, is the social fragmentation of societies into tribes, ethnicities, and religious groupings. As Puntigliano (2017) adds, embedded at the centre of rural communities are the components of values and beliefs, institutions, and the elite.

Rooted deeply in rural societies is a strong value and belief system. According to Shil (1961) cited in Sharaby (2022), values and beliefs are at the epicentre and core of what a community hold sacred. Migdal (2021) argues that the values and beliefs become the irreducible non-negotiable principles upon which the institutions of the community (such as cultural, religious, economic, and political) are founded. The institutions only express the order that originates from the core values while the elite exist and act only on the core value system. In short, the elite is inextricably linked to the core. This web-like communities function nationally and at the local levels, but none is willing to lose their influence in their areas of control.

The knowledge on the delineation from core values to peripheral elites is fundamental in any attempt towards transforming a rural community. As Shils (2022) puts it, a centre (core) has just as much authority as state. With its constant and persistent drive to expand its values and beliefs, together with its social power derived from the integration of its elites and their institutions and organizations, the community can assert itself and to weather storms that come its way through state agencies. In this kind of state-society interactions, the community emerges atop and defiant to the state's pursuits for compliance with its directives.


Both the state and the social through interaction provide incentives and sanctions to ensure members adhere to the guidelines. As Migdal (2018) further argues, the state-social interaction provides the means and the psychological and material needs. Individuals therefore must make the choice to either align with the state or the social demands. The social organization is able to provide social support and survival strategies and thus able to strive for control. While the state as the domineering

authority may lay claim to the entire territorial areas, within the social organizations, their influence on social control is limited.

While the state may be revered from its sheer complexity, capacities and capabilities, this reverence only enhances their global image. As Bakker et al., (2016) argue, social control mechanisms is one essential component of state authority yet many countries struggle to achieve this. Shils (2022) adds that, internally, many state struggle to contain dissidents. Migdal argues that most post-colonial states undermined the influence of traditional conflict zones by focusing more towards modernity. As reality has shown, law enforcement and other agencies have failed to achieve the much sought-after security even with state's demands by way of sanctions, orders, or even by force. In this context, the impact of state policies, directives, programs, laws, and sanctions upon rural populations whose social fabric have remained largely unaltered, has not achieved the policy makers' desires.

Among the communities that inhabit Turkana, Baringo, and West Pokot, the state has been significantly strained in their pursuit for enduring peace and security. The social control exercised by inhabitants in the regions have persistently demonstrated strength over and above state-initiated security operations. This theory is quintessential in bringing out and explaining the social dynamics that may be at play in the study areas. The theory also helps to explain the basis for the formation of corresponding communal initiatives against common violence. Together with the geometric theory of crime, they provide a strong theoretical framework to answer the study objectives.

2.6 Conceptual Framework



Source; Author, 2024

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework on Hotspot Policing Strategies and Crime Displacement

This conceptual framework, developed in line with the study's objectives, illustrates the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It provides a structured lens through which the research problem is examined, clarifying how specific factors influence the outcomes under investigation. From the framework, the independent variables are hotspot policing strategies while the dependent variable is crime displacement. For the independent variable, three hotspot policing strategies are investigated; the implications of disarmament, the implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew, and the implications of increased presence of security agencies in the study areas. Disarmament is measured by determining the type of disarmament and its characteristics, dusk-to-dawn is measured by establishing the change in crime rates after its imposition, curfew violations, and community perception on curfew. The implications of increased presence of security agencies is determined by the change in

crime rates, the number of arrests, contraband seizures, and sustainability of the crime reductionist benefits.

Disarmaments, dusk-to-dawn hotspot policing strategy, and increased presence of security agencies act together in a mutually reinforcing way to form the hotspot policing strategies under consideration in this study. The intervening variables in the study are the community perception of police presence, criminal's social/ethnic network, social and economic conditions, police resource allocation, and existing crime prevention measures.

The dependent variable for this study was crime displacement which was determined in six forms of crime displacement; spatial (geographical) displacement, temporal (time) displacement, tactical crime displacement, target crime displacement, functional crime displacement, and perpetrator crime displacement. The crime displacement patterns were determined by analysing crime rates just before the hotspot policing strategy implementation, during the intervention, and after the intervention. Second, the study analysed police data of reported offences just before the hotspot policing intervention, during the intervention, and after the intervention. This was done across the entire study area.

Dusk-to-dawn was measured by establishing the change in crime rates after its imposition, curfew violations, and community perceptions on curfew. The implications of disarmament was measured by determining the type of disarmament while increased presence of security agencies was determined by the changing crime rates and sustainability of the crime reductionist benefits. Disarmament, dusk-to-dawn curfew, and increased presence of security agencies act together in a mutually reinforcing way to form the hotspot policing strategies under consideration in this study. The intervening variables in this study are community perception of police presence, criminal's social/ethnic network, social and economic conditions, police resource allocation, and existing crime prevention measures.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Location of Study

This study was conducted in North-Rift Counties of Kenya. These North-Rift counties have been at the centre of the crimes of cattle rustling and banditry. This region has experienced persistent crime regardless of the strategies applied by the government to contain crime. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the persistence in crime is due to crime displacement. However, little has been done to establish how hotspot policing is associated with crime displacement.

The selected North-Rift counties of Kenya are arid and semi-arid areas (ASALs) characterised by stunted vegetation, shrubs, valleys, hills, escarpments, mountains, and gorges within the former Rift Valley province in Kenya (Pkalya et al., 2003). According to Otieno (2016), the communities that inhabit the areas make a living from scarce natural resources such as livestock and pasture. The counties have also been at the centre of the crimes of cattle rustling and banditry. Amutabi and Hamasi (2023) also point out that the inhabitants of North-Rift counties of Kenya are largely nomadic pastoralists and livestock is their main source of income. Livestock is also at the centre of their daily routine socio-economic activities (Chelang'a, 2020).

The North-Rift counties of Kenya share a long border with Kenya's neighbouring countries. Turkana County borders Uganda to the west, Ethiopia to the North, and South Sudan to the North-West. West Pokot borders Uganda to the West. As Mburu (2007) pointed out, the Pokot also inhabit the eastern part of Uganda along the Kenya-Uganda boundary and stretch to parts of Baringo County. Porous nature of the borders and the conflicts within the neighbouring countries have also exacerbated the insecurity situation through proliferation of illicit arms (Mugo, 2023). Figure 3.1 shows a map of the study areas.




Figure 2: A Map of the Study Area

3.2 Research Design

This study employed a descriptive survey design. A descriptive design entails documenting the characteristics of the group without establishing a causal relationship. As Creswell and Creswell (2023) point out, a descriptive design is a method in which the researcher stays close to the data and uses minimal frameworks for interpretation of the data gathered other than descriptive themes and statistics. As Leavy (2022) points out, collecting data in the natural setting of the respondents is a fundamental part of the descriptive design.

This design is significant in this study because it allowed the researcher to demonstrate using descriptive and inferential statistics the implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement and reveal the experiences, behaviour, and attitudes of the respondents (qualitative). As justified by Leavy (2022) a descriptive design allows the study to collect multiple data using various mixed methods such as questionnaires and focus discussion guides, and observation tools. Moreover, Creswell and Creswell (2023) add that the descriptive design allows the researcher to catalogue the data, code, and conduct thematic analysis. This design allowed the researcher to perform varied analytical frameworks for both quantitative data and qualitative data (Leavy, 2022). Adopting this design thus enhances the quality and credibility of the study. This design is suitable for this study because it allowed the researcher to perform a code-to-theme analysis while also making quantitative, descriptive, and interpretive framework possible. The use of the descriptive design further allowed the researcher to catalogue the data, code, and conduct thematic analysis (Creswell and Creswell, 2023).

3.3 Target Population

The target population for this study was the adult population living in North-Rift counties of Kenya. According to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS, 2019) there are 1,360,716 adults living in the North-Rift counties of Kenya. Table 3.1 below summarised the target population.

Table 1: Target Population Distribution

County	Male	Female	Total
Turkana	217,015	210,974	427,989
Baringo	154,852	159,915	314,767
West Pokot	123,647	133,004	256,651
Samburu	65,420	69,253	134,673
Elgeyo Marakwet	112,268	114,368	226, 636
Total	673,202	687,514	1,360,716

Source; KNBS, 2019

3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sampling Size

According to Krejcie and Morgan (1970) a sample of 384 subjects is a suitable representation of a population of 1,360,716 (Appendix III). To select the 384 people, a multi-level sampling procedure was used. This study used a three-level sampling

frame. At the first level, the study purposively sampled the counties worst hit by crime and gazetted as hotspots based on legal notices no. 9, 10, 11, and 12 of 2023 and their subsequent extensions vide legal notices no. 167, 168, and 169 (Kenya Gazette, 2023) (Appendix XI). These counties were Turkana, Baringo, and West Pokot Counties. At the second stage, the study randomly sampled two divisions within each selected County. Thirdly, proportionate sampling was used to distribute the sample population (384) across all the divisions. Then, the respondents were randomly selected taking into consideration gender balance. Table 2 below summarised this distribution.

Table 2: Distribution of Sample Population per Divisions

County	Subcounty	Division	Population of Sampled Counties per Division	Proportionate sample population (N/Nt)n
Turkana	Turkana South	Kainuk	6,024	10
		Katilu	22,878	37
		Total	28,902	47
	Turkana East	Lokori	4,388	7
		Lomelo	10,524	17
		Total	14,912	24
	Loima	Loima	13,338	22
		Turkwel	34,992	57
		Total	48,330	79
Baringo	Baringo North	Bartabwa	6,454	11
		Barwessa	13,771	23
		Total	20,225	34
	Baringo South	Mukutani	2,927	5
		Muchongoi	9,789	16
		Total	12,716	21
	Tiaty East	Churo	8,638	14
		Mondi	11,706	19
		Total	20,344	33
	Tiaty West	Nginyang’	7,517	12
		Kolowa	12,554	21
		Total	20,071	33
West Pokot	Pokot North	Alale	12,720	21
		Kiwawa	7,417	12
		Total	20,137	33
	Pokot Central	Sigor	31,379	51
		Chesegon	17,478	29
		Total	48,857	80
Total			234,494	384

Source; KNBS, 2019

Focus group discussions were then held in each division. A total of eighteen focus group discussions were held. Respondents who took part in the focus group discussions were purposively selected and constituted the area Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs, the Village Elders, the Ward Commander, the Assistant County Commissioner (ACC), the Member of the County Assembly (MCA), and a member of the business community. Each focus group discussion had between five and eight participants. The participants in focus group discussion were individuals with administrative, political, and business responsibilities at the divisional level.

3.5 Research Instruments

The study used structured Questionnaires to collect quantitative data while Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to collect qualitative data. The qualitative data corroborated and augmented the quantitative data (Creswell and Creswell, 2023; Leavy, 2022).

3.5.1 Questionnaires

Structured questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data from the primary respondents in this study (Appendix I). Questionnaires asked questions on association between disarmament and crime displacement; relationship between dusk to dawn curfews and crime displacement and relationship between increased police presence and crime displacement. A structured Questionnaire is essential for numeric description of attitudes, perceptions, opinions, and trends (Bryman, 2016). In this study, the researcher included matrix questions such as a Likert scale within the structured Questionnaire. The Likert scale was appropriate as it helped achieve standardization and further allowed for gathering both particular and specific data (Bryman, 2016). This tool was administered to the primary respondents in this study.

3.5.2 Focus Group Discussion Guide

Focus Group Discussion Guide (FGD) collected qualitative data from the key respondents (Appendix II). This helped clarify and corroborate findings from the questionnaires. Creswell and Creswell (2023) point out, a focus group discussion is a form of interview consisting of between five and ten interviewees in a group at a time. In this study, the researcher interviewed the participants in groups of between five and eight. The FGD allowed for in-depth information gathering through probing.

According to Takona (2024) FGDs provide the advantage of probing and clarifications in the process of collecting data.

The key respondents that constituted the focus group were; the Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs, Village Elders, Assistant County Commissioners (ACCs), Ward Commanders (WCs), Member of County Assembly (MCA), and a representative of the business community.

3.6 Piloting

Pilot for the study was conducted in Elgeyo Marakwet County. Elgeyo Marakwet County has semblance with the selected study areas in terms of geographical features, climate, and insecurity experiences. This conformed with Creswell and Creswell (2023)'s caution that a pilot study should not be undertaken among participants in the study. According to Clark et al., (2021), a pilot study should be conducted with the goal of determining the suitability of the research instruments. Therefore, the pilot study revealed potential problems with the instruments and helped refine them before the actual study data collection process. This helped modify the instruments to elicit appropriate responses. The study conducted a pilot test using 38 respondents selected from Elgeyo Marakwet County. As Thabane et al., (2010) point out, a pilot often considers between 1% and 10% of the sample population that should constitute the pilot test size. The feedback from the pilot test was used to enhance the research instruments.

3.7 Validity of the Instruments

The research instruments were checked for face, content, and criterion validity by faculty from the Chuka University and experts on policing. During piloting, the instruments were also checked to see if the questions brought out the meaning they intended to bring. Syntactical and semantical errors were corrected with the guidance of the supervisors and policing experts. According to Lakens (2022) "content validity is the degree to which elements of an assessment instrument are relevant to a representative of the targeted construct". Validity of the instrument was done using the expert opinion. Content validity was assessed through discussions with Criminology experts during questionnaire formulation. To demonstrate construct validity, "evidence that the test measures what it purports to measure and the evidence that the

test does not measure irrelevant variables was considered” (Lakens, 2022). The construct validity was also done by comparing the test used in other tests that measure similar qualities to gauge how highly correlated the measures were. Moreover, construct validity was ensured by basing the constructs to relevant theories. The questionnaire and interview guides were availed to supervisors as well as an independent researcher who gave their advice on the questions with reference to the research objectives. This was done to ensure validity of the content, and enhancement of face validity. Criterion related validity was ensured by analysing collected data by use of SPSS statistical software.

3.8 Reliability of the Instruments

The Cronbach alpha was computed to measure the reliability of the data collection instrument. Reliability measures the internal consistency of the data being analysed. Pearson correlation coefficient (r) was used to determine the score. The instrument gave a reliability co-efficient from 0.711 for presence of security agencies on target crime displacement to 0.987 for dusk-to-dawn curfew on spatial crime displacement. If the tool gave a reliability co-efficient of 0.7 and above, it was considered reliable. According to Leavy (2022) a reliability co-efficient of $r > 0.7$ is considered appropriate for a research instrument. The summary of the pilot test results is given below where Cronbach's Alpha coefficient was used to compute the research instrument reliability in relation to each study variable. The results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Reliability Analysis

Construct	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Disarmament on Spatial Crime Displacement	6	0.719
Disarmament on Temporal Crime Displacement	6	0.976
Disarmament on Tactical Crime Displacement.	6	0.975
Disarmament on Target Crime Displacement	6	0.962
Disarmament on Functional Crime Displacement	6	0.971
Disarmament on Perpetrator Crime Displacement	5	0.926
Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Spatial Crime Displacement	6	0.987
Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Temporal Crime Displacement	6	0.963
Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Tactical Crime Displacement.	6	0.911
Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Target Crime Displacement	6	0.820
Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Functional Crime Displacement	6	0.750
Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Perpetrator Crime Displacement	5	0.897
Presence of Security Agencies on Spatial Crime Displacement	6	0.963
Presence of Security Agencies on Temporal Crime Displacement	6	0.911
Presence of Security Agencies on Tactical Crime Displacement.	6	0.963
Presence of Security Agencies on Target Crime Displacement	6	0.711
Presence of Security Agencies on Functional Crime Displacement	6	0.720
Presence of Security Agencies on Perpetrator Crime Displacement	5	0.850

Source: Research, 2025

The results presented in Table 3 show the Cronbach's Alpha reliability coefficient which range from 0.711 for presence of security agencies on target crime displacement to 0.987 for dusk-to-dawn curfew on spatial crime displacement. These values are within the acceptable range of 0.50 (Cronbach, 1951) and above the recommended value of 0.7. reliability coefficient below 0.5 are unaccepted, below 0.6 and above 0.5 are poor, below 0.7 and above, 0.6 are questionable, below 0.8 and above 0.7 are acceptable and below 0.9 and above 0.8 are good and those greater than 0.9 are considered excellent (Leavy. 2022). Therefore, the instrument internal consistence was considered satisfactory for data analysis to answer the study objectives.

3.9 Data Collection Procedures

Data collection began after the researcher was cleared by Chuka University Ethics Committee and received authorization to collect data from the National Council for Science Technology and Innovations (NACOSTI) (Appendix VI). Upon receipt of the

authorizations, the researcher informed the Regional Commissioner Rift-Valley Region of Kenya of the purpose to collect data in the region. The researcher then proceeded to visit the County Commissioners', the Deputy County Commissioners, and the Assistant County Commissioners of the selected regions and informed them of the purpose to collect data in their regions. This helped in arranging for safety and security of the research team during the data collection process.

To facilitate data collection, two research assistants were recruited. These assistants were recruited from individuals who were familiar with the research geographical area before being trained on the research tools and ethics. Once the research assistants were selected, they helped the researcher book appointments with various respondents and set dates for data collection.

Questionnaires were administered to the already randomly sampled population. The two research assistants and the researcher issued out the questionnaires to the respondents, gave them time to allow the filling of the responses and collected the questionnaires. The presence of the researcher and the research assistants during the data collection process was essential as it helped with clarification of unclear questions and to ensure that majority of the questionnaires were handed in after completion. Research assistants helped respondents who were not literate enough to read the questionnaire and fill in the questionnaires. They read the questions to the respondents then filled in the answers as given by the respondents. This process was conducted at a central location within the selected division. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected simultaneously.

Focus Group Discussions was conducted through face-to-face interaction with the focus group respondents selected for the study. The researcher asked questions then filled in the answers in the interview guide. Note taking was used to record the discussions.

3.10 Data Analysis

Quantitative and qualitative data analysis was applied in this study. Quantitative data was coded, cleaned, and checked for completeness before analysis. The datasets were coded and analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics aided by the Statistical

Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 28. Descriptive statistics utilized were median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The primary inferential statistics to be used was Chi-square.

After checking for completeness, qualitative data was be transcribed, scanned, sorted, organized, and coded before being analysed thematically. The researcher revealed the patterns from the analysis. The qualitative data was embedded into the quantitative analysis. This way, qualitative data augmented quantitative analysis to achieve a comprehensive holistic analysis. Leavy (2022) points out that qualitative and quantitative findings are nested to generate complementary insights and produce a more comprehensive understanding.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

The study was conducted upon getting approval both from the Chuka University Board of Postgraduate Studies and a permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI) (Appendix VI). Since the study was dealing with national security matters, additional clearance was sought from the Rift Valley Regional Commissioner whose jurisdiction the study areas fall. To promote integrity, the researcher observed legal and ethical research requirements. Informed consent was sought from respondents before securing their voluntary participation. Confidentiality was maintained throughout the data collection process. Anonymity has been guaranteed as no form of identification has been used to identify the respondents. The researcher disclosed all benefits to the respondent and explained to them every material fact about the study. The researcher strove for the highest standards of integrity throughout the data collection process.

To promote integrity in the research, the study was complied with the Social Science Research Code of Ethics. The researcher was aware and sensitive to the culture of the people in area of study. Cultural, gender and age considerations were respected to ensure personal safety of the research participants. The participants were informed that taking part in this study was voluntary and that they were at liberty to withdraw at any stage their participation without having to provide any reason whatsoever. The study further clarified to the participants the nature of information sought and how that information would be processed.

Throughout the research process, the participants remained anonymous unless when expressly consented to by the participant. Even then, pseudonymization has been used to process data in such a manner as to conceal identity attributes. The data collected has been handled confidentially. This study assured the participants that information gathered from them shall not be disseminated in ways that would violate the principles of confidentiality and that assurance has been kept. Moreover, the study adhered to the principles of privacy, duty of notification, and integrity throughout the research process.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Preliminary Findings

The study analysed the implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya. The data was collected from 384 adult population living in North-Rift counties of Kenya. A total of 378 questionnaires were completed. This gave a response rate of 98.4%. Focus group discussions were also held in each division having between five and eight participants. A total of eighteen focus group discussions were held with the key respondents constituting; the Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs, Village Elders, Assistant County Commissioners (ACCs), Ward Commanders (WCs), Member of County Assembly (MCA), and a representative of the business community. The participants in focus group discussion were individuals with administrative, political, and business responsibilities at the divisional level.

4.1.1 Response Rate

A total of 384 questionnaires were distributed to the sampled adults living in North-Rift Counties of Kenya. Out of the 384 questionnaires distributed, only 378 were returned giving a response rate of 98.44% (Figure 3). This response rate was considered adequate because according to Javali and Javali (2024) a response rate of 70% is adequate for a sampled population.




Figure 3: Response Rate

Figure 3 indicates that the study obtained a response rate of 98.44%. This response rate is higher than that obtained in recent studies conducted in North-Rift counties of Kenya by Makokha et al., (2024); Amutabi et al., (2025) and Tawane (2025). The high response rate in this study was credited to the logistical preparations made before data

and the social acceptance of the data collection assistants by the respondents. The distribution of the response rate in the study area is shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Distribution of Response Rate per Division

County	Subcounty	Division	Expected Respondents	Actual Responses	Response rate
Turkana	Turkana	Kainuk	10	9	90
		Katilu	37	37	100
	Turkana East	Lokori	7	7	100
		Lomelo	17	16	94.12
	Loima	Loima	22	22	100
		Turkwel	57	55	96.49
Baringo	Baringo	Bartabwa	11	11	100
	North	Barwessa	23	23	100
	Baringo	Mukutani	5	5	100
	South	Muchongoi	16	16	100
	Tiaty East	Churo	14	14	100
		Mondi	19	18	94.74
	Tiaty West	Nginyang'	12	12	100
		Kolowa	21	21	100
West Pokot	Pokot North	Alale	21	21	100
		Kiwawa	12	12	100
	Pokot	Sigor	51	51	100
	Central	Chesegon	29	28	96.55
Total			384	378	98.44

The results in Table 4 show that the study results captured the intended regions in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya. This implies that the results of this study are representative of the divisions and counties in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya and therefore captured the full and actual spectrum of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya.

4.2 Demographic Information

The study sought to determine the demographic general information factors of the respondents in terms of their gender, age, highest education level, marital status, and occupation of the primary respondents. The subsequent sections present the research bio-data of the respondents and their general information.

4.2.1 Gender of the Respondents

The distribution by gender of the respondents was established by the study. This was meant to determine the distribution of the sample across gender. This was also meant

to show that the results were representative of both genders. The results determined that 55.8% of the respondents were male while 44.2% were female. While the male percentage was higher than that of female; the results show a substantial representation of both genders. This slight gender disparity may be indicative of the overarching or diminished contributions of both men and women as victims or offenders in the hotspot policing and crime displacement dynamics. Table 5 below summarises the gender of the respondents.

Table 5: Gender of the Respondents

Gender of the Respondents	Frequency	Percentage
Male	211	55.8
Female	167	44.2
Total	378	100.0

4.2.2 Age of the Respondents

The results further showed that majority (37.0%) of the respondents were between the ages of 41-50 years. Those above 51 years were (21.7%), between ages 31-40 were 21.7% and those below 30 years were 19.6%. This implies that most of respondents were between ages 31 to above 51 years, that is, 80.4%. Therefore, they were able to appreciate and understand implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement in North-Rift of Kenya. These results thus reveal that the respondents were old enough and are thus were conversant with hotspot policing strategies and crime displacement; they have an experienced view of their surrounding circumstances. Moreover, the results were distributed across all ages. Therefore, these findings were diverse and inclusive of all ages. Table 6 below summarises the findings on age.

Table 6: Age of the Respondents

Age in Years	Frequency	Percentage
Below 30 Years	74	19.6
31-40 Years	82	21.7
41-50 Years	140	37.0
Above 51 Years	82	21.7
Total	378	100.0

4.2.3 Education Level of the Respondents

The results also showed that 75.8% of the respondents had below college level education (primary 48.9%; Secondary 26.9%). Those with college level education constituted 14.4% while only 9.8% had University level education. There was generally low levels of education among the respondents. This reflected the level of education across the study areas and thus a high likelihood to resort to crime as their main alternative source of livelihood. Similar findings were established by Kapoyon (2019) and Kareithi (2015) who pointed out that educational challenges significantly limited opportunities avenues thus may incline the residents of North-Rift to perpetual state of crime. Table 7 below summarises the findings on levels of education of the respondents.

Table 7: Education Level of the Respondents

Education Level	Frequency	Percentage
Primary	185	48.9
Secondary	102	26.9
College	54	14.4
University	37	9.8
Total	378	100.0

4.2.4 Marital Status of the Respondents

The results show that 63% of the respondents were married, 19.3% were single, 10.1% were divorced/separated while 7.7 percent were widowed. Marital status plays a valuable role in shaping views and perceptions of individuals particularly when considering strategies that affect them such as hot-spot policing strategies. Moreover, while the impact of crime and hotspot strategies affected all residents, family units with children bore the greatest burden since both criminals and security agencies' actions may engineer distress and displacement. This observation and finding concur with Rialem (2018) who pointed out that families are greatly affected during disarmament operations and by criminal activities across the North-Rift. Table 8 summarises the findings on marital status of the respondents.

Table 8: Marital Status of the Respondents

Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage
Married	238	63.0
Single	73	19.3
Divorced/Separated	38	10.1
Windowed	29	7.7
Total	378	100.0

4.2.5 Occupation of the Respondents

The results show that 83.1% of the respondents were in informal employment while 16.9% were in formal employment. Since majority of the respondents are informally engaged in work, their flexibility, and levels of attrition to other informal jobs or even crime is highly likely. Ekitela & Odera (2021) argued that flexibility and the high level of informal engagement and unemployment contributes to the emergence of the use of *boda-boda* by criminals and by locals across the country. The informality creates a duality in which a clear distinction between the informal, the unemployed, and the criminal is almost impossible to establish. Table 9 summarises the findings on occupation of the respondents.

Table 9: Occupation of the Primary Respondents

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Formal Employment	64	16.9
Informal Employment	314	83.1
Total	378	100.0

4.3 Implications of Hotspot Policing Strategies on Crime Displacement in North Rift Counties of Kenya

This section presents the analysis and findings of the study according to the study objectives which were; the implications of disarmament on crime displacement, the implications of dusk-to-dawn curfews on crime displacement, and the implications of continued increased presence of security agencies on crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya. Chi-square test was done to determine the level of statistical significance between the dependent and the independent variables. Table 10 below summarises the findings.

Table 10: Implications of Hotspot Policing Strategies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

Variable	N	Chi-Square	df	P-Value
Disarmament	378	4972.584 ^a	720	0.0001
Dusk-to-Dawn	378	3332.545 ^a	480	0.0001
Continued Increased presence of security agencies	378	5292.000 ^a	672	0.0001

$p < 0.05$

The results showed a statistically significant relationship $p < 0.05$ between disarmament and crime displacement ($p = 0.0001$); a significant relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfews and crime displacement ($p = 0.0001$), and a statistically

significant relationship between continued increased presence of security agencies and crime displacement in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya ($p=.0001$). This means that all the three hotspot policing strategies contributed to crime displacement across the study areas. Six measures (types) of crime displacement were tested to determine their particular levels of statistical significance with the independent variables. These were; spatial crime displacement, temporal crime displacement, tactical crime displacement, target crime displacement, functional crime displacement, and perpetrator crime displacement. Subsequent sections present the findings of these analyses as per the study objectives.

4.4 Implications of Disarmament on Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

A Chi-square test was conducted to examine the relationship between disarmament and crime displacement in the North Rift Counties of Kenya. The results indicated a statistically significant association between disarmament and crime displacement ($p = .0001$). The Chi-square analysis further assessed how disarmament influenced six forms of crime displacement across the North Rift Counties. Table 11 presents a summary of these findings.

Table 11: Relationship between of Disarmament and Crime Displacement in North Rift Counties of Kenya

Variable	N	Chi-Square	df	P-Value
Relationship between Disarmament and Spatial crime displacement	378	2180.705 ^a	210	0.0001
Relationship between Disarmament and Temporal crime displacement	378	2385.546 ^a	180	0.0001
Relationship between Disarmament and Tactical crime displacement	378	1821.480 ^a	165	0.0001
Relationship between Disarmament and Target crime displacement	378	2875.470 ^a	210	0.0001
Relationship between Disarmament and Functional crime displacement	378	2117.262 ^a	225	0.0001
Relationship between Disarmament and Perpetrator crime displacement	378	2750.767 ^a	180	0.0001

The findings show that disarmament contributed to all the six types of crime displacement. Specifically, disarmament showed a statistically significant relationship with spatial crime displacement ($p=.0001$); temporal crime displacement ($p=.0001$); tactical crime displacement ($p=.0001$); target crime displacement ($p=.0001$);

functional crime displacement ($p=.0001$), and perpetrator crime displacement ($p=.0001$).

4.4.1 Implications of Disarmament on Spatial Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was a relationship between disarmament and spatial crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 12.

Table 12: Inferential Analysis on Implications of Disarmament on Spatial Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2180.705 ^a	210	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	889.207	210	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	217.088	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Contingency Coefficient	0.923		0.0001
	Cramer's V	0.642		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.759		0.0001
	N of Valid Cases	378		
a. 228 cells (95.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.				

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2180.705^a$, $p=0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between disarmament and spatial crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.642 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .759, p= 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 92.3% of the total variance in spatial crime displacement could be attributed to disarmament.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of disarmament has led to criminals relocating their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament measures. This further implied that disarmament remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid crime displacement. According to Tregle et al., (2025) the geographic distribution of crime may change significantly due to disarmament policies especially if it is not paired with a sustained resource commitment. Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of disarmament on spatial crime displacement in North-Rift of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 13.

Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Disarmament on Spatial Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent (%)	Little Extent (%)	Moderate Extent (%)	Great Extent (%)	Very Great Extent (%)	N	Median	Mode
Disarmament in hotspot areas has led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions.	2.4% (9)	—	2.4% (9)	70.1% (265)	25.1% (95)	378	4.00	4.00
Criminals have relocated their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament.	2.4% (9)	—	14.3% (54)	29.1% (110)	54.2% (205)	378	5.00	5.00
Spatial crime displacement is a direct consequence of disarmament in hotspot zones.	—	7.1% (27)	33.3% (126)	42.6% (161)	16.9% (64)	378	4.00	4.00
Disarmament has shifted crime from urban to rural/suburban areas.	19.8% (75)	48.9% (185)	14.3% (54)	9.5% (36)	7.4% (28)	378	2.00	2.00
Geographic crime distribution has changed significantly due to disarmament policies.	7.7% (29)	9.5% (36)	16.7% (63)	56.3% (213)	9.8% (37)	378	4.00	4.00
Crime hotspots have remained the same despite disarmament strategies.	22.5% (85)	32.0% (121)	14.3% (54)	14.3% (54)	16.9% (64)	378	2.00	2.00

The study examined the implications of disarmament on spatial crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya by analysing respondents' perceptions across six key statements. The findings indicate statistically significant agreement with the assertion that disarmament efforts have influenced the geographic distribution of criminal activities, reflecting both the intended and unintended consequences of these strategies. The statement “Disarmament in hotspot areas has led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions” recorded high agreement, with 70.1% (n = 265) of respondents indicating "great extent" and 25.1% (n = 95) reporting "very great extent." A minority of 2.4% (n = 9) chose "no extent" or "moderate extent." The median and mode were both 4.00, suggesting strong consensus on the crime displacement effect from the disarmed to neighbouring areas. Similarly, strong agreement was found with the statement “criminals have relocated their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament”, where 54.2% (n = 205) selected "very great extent" and 29.1% (n = 110) chose "great extent." Only 2.4% (n = 9) reported "no extent," and the median and mode for this item were 5.00, indicating an even stronger consensus regarding criminal migration in response to disarmament. For the item “Spatial crime displacement is a direct consequence of disarmament in hotspot zones,” the highest proportion of respondents selected "great extent" (42.6%, n = 161), followed by "Moderate Extent" (33.3%, n = 126), while a smaller share (7.1%, n = 27) indicated "little extent."

The median and mode remained at 4.00, reinforcing agreement on the spatial dynamics of crime as an outcome of targeted disarmament efforts. Contrastingly, the statement “Disarmament has shifted crime from urban to rural/suburban areas” elicited more divided responses. Nearly half (48.9%, n = 185) selected "little extent," and 19.8% (n = 75) chose "no extent." Only 16.9% combined indicated "great" or "very great extent." Both the median and mode for this item were 2.00, implying general disagreement with the notion that disarmament has led to an urban-to-rural crime shift. The assertion “geographic crime distribution has changed significantly due to disarmament policies” was more positively received, with 56.3% (n = 213) selecting "great extent" and 9.8% (n = 37) indicating "very great extent." Combined, 66.1% affirmed this claim, while only 7.7% (n = 29) selected "no extent." The median and mode were 4.00, demonstrating overall agreement.

Lastly, the statement “crime hotspots have remained the same despite disarmament strategies” received a mixed reaction, with 32.0% (n = 121) indicating "little extent" and 22.5% (n = 85) reporting "no extent." Meanwhile, 31.2% reported either "great" or "very great extent." With a median and mode of 2.00, the results suggest general disagreement, indicating that crime hotspots have indeed shifted post-disarmament. The study underscores a prevalent perception among respondents that disarmament has led to notable spatial crime displacement, particularly from targeted hotspots to less policed areas. However, the extent of this displacement varies by context and geography, emphasizing the complexity of crime control through disarmament alone.

The results correspond with those of a study by Braga et al., (2019b) who found that hotspot policing strategies, including disarmament, significantly reduced violent crime in high-risk areas but also caused spatial and temporal displacement in some cases. Moreover, as the geometric theory of crime assert, spatial crime displacement is probable if criminals are deeply aware of the space features in their environment such as edges, pathways, and activity joints. Bandits and cattle rustlers operating in the vast North-Rift have mastered the ungoverned spaces, the difficult terrain, and enclaves that they use as hideouts from security dragnets (Musau et al., 2023; Osamba, 2000).

The quantitative findings were corroborated with the qualitative data collected from the Focus Group Discussions. One of the major discoveries was that crime is a socially organized activity where bandits lived and kept their livestock in social units called the “*kraal*”. As Chief A described;

“...the kraal is at the heart of the crime of banditry and cattle rustling here. The kraal is like a typical village formation among those who have large herds of cattle. The kraal is heavily fortified. Each kraal can contain between 500 and 2000 firearms. When disarmament is underway, only old weapons are given out. The new ones are retained within the kraal formation.” (Chief A)

Moreover, disarmament in hotspot areas has produced crime increase in neighbouring regions. Criminals have relocated their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament measures and the displacement is a direct consequence of disarmament efforts in hotspot zones. According to Village Elder A, disarmament has led to spatial crime displacement.

“...disarmament of one kraal often means the criminals will definitely move to the other kraals. You know the kraals support each other. An attack on one is a threat to all of them and so they have to help their brothers who are fleeing disarmament and other acts of the security forces.” (Village Elder A).

The geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly due to disarmament policies. Disarmament has shifted crime from urban areas to rural or suburban areas. This has also heightened fear among the neighbouring community. Chief C added that due to this strategy, crimes had spread in other places that were initially safe such as Kainuk, Kaptur, Kakong.

“...we never had a problem here until when government announced disarmament in Marakwet. Then the bandits moved here to flair things for us here in Kainuk. Kainuk now is a hotspot. Have you not seen the camps? We have KDF camp, ASTU camp, and GSU camp. This place is the epicentre now. I suspect because of the security agencies response; the bandits will move to Laikipia.” (Chief C)

According to Assistant Chief A the borders are so porous so it remains a challenge to comprehensively conduct disarmament. The intercommunal borders are weak so are the international border of Kenya with Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia.

“...when you tell one kraal to submit arms, they move the good arms to their other neighbouring kraals that are not a target for disarmament. They simply surrender old useless arms. You know the kraals are strategically located. The distance between one and another is about 5Kms. The porous border is also a problem at the far North of Turkana. Many times, the Merille cross to Todonyang’ and drive away livestock to Ethiopia. The problem was also persistent with the Toposa crossing from South Sudan but this has gone down.” (Chief A)

Due to hostile neighbourhood and uncooperating members of the community some police are killed and this creates fear among the security agencies. According to the Assistant County Commissioner, there is a challenge since during disarmament curfew, the criminals change to be soft and good people temporarily during the

security operation then they emerge later and displace the locals taking their property and displacing the people.

“...you know, these criminals are just locals, they blend with the locals and turn against non-locals when the security operations are complete. Again, the criminals are always welcome among their own kind who maybe staying elsewhere during disarmament operations” (Assistant County Commissioner, West Pokot)

According to Chief B, crime hotspots have generally remained the same despite disarmament strategies being implemented. He also added that disarmament faces the challenge of inaccessibility of some places.

“...let me tell you, there has been no significant change here. The bandit hotspots in Baringo, West Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Marakwet, Laikipia have remained the same. These criminals build kraals in inaccessible places where they keep livestock. The kraals are heavily fortified with rings of morans around them. This terrain is hard, hilly, forested, infested with wildlife. Police do not go deep. Perhaps the security agencies need to blast at the heart of the kraals but women, children, and the livestock will die.” (Chief B)

Chief A added that total disarmament has been done under previous regimes but with little success and spatial displacement still occurred.

“...you remember the 1979 disarmament under the Tegla Lorupe and 1984. These were the major disarmaments that would have had total shut down on crime in West Pokot region. The problems persist to date. What we need is total commitment to expose the people to alternative livelihoods in addition to cattle. Why can't we do it like the Uganda government did. They also had a problem with the among the Karamoja clan. Since creating a ministry exclusively in charge of Karamoja affairs, they have not had much insecurity. It works for them.” (Chief A)

These sentiments suggest the need to localize solutions especially if we have to breakdown traditional rural conflict zones. Migdal (2021) in his theory of state society relations argues that instead of seeking to confront the values and beliefs that are the irreducible non-negotiable principles upon which the institutions of the community

(such as cultural, religious, economic, and political) are founded, recognition of such values coupled with concerted efforts towards education and development may provide a sustainable solution and thus avoid crime displacement and incessant conflict.

4.4.2 Implications of Disarmament on Temporal Crime Displacement in North Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the disarmament and temporal crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 14.

Table 14: Inferential Analysis on Implications of Disarmament on Temporal Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2385.546 ^a	180	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	1049.883	180	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	308.995	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.725		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.929		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.905		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		
a. 190 cells (91.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .07.				

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2385.546^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between disarmament and temporal crime displacement was statistically significant. This means that disarmament as a hotspot policing strategy led criminals to change the timing of their crime activities to those times when disarmament was less likely to be carried out. Cramer's V value was $.725 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .905$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 92.9% of the total variance in temporal crime displacement could be attributed to disarmament.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of disarmament has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities or the criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when police hotspot policing strategies are relaxed. This implies

that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid crime displacement. According to Carvalho and Guerra (2025) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to change the timing of their activities e.g., from daytime to night-time.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of disarmament on temporal crime displacement in North-Rift of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 15.

Table 15: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Disarmament on Temporal Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent (%)	Little Extent (%)	Moderate Extent (%)	Great Extent (%)	Very Great Extent (%)	N	Median	Mode
Disarmament has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities (e.g., day to night)	—	—	2.4% (9)	43.9% (166)	53.7% (203)	378	5.00	5.00
Crime rates have increased during periods when disarmament enforcement is relaxed	—	2.6% (10)	9.5% (36)	13.0% (49)	74.9% (283)	378	5.00	5.00
Temporal displacement of crime is a noticeable outcome of disarmament strategies	—	2.4% (9)	21.4% (81)	43.9% (166)	32.3% (122)	378	4.00	4.00
Criminals have adapted by committing crimes when police presence is reduced	2.4% (9)	—	9.5% (36)	24.1% (91)	64.0% (242)	378	5.00	5.00
Disarmament has led to a shift in the frequency of criminal activities over time	2.4% (9)	2.4% (9)	14.6% (55)	44.2% (167)	36.5% (138)	378	4.00	4.00
Crime times have generally remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies	24.6% (93)	41.5% (157)	12.4% (47)	11.9% (45)	9.5% (36)	378	2.00	2.00

The study examined perceptions of temporal displacement of crime following disarmament efforts in the North-Rift counties of Kenya. Results indicated that majority of respondents agreed that disarmament has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities, shifting from daytime to night-time, with 53.7% indicating this to a very great extent and 43.9% to a great extent (Median = 5, Mode = 5). Similarly, 74.9% of respondents perceived that crime rates increased during periods when disarmament enforcement was relaxed, reflecting strong agreement on temporal crime fluctuations (Median = 5, Mode = 5). Temporal displacement was widely recognized as a noticeable outcome of disarmament strategies, with 43.9% and 32.3% of participants rating this to a great and very great extent, respectively (Median = 4, Mode = 4).

Additionally, 64.0% believed criminals adapted by committing crimes during times of reduced police presence, supported by a median and mode of 5. Shifts in the frequency of criminal activities over time were also reported, with 44.2% indicating a great extent and 36.5% a very great extent (Median = 4, Mode = 4). Conversely, 66.1% of respondents felt that crime times generally remained unchanged despite disarmament efforts, with 24.6% indicating no extent and 41.5% little extent, reflected in a lower median and mode of 2. These findings highlight nuanced views on how disarmament influences the temporal patterns of criminal behaviour.

The results correspond with Weisburd and Telep (2014) who argued that disarmament causes the temporal displacement of crime. Therefore, criminals may relocate to places that have not received intense law enforcement intervention as their initial location. Guerette (2016) adds that criminals were likely to displace spatially and temporally whenever the crime opportunity continued to exist and as long as their familiarity with the area remained. These scholars and the findings of this Thesis concur with the geometric theory of crime and the theory of state society relations; strong societies and weak states. Examining the role of place, Brantingham and Brantingham (2017) assert that criminals who have mastered the map; who have clear knowledge and experience in nodes, hills, valleys, gorges, and other features, are highly likely to displace their crime acts. Similarly, Migdal (2018) acknowledged the “ever diminishing” role of the state in disrupting traditional crime opportunities especially in rural places.

On the question on implication of disarmament on temporal crime displacement, there were several qualitative responses. According to Chief B, disarmament led to temporal crime displacement. Criminals tend to change the time they commit crimes for example from day time to night time. According to a business community leader A, due to disarmament, these criminals have started committing crimes when police presence is reduced and this has led to a shift in the frequency of their activities.

“...criminals change their operational time. They avoid times when security operations are intense. You know you simply cannot face the police. The use guerilla warfare. Attack the police when they least expect it and run back into hiding in the bush.” (Business Community Leader, Loima)

According to the Ward Commander B, criminals can maintain their illicit acts since they always have more knowledge about the surrounding terrain and in all seasons as compared to the officers and at times, they kill officers who understand the terrain. Some officers who carry out the disarmament lack awareness of the local landscape and hide outs are unable to keep up with such criminals.

“...these criminals operate day and night. When you target them during the day, they shift to the night. Most police officers sent to carry out disarmament cannot operate at night. This because we fear for our lives as well. We can be, and have in the past been targeted by these bandits. The outcome has been fatal for us. Also, at night, the woods and shrubs are dangerous and with poor geographical know-how, we have to stay out. I think the bandits know this. The disarmament only affects their day activities which they shift to night.” (Ward Commander B)

Chief C added that bandits had also set up traps in the forests to challenge the disarmament strategy.

“...there are parts of the jungle that police wouldn't dare go no matter the time or day. The real kraals are so fortified by the bandits such that an attack on them especially at night, would be fatal.” (Chief C)

Most community members were quite hesitant and sometimes sceptical of security officers during security operations such as disarmament. According to Assistant County Commissioner B, during disarmament, officers lacked basic things like food

and water especially when they run out of their sources. Locals were hesitant to share these either because of the shortage in general or the fear of being branded as siding with the “enemy.”

“...during disarmament, police officers are often negatively perceived by locals. The level of cooperation and support even with basic supplies like water and food when they run out is not provided. The people fear that retaliation by bandits might befall them especially if they assist the police. The locals are often hesitant to assist deliberately, out of fear, or sometimes because of genuine lack or shortages.” (Assistant County Commissioner B)

According to a member of the county assembly A, disarmament leads to temporal crime displacement since there is lack of enough resources to ensure effective enforcement and sustenance of the strategy.

“...if you only enforce disarmament during the day, obviously, the criminals will roam with real weapons at night after depositing the old deposed weapons with the police. Police also cannot operate 24/7 for weeks and months. They will grow weary, relax and criminals who always have endurance will continue to survive.” (Member of County Assembly A)

According to Assistant Chief B, the number of crimes reported in the area after hotspot policing intervention such as disarmament has remained the same only the time of commission has changed.

“...these bandits simply change time. The crime of rustling cattle and banditry is the constant year-round.” (Assistant Chief B)

The inability of the disarmament strategy to comprehensively disrupt crime in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya reaffirm Joel Migdal’s assertions that the state, while exuding confidence in their ability and capacities in fighting crime from an external point of view, internally, they continue to struggle to contain traditional rural crime and conflict frontiers (Migdal, 2018). The disruption of such traditional crime hotspots may require much more than the disarmament strategy in general.

4.4.3 Implications of Disarmament on Tactical Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the disarmament and tactical crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 16.

Table 16: Inferential Analysis on Implications of Disarmament on Tactical Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	1821.480 ^a	165	.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	797.507	165	.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	217.680	1	.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	.662		.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	.910		.0001
	Pearson's R	.760		.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 172 cells (89.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 1821.480^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between disarmament and tactical crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.662 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .760$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 91.0% of the total variance in tactical crime displacement could be attributed to disarmament.

Therefore, when disarmament is enhanced, the criminals may adopt new methods or tools to commit crimes for example non-firearm-related crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects) to avoid detection after disarmament. According to contemporary rational choice approach in explaining crime, offenders break the law after considering personal dexterity characteristics and situational factors (Cornish and Clarke 2017). Exercising their rationality would mean making the decision to change their *modus operandi* during intense enforcement of hotspot policing strategies such as disarmament if crime opportunities continue to exist.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of disarmament may cause criminals to change the tactics of crime commission or the criminals have adapted to using less

detectible tools when police hotspot policing strategies are underway. This implies that while hotspot policing strategy of disarmament remains an effective crime reduction strategy, it however should be dispersed across the entire regional spectrum rather than concentrated to avoid tactical crime displacement. According to Das et al., (2025) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after disarmament.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of disarmament on tactical crime displacement in North-Rift of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 17.

Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Disarmament on Tactical Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent (%)	Little Extent (%)	Moderate Extent (%)	Great Extent (%)	Very Great Extent (%)	N	Median	Mode
Criminals have adopted new methods or tools to commit crimes following disarmament	17.5% (66)	15.1% (57)	16.9% (64)	38.1% (144)	12.4% (47)	378	4.00	4.00
Disarmament has led to an increase in non-firearm-related crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects)	32.8% (124)	38.6% (146)	14.3% (54)	11.9% (45)	2.4% (9)	378	2.00	2.00
Tactical changes in criminal behaviour are a direct result of disarmament efforts	—	11.9% (45)	48.7% (184)	29.4% (111)	10.1% (38)	378	3.00	3.00
Criminals have become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after disarmament	2.6% (10)	19.8% (75)	19.3% (73)	43.7% (165)	14.6% (55)	378	4.00	4.00
Disarmament has forced criminals to use less detectable or traceable weapons	15.3% (58)	36.5% (138)	11.9% (45)	24.1% (91)	12.2% (46)	378	2.00	2.00
Criminal tactics have remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies	15.1% (57)	16.7% (63)	9.5% (36)	31.2% (118)	27.5% (104)	378	4.00	4.00

The study explored perceptions of how disarmament in the North-Rift region of Kenya has influenced changes in criminal tactics. Respondents rated six statements on a five-point scale, ranging from no extent (1) to very great extent (5). Results showed that a substantial proportion of participants agreed that criminals have adopted new methods or tools to commit crimes following disarmament, with 38.1% indicating this to a great extent and 12.4% to a very great extent. The median and mode values for this item were both 4.00, suggesting general agreement with this trend. Regarding the increase in non-firearm-related crimes such as those involving knives or blunt objects, responses skewed toward lower agreement, with 32.8% and 38.6% indicating no extent or little extent, respectively. The median and mode were 2.00, indicating limited perceived impact in this area.

Tactical changes in criminal behaviour were reported as a moderate consequence of disarmament efforts by nearly half of the respondents (48.7%), with an additional 29.4% and 10.1% rating the change as great and very great extent, respectively. The median and mode of 3.00 reflect moderate agreement. Similarly, innovation in criminal approaches to avoid detection was recognized, with 43.7% of respondents endorsing this to a great extent and 14.6% to a very great extent. The median and mode of 4.00 highlight a strong perception of increased innovation. The extent to which criminals have been forced to use less detectable or traceable weapons yielded more mixed responses.

While 36.5% reported little extent, 24.1% indicated a great extent and 15.3% no extent, with median and mode values at 2.00, reflecting only mild agreement. Finally, the statement that criminal tactics have remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies had a notable level of agreement: 31.2% and 27.5% of respondents indicated great and very great extents, respectively, with both median and mode at 4.00. This suggests that while some criminal tactics have adapted, others persist despite disarmament efforts. These findings reveal that disarmament has led to both adaptation and persistence in criminal behaviours, reflecting a complex dynamic in the criminal landscape following disarmament interventions.

The results correspond to Weisburd et al. (2017) who observed that disarmament caused tactical displacement. While concentrated policing efforts often led to a "diffusion of benefits", criminals adapted to new crime tactics and manoeuvred away out of enforcement measures. This finding fundamentally concur with Joel Migdal's theory of state society relations. Migdal (2018) pointed out the persistence of common conflict lines that have remained anchored on values and beliefs as their core components. Such values and beliefs are self-reinforcing and reinforced through cultural, religious, economic, and political foundations.

On the question whether disarmament has implication on tactical crime displacement, the focus group discussion revealed the following:

According to the representative of the business community, disarmament leads to tactical crime displacement.

"...sometimes these criminals attack now other vulnerable installations using methods such as guerrilla tactics and spontaneous attacks. Schools and businesses have been victim especially when they want security operations such as disarmament to come to an end." (Business Community leader).

This sentiment confirm that tactics of criminals can shift during intense disarmament operations. Criminals are able to develop new methods of committing crimes due to disarmament. According to Village Elder A, criminals shift from one form of committing crime to another for example from firearm related crimes to non-firearm related.

"...for cattle rustling and banditry, firearms are always involved. For other crimes such as simple robbery and hijacking on highways, they use any weapon. But this is often rare and they only attack specific vehicles such as those used by security agencies." (Village Elder A).

Criminals have become more innovative in their practices to avoid being detected. According to Assistant County Commissioner A, criminals are the very ones throughout despite disarmament strategies. They only shift to use less detectable means to commit their offences.

"...the bandits are the very same people. The young often uneducated or less educated morans. They are not changing. What is changing are their tactics.

These tactics also change depending on the security operation that is going on. They know for instance that if the strategy is disarmament, the strategy is to surrender some old weapons, dig up other weapons or move the good weapons to another place should security agencies storm the area.” Assistant County Commissioner A).

Both Chief A and Chief B stated that the number of criminal activities reported in the area before, during and after hotspot policing have remained unchanged despite the hotspot policing. Chief A stated that criminals have knowledge that enable them manoeuvre and sustain their criminal activities within the region for example knowledge of the hiding places.

“...the problem here is that these criminals have mastered the government’s workplan and roadmap. But you see, the bandits have something the government do not have. That is, they are naturally bred and brought up here. They have mastered these hills so well. They know the gorges to hide in, the ones to avoid, the traps to set and the hills to use for surveillance and watchtower places. Disarmament is only for a season. They can hibernate for that season. When it passes, because it will pass, the criminals will be back.”
(Chief A and Chief B)

They have also adopted skilful ways of reaching their target in committing crime. Village Elder C added that fear created by hostile bandit criminals coupled with poor road conditions lead to lack of motivation for police officers. According to Village Elder B, hostile community members, high number of bandits and the rugged and thick environment also contribute to tactical crime displacement.

“...it is easy to change tactics especially during disarmament. Even changing territory by migrating is one way of changing tactics. The terrain makes it easier for them to manoeuvre faster. I think the environment here is their greatest weapon. The conditions here are their greatest armour.” *(Village Elder B)*

From a geometric theory of crime standpoint, criminals must, in addition to developing strong mental maps of their areas of operations, demonstrate tactical and methodical skills especially when hotspot policing strategies such as disarmament are

enforced. As Andresen and Malleson (2014) points out, criminals must demonstrate increased awareness acumen, accuracy, and executory skills at the appropriate time and place. All these are essential capabilities for the continued sustenance of criminal activities in the heat of hotspot policing strategies.

4.4.4: Implications of Disarmament on Target Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the disarmament and target crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 18.

Table 18: Inferential Analysis on Implications of Disarmament on Target Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2875.470 ^a	210	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	1138.230	210	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	286.788	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.737		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.940		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.872		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		
a. 222 cells (92.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.				

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2875.470^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between disarmament and target crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.737 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .872$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 94.0% of the total variance in target crime displacement could be attributed to disarmament.

Therefore, when disarmament activities are enhanced, the criminals shift their focus to softer or less protected targets. The criminals may increase their crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children). This implies that while hotspot policing strategy of disarmament remains an effective crime reduction strategy, its crime reduction benefits are short-lived and target crime displacement most likely would occur. According to Zubair et al., (2025) and Rosenbaum (2006), the hotspot

policing strategies may cause criminals to change the types of victims targeted, their focus moves to softer or less protected targets. Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of disarmament on target crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 19.

Table 19: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Disarmament on Target Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent (%)	Little Extent (%)	Moderate Extent (%)	Great Extent (%)	Very Great Extent (%)	N	Median	Mode
Disarmament has caused criminals to shift their focus to softer or less protected targets.	2.6% (10)	2.4% (9)	4.8% (18)	46.8% (177)	43.4% (164)	378	4.00	4.00
There has been an increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children) due to disarmament.	10.3% (39)	32.5% (123)	31.0% (117)	19.0% (72)	7.1% (27)	378	3.00	2.00
Target displacement is a significant consequence of disarmament strategies.	—	2.6% (10)	48.4% (183)	36.8% (139)	12.2% (46)	378	3.00	3.00
Criminals are now targeting properties instead of individuals due to disarmament.	5.0% (19)	42.3% (160)	23.8% (90)	19.0% (72)	9.8% (37)	378	3.00	2.00
Disarmament has led to a change in the types of victims targeted by criminals.	10.3% (39)	29.6% (112)	19.0% (72)	33.9% (128)	7.1% (27)	378	3.00	4.00
Criminal targets have remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies.	11.9% (45)	16.9% (64)	16.7% (63)	21.4% (81)	33.1% (125)	378	4.00	5.00

The study examined the implications of disarmament on spatial crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya by analysing respondents' perceptions across six key statements. The findings indicate statistically significant agreement with the assertion that disarmament efforts have influenced contributed to target crime displacement, showing both the intended and unintended consequences of these strategies. The statement “Disarmament has caused criminals to shift their focus to softer or less protected targets” recorded the highest agreement, with 46.8% (n = 177) of respondents indicating "great extent" and 43.4% (n = 164) reporting "very great extent." A minority of 2.4% (n = 9) chose "no extent" while 2.6% (n=10) chose "moderate extent." The median and mode were both 4.00, suggesting strong consensus on the target crime displacement effect.

Similarly, strong agreement was found with the statement “Target displacement is a significant consequence of disarmament strategies”, where 36.8% (n = 139) selected "great extent" and 12.2% (n = 46) chose "great extent." Only 2.6% (n = 10) reported "no extent,.". Majority of the respondents chose “moderate extent” at 48.4% (n=186). The median and mode for this item were 3.00, indicating an even feeling overall.

For the item “There has been an increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children) due to disarmament,” the highest proportion of respondents selected "little extent" (32.5%, n = 123), followed by "moderate extent" (31.0%, n = 117), while a smaller share (7.1%, n = 27) indicated "very great extent." The median and mode remained at 3.00, showing general lack of agreement or disagreement with the statement.

The statement “Criminals are now targeting properties instead of individuals due to disarmament” elicited more divided responses. 42.3%, n = 160) selected "little extent," and 23.8% (n = 90) chose "moderate extent." Only 28.8% combined indicated "great" or "very great extent." Both the median and mode for this item were 3.00 and 2.00 respectively, implying general disagreement with the notion that disarmament has led to target crime displacement. The assertion “disarmament has led to a change in the types of victims targeted by criminals” was not positively received either, with 10.3% (n = 39) selecting "no extent" and 29.6% (n = 112) indicating "less extent." However, combined 60% affirmed this claim, with 19.0% (n = 29) selected "moderate

extent." 33.9% (n=128) selecting "great extent" and 7.1% (n=27) selecting "very great extent". The median and mode were 3.00 and 4.00 respectively, demonstrating overall agreement.

Lastly, the statement "criminal targets have remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies" received a general agreement reaction, with 11.9% (n= 45) indicating "no extent" and 16.9% (n = 64) reporting "little extent." Meanwhile, 74.2% reported either "moderate extent", "great" or "very great extent." With a median and mode of 4.00 and 5.00, the results suggest general agreement that disarmament could contribute to target crime displacement. These findings correspond with those of a study by Kinyondo and Pelizzo (2018) which found that disarmament led to target and tactical and crime displacement. Criminals shifted their focus from armed robberies to cybercrime and fraud.

In response to the implication of disarmament on target crime displacement, a member of the County Assembly A stated that disarmament has caused target crime displacement. Criminals have changed their target to less protected targets.

"...even here, schools have been targeted and churches sometimes torched. The bandits perceive such institutions to be going against their ways of life and challenging their traditional cultural practices." (Member of County Assembly A)

Village Elder B indicated that crimes had increased against the weak populations due to disarmament.

"...the bandits often attack these schools and women only as a last resort to disorient security operations. They want the police to abandon the disarmament exercise to go back in guarding schools, hospitals, highways, government offices and installations and such other things. Many times, the criminals succeed." (Village Elder B)

The number of crimes committed in the area have generally remained the same even though the criminals may be targeting different victims. The representative of the business community A observed that disarmament enforcement faced challenges of implementation.

“...the crimes are just the same year-round, the challenge is lack of cooperation by the community. The community fear retaliation attacks once the police have retreated and they are left behind. Even Chiefs and elders have been killed for cooperating with security agencies.” (Member of Business Community A)

According to Village Elder A, disarmament officers encountered challenges such as language barrier, lack of familiarity of the terrain and political interference. Ward Commander A stated that some hotspot areas are inaccessible making it difficult to carryout disarmament effectively and an added advantage to the criminals.

“...while police officers are using the road, the criminals have no use of the road. They use the forest and the shrubs. They have some “panya routes” that lead to nowhere according to the police but lead to some destination for the bandits and the rustlers. These people can attack here at Kambi Karaya today and in 24 hours or less, they will be in Laikipia more than 300Kms away. They move day and night in the hills and gorges and valleys. They don’t use the road.” (Ward Commander A)

Village Elder A stated that when carrying out disarmament, new strategies need to be employed to ensure the safety of the vulnerable populations such as women and children because these criminals will deflect their crime on such soft spots to create a situation of chaos and pandemonium. Moreover, women, children, the elderly, and families bear the force of the security agencies while the morans have all run away leaving behind such people who cannot move, or move fast enough.

“...they want to ensure that the strategy does not work by simply creating conditions of lawlessness all over the place. Attacking everything that will shift the attention of people to the victims. In their mind, the criminals know that this is a clever move. But for you and I, we know it is a stupid move that only increases attention and focus on them. Then, the police move in to disarm the people and force is used. The cattle rustlers are gone and only the vulnerable people such as women, children, and the elderly suffer.”(Village Elder A)

According to Chief B: criminals at times shift their target to police officers and this has increased their fear.

“...instances when police have been targeted are well documented. Today, when police officers are transferred to Tot, Kerio, Ortum, Kainuk, Barwessa, Tiaty, Nginyang’ Todonyang’ Mukutani and such places, fear grips them. Even us as administrators, we have a problem accepting such deployments. You fear that the criminals may just turn against you as they have done previously. ”
(Assistant County Commissioner, C)

A representative of the business community B added that there is need to enhance community engagements and improve community cooperation in restoring security in the North-Rift region.

“...these regions should be treated as a unit. One single unit because their cultures resemble, their socio-economics also resemble. Piecemeal actions are not helping. See how Uganda dealt with the banditry and cattle rustling among the Karamoja clan in Uganda. President Museveni created an entire government department. A ministry in charge of the Karamoja. These days we rarely hear cattle rustling among the Karamoja of Uganda and Toposa of South Sudan and the Merille of Ethiopia.” (Member of Business Community B)

These sentiments concur with Joel Migdal’s theory of state society relations; strong states, weak nations. According to Migdal (2018), despite tremendous advancements that have been made economically, politically, and socially, fewer developing countries have fully succeeded in integrating their populations seamlessly into the so-called modernity. Traditional rural societies have generally remained unchanged in terms of their histo-socio-cultural practices and conflict frontiers. Similarly, routine activity theory of crime assert that crime will occur at the confluence of a perpetrator and a victim in time and place (De Melo et al. 2018). In the case of North-Rift Counties of Kenya, the existence of cattle, goats, and camels side-by-side with motivated criminals can only lead to crime.

4.4.5 Implications of Disarmament on Functional Crime Displacement in North Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the disarmament and functional crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 20.

Table 20: Inferential Analysis on Implications of Disarmament on Functional Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2117.262 ^a	225	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	899.857	225	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	243.688	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.611		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.921		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.804		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 242 cells (94.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2117.262^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between disarmament and functional crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.611 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .804$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 92.1% of the total variance in functional crime displacement could be attributed to disarmament.

Therefore, when disarmament operations are enhanced, the criminals may diversify their illegal activities for example shift the types of crimes being committed (e.g., from banditry to cattle rustling or robbery). This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be monitored to detect the instances of functional crime displacement. According to Palma-Borda et al., (2025) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to transition to less risky forms of crime and diversify their illegal activities. Moreover, criminals may even revert to more risky and malign crimes. Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of disarmament on functional crime displacement in North-Rift of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 21.

Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Disarmament on Functional Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent (%)	Little Extent (%)	Moderate Extent (%)	Great Extent (%)	Very Great Extent (%)	N	Median	Mode
Disarmament has led to a shift in the types of crimes being committed (e.g., from armed robbery to fraud).	32.8% (124)	14.6% (55)	26.2% (99)	21.7% (82)	4.8% (18)	378	3.00	1.00
Criminals have diversified their illegal activities as a result of disarmament.	—	12.4% (47)	33.6% (127)	44.2% (167)	9.8% (37)	378	4.00	4.00
Functional displacement of crime is a direct outcome of disarmament strategies.	2.6% (10)	14.6% (55)	33.9% (128)	43.9% (166)	5.0% (19)	378	3.00	4.00
Disarmament has caused a decline in violent crimes but an increase in non-violent crimes.	7.4% (28)	54.2% (205)	9.5% (36)	19.0% (72)	9.8% (37)	378	2.00	2.00
Criminals have transitioned to less risky forms of crime due to disarmament.	10.1% (38)	36.2% (137)	15.1% (57)	28.8% (109)	9.8% (37)	378	3.00	2.00
The same types of crimes have endured despite disarmament strategies.	12.2% (46)	14.6% (55)	7.1% (27)	38.1% (144)	28.0% (106)	378	4.00	4.00

The analysis of the implications of disarmament on functional crime displacement in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya revealed varied responses regarding changes in criminal behaviour and crime types. A substantial proportion of respondents indicated that disarmament has led to a shift in the types of crimes being committed, such as a transition from armed robbery to fraud, with 32.8% reporting no extent of change, 14.6% little extent, and 48% indicating moderate to very great extent. The median and mode for this item were both 3.00, indicating a moderate extent agreement. Regarding the diversification of illegal activities, most respondents agreed, with 44.2% reporting a great extent and 9.8% a very great extent of diversification; the median and mode were both 4.00, reflecting strong agreement.

Functional displacement of crime was widely acknowledged as a direct outcome of disarmament strategies, with 43.9% and 5.0% of respondents indicating great and very great extents, respectively. The median and mode were 3.00 and 4.00, respectively, suggesting moderate to strong agreement. Many participants also perceived a decline in violent crimes alongside an increase in non-violent crimes, with 54.2% indicating little extent and 28.8% reporting great or very great extents; the median was 2.00 and mode 2.00, showing a tendency toward slight agreement.

Similarly, criminals transitioning to less risky crimes was supported, with a median of 3.00 and mode of 4.00. Despite these changes, 38.1% and 28.0% of respondents reported that the same types of crimes have endured, with median and mode values of 4.00, indicating that traditional crime patterns persist alongside emerging shifts. Overall, disarmament appears to have influenced crime functionally but not eliminated conventional criminal activities

The findings correspond to those of a study by Kagwanja and Southall (2020) in Mombasa who found that disarmament led to functional crime displacement. Disarmament led to an increase in drug-related crimes, particularly in coastal towns like Malindi and Lamu and a decrease in firearm related crimes. This shows the ability of criminals to functionally displace their crime activities and the need for strategies that address the underlying cause of crime. A study by Weisburd et al., (2017) also showed that disarmament led to functional crime displacement. This is due to the criminal's ability to adapt to new enforcement measures.

On the question on implications of disarmament on functional crime displacement, thematic analysis revealed that there was significant influence. Chief A responded that disarmament had led to functional crime displacement. Due to disarmament criminals were shifting from the initial crimes to other forms of crime. Assistant Chief A responded that this strategy had caused criminals to engage in other forms of crime such as assault.

“...the theft of cattle has reduced slightly but we now see instances of assaults especially assaulting people of different clan.” (Assistant Chief A)

Criminals have diversified the illegal activities they engage in. Village Elder B stated that due to disarmament, criminals have shifted to crimes that are less detectable and this has caused the number of crimes to remain the same despite the strategies.

“...now we see molestation, theft, hijacking travellers on the road, those going to Lodwar. Even though we know that these are diversionary since the cattle rustler interest and focus remain livestock.” (Village Elder B)

Assistant county commissioner C stated that, disarmament officers are faced with the challenge of detecting new crimes and addressing the new crimes that criminals have changed into after changing their initial criminal activities.

“...you know officers were sent here because of cattle rustling and banditry majorly. But other crimes also exist and emerge. After criminals change to these other crimes, security agencies may think the crime of banditry and cattle rustling has ended, and that the operation has been a success. This is not always accurate.” Assistant County Commissioner C)

Criminals gain an advantage over the officers due to this false impression that security agencies may have of success. A member of the County Assembly B added that the police are faced with the challenge of regulating criminals who are more in number, increasingly use dangerous weapons and well-versed with their terrain. The representative of the business community A responded that for disarmament to address functional crime displacement and provide security the enforcers must come up with strategies that monitor and eliminate crimes and do not allow criminals to engage in different crimes. They can employ local informants and avoid engaging in blanket disarmament.

4.4.6 Implications of Disarmament on Perpetrator Crime Displacement in North Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the disarmament and perpetrator crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 22.

Table 22: Inferential Analysis on Implications of Disarmament on Perpetrator Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2750.767 ^a	180	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	1237.631	180	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	354.921	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.779		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.938		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.970		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 195 cells (93.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .05.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2750.767^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between disarmament and perpetrator crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.779 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .970$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 93.8% of the total variance in perpetrator crime displacement could be attributed to disarmament.

Therefore, when disarmament is enhanced, the criminals may shift the demographic profile of criminals may shift (e.g., younger offenders). Also new perpetrators emerge in the area and experienced criminals recruit or mentor new offenders. This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid perpetrator crime displacement. According to Braga et al., (2024) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to change their demographic profiles including changing the landscape. The shift may also include more first-time offenders. Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of disarmament on perpetrator crime displacement in North-Rift of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 23.

Table 23: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Disarmament on Perpetrator Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent	Little Extent	Moderate Extent	Great Extent	Very Great Extent	Median	Mode	N
Disarmament has led to a change in the demographic profile of criminals (e.g., younger offenders)	30.4% (115)	12.2% (46)	26.2% (99)	28.8% (109)	2.4% (9)	3.00	1	378
New perpetrators have emerged in areas where disarmament has been implemented	5.0% (19)	16.9% (64)	36.5% (138)	36.8% (139)	4.8% (18)	3.00	4	378
Perpetrator displacement is a noticeable effect of disarmament policies	0.0% (0)	9.5% (36)	53.4% (202)	24.6% (93)	12.4% (47)	3.00	3	378
Disarmament has caused experienced criminals to recruit or mentor new offenders	5.0% (19)	25.4% (96)	40.7% (154)	19.0% (72)	9.8% (37)	3.00	3	378
The criminal landscape has shifted to include more first-time offenders due to disarmament	27.5% (104)	24.1% (91)	14.3% (54)	19.6% (74)	14.6% (55)	2.00	1	378

The Table above presents the distribution of responses regarding perpetrator displacement following disarmament initiatives. The item “disarmament has led to a change in the demographic profile of criminals (e.g., younger offenders)” recorded the highest percentage of responses at "no extent" (30.4%, n = 115), with a median of 3.00 and a mode of 1, indicating general disagreement. Conversely, the statement “New perpetrators have emerged in areas where disarmament has been implemented” had the highest proportion of agreement, with 36.8% (n = 139) selecting "great extent" and 36.5% (n = 138) selecting "moderate extent," yielding a median of 3.00 and a mode of 4, suggesting overall agreement.

The item “perpetrator displacement is a noticeable effect of disarmament policies” was rated "Moderate Extent" by 53.4% (n = 202) of respondents, with a median and mode of 3.00. Similarly, responses to “disarmament has caused experienced criminals to recruit or mentor new offenders” concentrated around "moderate extent" (40.7%, n = 154), with a mode of 3. Finally, the statement “the criminal landscape has shifted to include more first-time offenders due to disarmament” was rated "no extent" by 27.5% (n = 104), indicating general disagreement (Median = 2.00; Mode = 1). All items were based on N = 378.

In response to the question on implication of disarmament on perpetrator crime displacement, Ward Commander A stated that disarmament led to perpetrator crime displacement. Displacement causes new perpetrators to emerge after the old ones are dealt with or die out due to natural attrition.

“...this is a socio-cultural induction to young morans to take over from the old retired ones. If you want to know, come here during their cultural ceremonies and age-set celebrations. The boys are inducted during rites of passage. They must prove heroic. To marry, they need cattle. Lots of it. Marriage is expensive here.” (Ward Commander A)

Ward Commander B concurred with Ward Commander A and added that disarmament led to a shift from old offenders to younger offenders. Old offenders mentored new offenders who continued committing the offences.

“...it is like being handed over power. Cattle are at the centre of every occasion. Successful raiders are celebrated by women and admired. The

unsuccessful ones are perceived as weak and may be sent to school. School is some form of banishment. Most of the elders were initially. Deep in Kraal, the children are simply herders. The morans leave around the manyatta. Usually a ring of three layers. At the heart of the manyatta are the cattle. They also are a very spiritual people believing in their spiritual leaders like Tororot and Laibons” (Ward Commander B)

Chief B observed that *morans* are only within a specified age category. They are trained by elders on the ways of the community and how to defend when the time comes.

“...the elders create new morans. All these communities here have this system. It is deeply rooted in their culture. So, no community here can say they are only always victim. The communal fabric is so strong that it is not easy to break.” (Chief B)

Assistant Chief A suggests that there is need to diversify economic means for the people in the North-Rift.

“...people kill each other here for cattle but cattle has not improved their living conditions. Poverty persists. Drought and lack of water persists. Sometimes food is donated here. Many times, donations come. Yet cattle in their thousands are here. We need to do much more to educate our people.” (Assistant Chief A)

Ward Commander A added that disarmament and all these strategies are merely relieving pain temporarily.

“...these strategies are just painkillers. The root causes are not being addressed. Let us focus on education, invest in animal tagging and branding, each region with a unique animal tag/brand, work on porous interstate borders, investigate the political class involvement, economic empowerment, and invest in attack drones not just surveillance drones.” (Ward Commander A)

The sentiment that “...the communal fabric is so strong...” resonate with Joel Migdal’s theory on state society relations. Migdal (2018) pointed out that traditional

cultural, religious, economic, and political formations provided the core (re)ordering of the community and that the elite (including the political elites) merely expressed the order that originates from the core values. That is, the elite exist and act only on the core value system. In short, the elite is inextricably linked to the core, influenced by it, and controlled by it.

4.5 Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The second objective sought to assess the impact of dusk-to-dawn curfews on crime displacement in the North Rift Counties of Kenya. The analysis revealed a statistically significant association between the imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfews and crime displacement ($p = .0001$). Further Chi-square analysis was conducted to determine the extent to which the curfews influenced the six categories of crime displacement within the region. A summary of these results is presented in Table 24.

Table 24: Relationship between of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfews and Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

Variable	N	Chi-Square	df	P-Value
Relationship between Dusk-to-dawn curfew and Spatial crime displacement	378	1839.638 ^a	140	0.0001
Relationship between Dusk-to-dawn curfew and Temporal crime displacement	378	1195.452 ^a	120	0.0001
Relationship between Dusk-to-dawn curfew and Tactical crime displacement	378	1926.725 ^a	110	0.0001
Relationship between Dusk-to-dawn curfew and Target crime displacement	378	1292.337 ^a	140	0.0001
Relationship between Dusk-to-dawn curfew and Functional crime displacement	378	2072.290 ^a	150	0.0001
Relationship between Dusk-to-dawn curfew and Perpetrator crime displacement	378	1598.223 ^a	120	0.0001

The findings show that dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to all the six types of crime displacement. Specifically, dusk-to-dawn curfew showed a statistically significant relationship with spatial crime displacement ($p=.0001$); temporal crime displacement ($p=.0001$); tactical crime displacement ($p=.0001$); target crime displacement ($p=.0001$); functional crime displacement ($p=.0001$), and perpetrator crime displacement ($p=.0001$).

4.5.1 Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Spatial Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the dusk-to-dawn and spatial crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 25.

Table 25: Inferential Analysis of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Spatial Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	1839.638 ^a	140	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	755.694	140	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	208.611	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.698		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.911		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.744		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 145 cells (87.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 1839.638^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfew and spatial crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.698 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .744$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 91.1% of the total variance in spatial crime displacement could be attributed to dusk-to-dawn curfew.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to criminals relocating their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament measures. This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid spatial crime displacement. According to Tregle et al., (2025) the geographic distribution of crime may change significantly due to the hotspot policing strategy in use. The spatial distribution may change (produce displacement) if the strategy is not paired with a sustained resource commitment. Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew on spatial crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 26.

Table 26: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Spatial Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent	Little Extent	Moderate Extent	Great Extent	Very Great Extent	Median	Mode	N
Dusk-to-dawn curfew in hotspot areas has led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions	4.8% (18)	19.3% (73)	2.4% (9)	51.3% (194)	22.2% (84)	4.00	4.00	378
Criminals have relocated their activities to areas with less stringent curfew measures	2.4% (9)	7.4% (28)	23.8% (90)	32.3% (122)	34.1% (129)	4.00	5.00	378
Spatial crime displacement is a direct consequence of dusk-to-dawn curfew in hotspot zones	4.8% (18)	10.3% (39)	33.9% (128)	33.6% (127)	17.5% (66)	4.00	3.00	378
Due to dusk-to-dawn curfew, crime has shifted from urban centres to rural or suburban areas	25.1% (95)	46.0% (174)	14.3% (54)	7.1% (27)	7.4% (28)	2.00	2.00	378
The geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly due to dusk-to-dawn policies	7.4% (28)	19.3% (73)	24.3% (92)	34.4% (130)	14.6% (55)	3.00	4.00	378
Crime hotspots have generally remained the same despite implementation of dusk-to-dawn curfew	14.8% (56)	24.1% (91)	9.5% (36)	26.5% (100)	25.1% (95)	4.00	4.00	378

The study examined the perceived effects of the dusk-to-dawn curfew on crime patterns in hotspot areas and neighbouring regions. Results showed that majority of respondents (51.3%, n = 194) agreed to a great extent that the curfew led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions, with an additional 22.2% (n = 84) reporting very great extent agreement; the median and mode for this item were both 4.00, indicating general agreement. Regarding relocation of criminal activities, 34.1% (n = 129) of participants strongly agreed that criminals shifted to areas with less stringent curfew enforcement, while 32.3% (n = 122) agreed to a great extent; the median was 4.00 and the mode was 5.00. Spatial crime displacement was also perceived as a consequence of the curfew, with 33.9% (n = 128) indicating moderate extent and 33.6% (n = 127) great extent, and a median of 4.00. In contrast, only 14.5% combined (n = 55) reported a great or very great extent of crime shifting from urban centres to rural or suburban areas, with a median and mode of 2.00, indicating less agreement.

The geographic distribution of crime was perceived to have changed significantly by 48.9% of respondents, who agreed to a moderate to very great extent, with a median of 3.00 and mode of 4.00. Finally, 51.6% (n = 195) of respondents indicated that crime hotspots generally remained the same despite curfew enforcement, reflected by a median and mode of 4.00. Overall, these findings suggest a complex pattern of crime displacement linked to dusk-to-dawn curfew measures.

The findings of this study are in accord with Marigat and Cheruiyotomo (2022) who found that dusk to dawn curfew affected spatial crime displacement. In the North-Rift counties, criminals continue to use sophisticated weaponry despite dusk-to-dawn curfews and other hotspot policing strategies being implemented and cattle rustling continue to persist. A study by Mengistu (2015) showed that despite the Ethiopian government using dusk to dawn curfew to control destruction of major government infrastructure projects in Addis Ababa the resultant effects were spatial displacement of crimes to other regions.

On the question of whether dusk to dawn curfew has any implications on spatial crime displacement, Chief A pointed out that dusk to dawn curfew caused spatial crime displacement. Criminals tend to change the location of their criminal activities due to this curfew.

“...if dusk-to-dawn curfew is in active in Loima, the criminals move to Aroo, Cheseгон, Suguta or Kainuk or even beyond into Samburu and Laikipia. There is no shortage of locations for these bandits.” (Chief A)

Assistant Chief B stated that dusk-to-dawn curfew caused criminals to change their activities from the hotspot areas to the neighbouring areas. This has resulted into fear among the neighbouring communities and even countries.

“...whenever there is curfew in force in a place like Mukutani, Marigat, Barwessa, Bartabwa, or Tot, prepare either for curfew to happen in the neighbouring places or prepare for attack and invasion by bandits and cattle rustlers.” (Assistant Chief B)

Village Elder A stated that dusk-to dawn curfews leads to crime being shifted to unprotected areas where criminals can easily carryout their activities. Areas with less stringent dusk-to-dawn curfew measures become the new hotspot areas for criminals. Similar sentiments were also shared by Assistant County Commissioner C.

“...criminals will definitely move to curfew free familiar territory. ”(Village Elder A and Assistant County Commissioner C)

Assistant County Commissioner A also stated that despite the implementation of dusk to dawn curfew, crimes have remained the same and only the geographic region changes. Ward Commander A further observed that criminals have come up with ways to evade the dusk to dawn curfews enabling them to carry out their activities without being discovered.

“...to evade curfew, the bandit would use less patrolled paths, routes and areas. Our officers cannot cover the entire expanse. Moreover, the porous borders also make it a challenge to control movement. Sometimes you these strategies are perceptive. The people should get the impression that something is being done while the challenges of the vast terrain make it impossible to do any meaningful enforcement of the dusk-to-dawn curfew.”(Ward Commander A)

Ward Commander C stated that curfew rarely helped address insecurity both at the place of implementation and beyond.

“...you know I told you these criminals don’t use the roads and those shopping centres there. These people are deep in the shrubs and hills. I think they do not even know if a curfew is in place. Which police officer will move through the thicket in the night to see who is violating curfew? The Kraals are located in inaccessible, extremely remote and hostile terrain areas. Still, I think curfew works. To safeguard innocent people and their property.”(Ward Commander C)

The Ward Commander C further stated that curfew works to avert crime, at the curfew zone at least, in other ways.

“...curfew prevents potential victims of crime from harm. For instance, Public Transport Vehicles (PSVs) that move along the crime zone will either be escorted by security agencies or wait regroup and form a formidable number before attempting to move across the terrain. During curfew, other crimes are also generally low as well.” (Ward Commander C)

The effectiveness of the dusk-to-dawn curfew can be enhanced if the focus is widespread across the region. This may limit violation, restrict movement of criminals, and thus reduce the likelihood of spatial crime displacement.

4.5.2 Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Temporal Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the dusk-to-dawn and temporal crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 27.

Table 27: Inferential Analysis on the Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Temporal Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	1195.452 ^a	120	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	589.327	120	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	61.465	1	0.0001
	Cramer's V	0.562		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.772		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.409		0.000 ^c
Symmetric Measures		N of Valid Cases		
		378		

a. 126 cells (88.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 1195.452^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfew and temporal crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.562 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .409$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 77.2% of the total variance in temporal crime displacement could be attributed to dusk-to-dawn curfew.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of dusk-to-dawn curfew has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities or the criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when police hotspot policing strategies are relaxed. This implies that hotspot policing strategy of dusk-to-dawn though effective in crime reduction and control within the short term, its crime reductionist's impact dissipates quickly and the residual deterrence effects are weak and highly likely to decay without remedying the crime situation.

Temporal crime displacement may be inevitable. According to Carvalho and Guerra (2025) and Hertfordshire (2025) the hotspot policing strategies, such as dusk-to-dawn curfews, may cause criminals to change the timing of their activities e.g., from daytime to night-time and vice-versa.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew on temporal crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 28.

Table 28 : Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Temporal Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent n (%)	Little Extent n (%)	Moderate Extent n (%)	Great Extent n (%)	Very Great Extent n (%)	Median	Mode	N
Due to dusk-to-dawn curfew, criminals have changed the timing of their activities (day to night or night to day)	19 (5.0%)	19 (5.0%)	9 (2.4%)	118 (31.2%)	213 (56.3%)	5	5	378
Crime rates have increased during periods when dusk-to-dawn curfew enforcement have been relaxed	10 (2.6%)	46 (12.2%)	46 (12.2%)	120 (31.7%)	156 (41.3%)	4	5	378
Temporal displacement of crime is a noticeable outcome of dusk-to-dawn curfew strategy	9 (2.4%)	47 (12.4%)	127 (33.6%)	83 (22.0%)	112 (29.6%)	4	3	378
Criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when dusk-to-dawn curfew efforts have been reduced	9 (2.4%)	10 (2.6%)	55 (14.6%)	111 (29.4%)	193 (51.1%)	5	5	378
Enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a shift in the frequency of criminal activities over time	0 (0.0%)	55 (14.6%)	85 (22.5%)	184 (48.7%)	54 (14.3%)	4	4	378
Crime times have generally remained unchanged despite enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew	65 (17.2%)	120 (31.7%)	55 (14.6%)	64 (16.9%)	74 (19.6%)	3	2	378

Participants' responses regarding temporal crime displacement due to the dusk-to-dawn curfew were analysed. The majority indicated that criminals changed the timing of their activities from day to night or vice versa, with 56.3% reporting this occurred to a very great extent and 31.2% to a great extent (Median = 5, Mode = 5). Similarly, 41.3% agreed that crime rates increased during periods when curfew enforcement was relaxed to a very great extent, and 31.7% to a great extent (Median = 4, Mode = 5). Regarding the perception of temporal displacement as a noticeable outcome of the curfew strategy, 29.6% of respondents agreed to a very great extent and 22.0% to a great extent (Median = 4, Mode = 3). Additionally, 51.1% indicated criminals adapted by committing crimes during reduced curfew efforts to a very great extent, while 29.4% indicated to a great extent (Median = 5, Mode = 5).

When asked about shifts in the frequency of criminal activities over time, 48.7% reported this occurred to a great extent and 14.3% to a very great extent (Median = 4, Mode = 4). However, opinions were more varied on whether crime times remained unchanged despite the curfew, with 31.7% reporting little extent and 17.2% reporting no extent, while 19.6% indicated a very great extent (Median = 3, Mode = 2). Overall, these findings suggest a strong perception that dusk-to-dawn curfew enforcement has influenced the timing and frequency of criminal activities, although some believe that crime timing has remained stable.

The findings are consistent with those obtained in a study by Fellmeth (2022). Fellmeth argued that the dusk-to-dawn curfew led to temporal crime displacement. Banditry and other crimes that have ravaged the North-Rift Counties of Kenya for decades, continue to exist due to temporal crime displacement.

Thematic analysis of the responses on the implication of dusk to dawn curfew on temporal crime displacement have been illustrated by views expressed through the focus groups as discussed below.

A member of County Assembly A stated that dusk to dawn curfew led to temporal crime displacement.

"...quite simply. Curfew at one time, and not all times exposes the other times for crime activity. Similarly, curfew at one place and not all places subjects the other places to more crime activities." (Member of County Assembly A)

Criminals have changed the timing of their activities to avoid curfews. Assistant County Commissioner B stated that crimes generally decrease when there is dusk to dawn curfew and increase when the curfew has been relaxed.

“...well during curfew here, Lami nyeusi is quite calm. We only here there are problems in Alale or Sigor. Maybe the criminals have moved to those places.”
(County Commissioner B)

The crimes are still the same only the time is different. Chief B stated that there are challenges such as lack of enough funds to implement the dusk to dawn curfew fully and comprehensively and the number of police officers, despite enhancement, are still low.

“...curfew does not make crime go away. Did curfew make covid 19 go away? Haha its arguable. But this is crime deeply infused and reinforced by some cultural beliefs. Do you think curfew order will just make it vanish? I think not.” (Chief B)

Ward Commander B stated that hostility of conditions and lack of awareness of the local landscape and hide outs, uncontrolled border firearm trade and existence of well-structured militia group all fight to keep the criminal network alive. This makes it difficult to enforce the dusk to dawn curfew consistently and effectively.

“...the curfew is effective to some extent. Not for the bandits. But in a situation of active violence, it can restore calm temporarily. Also, you see, the police are strained of resources, when a curfew is in place, the response to time by police (usually three hours) can be reduced to less.” (Ward Commander B)

Representative of the business community A stated that the implementation of dusk to dawn curfew, especially late market curfew leads to reduced economic growth which affects the communities.

“...businesses and locals are hit the most by these curfews. We close early and products take longer to reach here. Criminals may end up breaking into our shops since no one is left to watch anything. We expect the police to be watching things and maybe they are not.” (Member of Business Community)

The Assistant Chief B also added that in implementing the dusk to dawn curfew the enforcers have to come up with new methods that criminals are not familiar with.

“...today for example, they hit Kainuk, you enforce curfew here. Tomorrow, they will be hitting Elchamus, Marakwet, and Baringo. To them curfew or no curfew, their lives go on almost in a similar fashion. The police need to hire the right people to confront them. Police alone will not win. Curfews alone will not help. ”(Assistant Chief B)

Assistant Chief C stated that the number of crimes in the area continues to exist despite the implementation of hotspot policing strategy. The criminals flip their operational time. This is possible since they have intricate understanding of their environment. Brantingham and Brantingham (2017) have pointed out that the criminal ecosystem contribute to the success and failure of crime control efforts such as dusk-to-dawn. For the North-Rift, the criminal ecological characteristics have largely contributed to the little significance of hotspot policing strategies overall.

4.5.3 Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Tactical Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the dusk-to-dawn and tactical crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 29.

Table 29: Inferential Analysis on the Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Tactical Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	1926.725 ^a	110	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	763.062	110	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	232.862	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.714		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.914		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.786		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		
		a. 112 cells (84.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.		

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 1926.725^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfew and tactical crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.714 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship

between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .786$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 91.4% of the total variance in tactical crime displacement could be attributed to dusk-to-dawn curfew. Therefore, when dusk-to-dawn curfew is enhanced, the criminals may adopt new methods or tools to commit crimes for example non-firearm-related crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects) to avoid detection after during enforcement of curfew.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of dusk-to-dawn curfews has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities or the criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when police hotspot policing strategies are relaxed. This implies that this strategy remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed throughout the expanse area rather than concentrated at hot zones only to avoid tactical crime displacement. According to Das et al., (2025) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after disarmament.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew on tactical crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 30.

Table 30: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Tactical Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent n (%)	Little Extent n (%)	Moderate Extent n (%)	Great Extent n (%)	Very Great Extent n (%)	Median	Mode	N
Criminals have adopted new methods or tools to commit crimes during dusk-to-dawn curfew	47 (12.4%)	102 (27.0%)	63 (16.7%)	147 (38.9%)	19 (5.0%)	3	4	378
Enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to an increase in non-firearm-related crimes	104 (27.5%)	110 (29.1%)	155 (41.0%)	9 (2.4%)	0 (0.0%)	2	3	378
Tactical changes in criminal behaviours are a direct result of dusk-to-dawn curfew	0 (0.0%)	37 (9.8%)	260 (68.8%)	81 (21.4%)	0 (0.0%)	3	3	378
Criminals have become more innovative in avoiding detection during dusk-to-dawn curfew	0 (0.0%)	19 (5.0%)	138 (36.5%)	158 (41.8%)	63 (16.7%)	4	4	378
Due to dusk-to-dawn curfew criminals have been forced to use less detectable weapons	18 (4.8%)	123 (32.5%)	64 (16.9%)	83 (22.0%)	90 (23.8%)	3	2	378
Criminal tactics have remained unchanged despite enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew	65 (17.2%)	101 (26.7%)	72 (19.0%)	101 (26.7%)	39 (10.3%)	3	2	378

The study examined the implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew enforcement on tactical crime displacement in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya, with a sample size of 378 respondents. Results indicated that 38.9% of respondents agreed to a great extent and 5.0% to a very great extent that criminals adopted new methods or tools to commit crimes during the curfew (Median = 3, Mode = 4). Regarding the increase in non-firearm-related crimes, 41.0% reported a moderate extent and 2.4% a great extent, while 27.5% and 29.1% indicated no extent and little extent, respectively (Median = 2, Mode = 3).

Tactical changes in criminal behaviour as a direct result of curfew enforcement were acknowledged by the majority, with 68.8% reporting a moderate extent and 21.4% a great extent (Median = 3, Mode = 3). Additionally, innovation by criminals to avoid detection during curfew was supported by 41.8% to a great extent and 16.7% to a very great extent (Median = 4, Mode = 4). Forced use of less detectable weapons by criminals due to curfew enforcement was reported by 22.0% to a great extent and 23.8% to a very great extent, although 32.5% indicated little extent (Median = 3, Mode = 2). Finally, 26.7% of respondents each reported little and great extents, and 10.3% a very great extent, indicating that criminal tactics have remained unchanged despite curfew enforcement (Median = 3, Mode = 2).

A study by Yesufu (2022) points out, that dusk to dawn curfew led to tactical crime displacement. There has been significant increase of homicide against foreign nationals in South Africa. Criminals have developed new techniques of committing crimes against person and property in ways that are less detectable ways especially during the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.

In response to the implication of dusk to dawn curfew on tactical crime displacement, Village Elder B stated that tactical changes in criminal behaviour are a direct result of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.

“...you know these criminals split into smaller groups of five and six and use motorcycles to outrun even security personnel during curfew. Imagine they are so small bodied that 5 or even six of them can fit one motorbike. They ride fast across those bushes.” (Village Elder B)

Village Elder A added that criminals have come up with new methods to commit their crimes after implementation of this curfew e.g., changing from using firearms to no firearm related crimes.

“...they know how to shoot arrows too. They never miss. When curfew is in place and arms are being confiscated, they have alternative weaponry that are just as fatal as guns.”(Village Elder A)

To the extent that they tactically change weapons, the criminals are able to continue their crime. Assistant County Commissioner B stated that the number of crime incidences after the enforcement of dusk to dawn curfew has remained the same and only the method of commission has changed.

“...the target is cattle and goats. This has not changed much across all the communities here. The gold mining at Marichi, Kambi Karaya, Lami nyeusi and these other places has only brought temporary calm. It cannot replace their thirst for cattle. Another thing, this place is dry, vehicles are rare. The criminals from their hilltops can see smoke of dust and monitor it. They know that the police are coming. They change their tactics.” (Assistant County Commissioner B)

Village Elder A and Village Elder B further stated that criminals have adopted skilful ways of reaching their target in fulfilling their desires to commit crime for example disguise and monitoring the police patrols.

“...there people use geography to their advantage. Things like dust, heat, gorges, valleys, hills, shrubs, rivers etc. The kraal is their centre force. Its location is deeply fortified. Each kraal contains a minimum of 400 firearms and a maximum of 1000 to 2000 firearms. This is more than enough to put up formidable resistance. Each kraal is about 3 Kilometres from another kraal. This is essential for backup purposes.” (Village Elder A and Village Elder B)

According Assistant County Commissioner B, the kraal is the centre for tactics.

“...if you destroy the kraal, you destroy the bandits. The challenge is how to destroy it entirely yet women and children and the elderly and cattle are there. During violent enforcement of curfew and disarmament, the security agencies

may be ambushed from all directions. The kraals help each other during conflict. This is tactical.” (Assistant County Commissioner B)

These assertions are in accord with the geometric theory of crime as suggested by Brantingham et al., (2020). The scholars pointed out that criminal events must be understood from the influence of the location of the crime event and the time of occurrence. In rural places many people generally operate in the same location creating a high degree of awareness of the location. Criminals can take advantage of the nodes and edges in their location to form and enhance crime decision making. Using and taking advantage of environmental cues, the criminals are able to strategically place themselves at an advantage, identify potential targets and execute action. Moreover, they will use the same cues to determine if, and when to avoid the bad luck and select the appropriate time, method, and tactic to execute their criminal activity (Brantingham and Brantingham 2017; 2016).

According to Village Elder C, the enforcement of this strategy was facing funding challenges, lack of knowledge of areas and lack of knowledge on the hiding places. Chief C stated that the police can provide more protection and patrols, use drone technology, invest in intelligence that can penetrate the people to determine the locations of the kraal among the bandits. He added that there is needed to get more resources to support the strategy and ensure the officers are familiar with all the areas.

4.5.4 Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Target Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the dusk-to-dawn curfews and target crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 31.

Table 31: Inferential Analysis of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Target Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	1292.337 ^a	140	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	640.659	140	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	62.771	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.585		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.880		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.408		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 150 cells (90.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 1292.337^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfew and target crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.585 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .408$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 88.0% of the total variance in target crime displacement could be attributed to dusk-to-dawn curfew.

Therefore, when dusk-to-dawn curfew is enhanced, the criminals shift their focus to softer or less protected targets. The criminals may increase their commission of crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children) and installations. This implies that the dusk-to-dawn curfew may be an effective hotspot policing strategy however, it should be cautiously applied given that its contribution to target crime displacement is apparent. According to Zubair et al., (2025) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to change the types of victims targeted, their focus moves to softer or less protected targets.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew on target crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. Table 32 illustrates the findings.

Table 32: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Target Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent n (%)	Little Extent n (%)	Moderate Extent n (%)	Great Extent n (%)	Very Great Extent n (%)	Median	Mode	N
Increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children) due to security agencies	29 (7.7%)	112 (29.6%)	155 (41.0%)	73 (19.3%)	9 (2.4%)	3	3	378
Target displacement is a significant consequence of increased presence of security agencies	0 (0.0%)	19 (5.0%)	200 (52.9%)	131 (34.7%)	28 (7.4%)	3	3	378
Criminals now targeting properties instead of individuals due to increased presence of security agencies	10 (2.6%)	150 (39.7%)	74 (19.6%)	99 (26.2%)	45 (11.9%)	3	2	378
Increased presence of security agencies has led to change in types of victims targeted by criminals	56 (14.8%)	95 (25.1%)	90 (23.8%)	101 (26.7%)	36 (9.5%)	3	4	378
Criminal targets have remained unchanged despite increased presence of security agencies	46 (12.2%)	100 (26.5%)	45 (11.9%)	83 (22.0%)	104 (27.5%)	3	5	378

The study assessed perceptions regarding the impact of dusk-to-dawn curfews on target crime displacement. Results indicated that 41.0% (n=155) of respondents reported a moderate extent of increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children), with 29.6% indicating little extent and 7.7% no extent; the median response was 3 (moderate), and the mode was 3. Regarding target displacement as a significant consequence of increased security presence, 52.9% agreed to a moderate extent, 34.7% to a great extent, and none indicated no extent, with both median and mode values of 3.

The study asked the respondents whether criminals were now targeting properties instead of individuals. 39.7% reported to little extent, 26.2% to a great extent, and 2.6% no extent, with a median of 3 and mode of 2. Changes in the types of victims targeted by criminals due to security presence were reported as moderate by 23.8%, great by 26.7%, and no extent by 14.8%; the median was 3 and mode was 4. Finally, regarding whether criminal targets remained unchanged despite increased security presence, responses were more varied: 27.5% reported very great extent, 22.0% great extent, and 12.2% no extent; the median was 3 and mode was 5. Overall, these findings suggest a moderate perceived effect of increased security presence on target displacement and changes in victim profiles, though some respondents believed criminal targeting remained unchanged.

According to Wall (2022), dusk to dawn curfew leads to target crime displacement. Within East African states, dusk to dawn curfew has been implemented to contain rising crime in urban neighbourhoods and to control violence and gang activities. In Ethiopia, dusk-to-dawn curfew imposed in the Northern Province of Tigray to restore law and order following the emergence of insurgencies in the region led to pillage of vulnerable groups such as the sick, schools, and civilians.

In response to the implication of dusk to dawn curfew on target crime displacement, Village Elder B stated that criminals have changed their target victims for example from young people to elderly people.

“...those elders who are pro-government are often targeted and killed. Chiefs, elders and other administrators have been killed in the past for simply siding with government or supporting security agencies.” (Village Elder B)

Assistant Chief A added that criminals have focused on easier and less protected targets due to dusk to dawn curfew.

“...the criminals often target schools and other unguarded government facilities in retaliation to the stringent security operations.” (Assistant Chief A)

Crimes have increased against the vulnerable people. Assistant County Commissioner A also stated that some criminals shift their target from people to property where the curfew is not concentrated.

“...we have seen damage to property, thefts, shop damage, and emergence of other property crimes. This are usually diversionary to shift the focus of security agencies away from cattle theft and thus create an opportunity for them.” (Assistant County Commissioner A)

A member of county assembly B added that uncooperative members of the public and individual residents, killing of security officials, shortage of weapons among the police and fear created by hostile bandit criminals are challenges experienced when enforcing this strategy. According to Assistant Commissioner B, there should be persistence use of the strategy coupled with monitoring to establish new adaptation tactics used by criminals.

4.5.5 Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Functional Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the dusk-to-dawn and functional crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 33.

Table 33: Inferential Analysis of the Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Functional Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2072.290 ^a	150	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	673.921	150	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	175.870	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.585		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.880		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.408		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 156 cells (88.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2072.290^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfew and functional crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.585 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .408$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 88.0% of the total variance in functional crime displacement could be attributed to dusk-to-dawn curfew.

Therefore, when dusk-to-dawn curfew is enhanced, the criminals may diversify their illegal activities for example shift the types of crimes being committed. This implies that the dusk-to-dawn hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy. However, it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid functional crime displacement. According to Palma-Borda et al., (2025) and Lee (2025) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to transition to less risky forms of crime and diversify their illegal activities.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew on functional crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 34.

Table 34: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Functional Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent n (%)	Little Extent n (%)	Moderate Extent n (%)	Great Extent n (%)	Very Great Extent n (%)	Median	Mode	N
Enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a shift in the types of crimes being committed (e.g., from armed robbery to fraud)	114 (30.2%)	36 (9.5%)	81 (21.4%)	119 (31.5%)	28 (7.4%)	3	4	378
Criminals have diversified their illegal activities as a result of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew	29 (7.7%)	28 (7.4%)	165 (43.7%)	147 (38.9%)	9 (2.4%)	3	3	378
Functional displacement of crime is a direct outcome of dusk-to-dawn curfew strategy	0 (0.0%)	46 (12.2%)	184 (48.7%)	129 (34.1%)	19 (5.0%)	3	3	378
Enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew has caused a decline in violent crimes but an increase in non-violent crimes	39 (10.3%)	166 (43.9%)	101 (26.7%)	63 (16.7%)	9 (2.4%)	2	2	378
Criminals have transitioned to less risky forms of crime due to the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew	29 (7.7%)	130 (34.4%)	74 (19.6%)	100 (26.5%)	45 (11.9%)	3	2	378
The same types of crimes have endured despite the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew	56 (14.8%)	55 (14.6%)	63 (16.7%)	119 (31.5%)	85 (22.5%)	4	4	378

The results indicate that enforcement of the dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a noticeable shift in the types of crimes being committed, with 31.5% of respondents reporting a great extent and 7.4% a very great extent of such shifts, while 30.2% indicated no extent to which this occurred (Median = 3, Mode = 4, n = 378). Similarly, 38.9% of respondents reported that criminals diversified their illegal activities as a result of curfew enforcement to a great extent, and 2.4% to a very great extent, with 7.7% indicating no extent (Median = 3, Mode = 3, n = 378). Functional displacement of crime was also identified as a direct outcome of the curfew strategy, with nearly half of respondents (48.7%) reporting a moderate extent and 34.1% a great extent, while none reported no extent (Median = 3, Mode = 3, n = 378).

Regarding the nature of crimes, 43.9% of respondents indicated a little extent and 16.7% a great extent decline in violent crimes accompanied by an increase in non-violent crimes, while 10.3% reported no extent of this change (Median = 2, Mode = 2, n = 378). Furthermore, 26.5% reported a great extent and 11.9% a very great extent transition by criminals to less risky forms of crime due to the curfew enforcement, with 7.7% indicating no extent (Median = 3, Mode = 2, n = 378). Finally, the persistence of the same types of crimes despite curfew enforcement was noted by 31.5% of respondents to a great extent and 22.5% to a very great extent, although 14.8% indicated no extent of such persistence (Median = 4, Mode = 4, n = 378). Findings collectively suggest that while the curfew has influenced crime patterns by causing shifts and diversification, certain crime types have persisted, indicating a complex and multifaceted impact of the dusk-to-dawn curfew enforcement on criminal behaviour.

These results correspond to those obtained in a study by Miller (2020) and Pina (2007) which showed that dusk to dawn curfew led to functional crime displacement. While dusk to dawn curfew reduced street violence, property crimes and crimes against persons increased. Welsh and Sebire (2025) also observed that dusk to dawn curfew failed to contain surge of crime, and crime displacement across drug-prone cities in most Caribbean and South American cities significantly short-up after the lifting of curfew.

In response to the implication of dusk to dawn curfew on functional crime displacement, Assistant County Commissioner A stated that functional displacement of crime is a direct outcome of dusk-to-dawn curfew strategy. Assistant commissioner B also stated that criminals are changing to other forms of crime due to the dusk to dawn strategy e.g., from cattle theft to robbery.

“Criminals have altered their illegal activities as a result of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew”. (Assistant Commissioner B)

Village Elder B stated that this strategy has caused a decline in violent crimes and an increase in non-violent crimes. Criminals are engaging in crimes that are less risky compared to the previous crimes. Representative of the business community A stated that the enforcement of dusk to dawn curfew had endangered their businesses.

“...when they are facing security operations, businesses and shops are their soft-landing spots.” (Member of Business Community)

Ward Commander added curfew is enforced to control bandits and not ordinary criminals. However, the distinction between these two is almost impossible. The goal is to protect the people and their property but specifically isolating the criminals from the locals is impossible.

“...curfews are not there for ordinary crimes. Banditry and cattle rustling may be crimes generally but their effects are not ordinary. The criminals may shift to other crimes but not often. This is because, for bandits, they only know banditry and cattle rustling. They have no tactics for committing these other crimes like they would for cattle rustling. (Ward Commander B)

According to the representative of the business community B, security personnel should be trained to recognize new form of crimes, as they emerge especially during the enforcement of curfew, establish coordination with other agencies to track changes in crimes and strengthen programs to reduce appeal of other forms of crimes to enhance effectiveness of this strategy. Ratcliffe et al., (2015) forewarned of criminals moving to new crime activities. While the initial crime may be reduced, the probability of another crime emerging exist.

4.5.6 Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Perpetrator Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the dusk-to-dawn and perpetrator crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 35.

Table 35: Inferential Analysis of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Perpetrator Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	1598.223 ^a	120	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	663.788	120	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	113.717	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.650		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.899		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.549		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 123 cells (86.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 1598.223^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfew and perpetrator crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was .650 > 0.50 which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .549$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 88.9% of the total variance in perpetrator crime displacement could be attributed to dusk-to-dawn curfew. Therefore, when dusk-to-dawn curfew is enhanced, the demographic profile of criminals may shift (e.g., younger offenders).

Also new perpetrators emerge in the area and experienced criminals recruit or mentor new offenders. This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy. However, to avoid perpetrator crime displacement, security agencies need to incorporate other policing strategies such as community policing, and enhance their level of cooperation with locals. According to Braga et al., (2024) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to change their demographic profiles including the criminal landscape may shift to include more first-time offenders. Amnesty International (2025) opined that hot-spot policing (targeted) while it can achieve quick fall in crime rates, the danger of crime displacement including perpetrator crime

displacement persists. The implementation of strategies such as dusk-to-dawn showed be weighed against the resultant crime displacement/diffusion of crime benefits outcome.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of dusk-to-dawn curfew on perpetrator crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 36.

Table 36: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew Perpetrator Crime Displacement

Statement	No Extent n (%)	Little Extent n (%)	Moderate Extent n (%)	Great Extent n (%)	Very Great Extent n (%)	Median	Mode	N
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a change in the demographic profile of criminals (e.g., younger offenders)	30 (7.9%)	80 (21.2%)	130 (34.4%)	100 (26.5%)	38 (10.1%)	3	3	378
New perpetrators have emerged in areas where dusk-to-dawn curfew has been enforced	20 (5.3%)	70 (18.5%)	120 (31.7%)	130 (34.4%)	38 (10.1%)	3	4	378
Perpetrator displacement is a noticeable effect of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew	10 (2.6%)	50 (13.2%)	180 (47.6%)	100 (26.5%)	38 (10.1%)	3	3	378
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has caused experienced criminals to recruit or mentor new offenders	40 (10.6%)	70 (18.5%)	130 (34.4%)	90 (23.8%)	48 (12.7%)	3	3	378
The criminal landscape has shifted to include more first-time offenders due to dusk-to-dawn curfew	35 (9.3%)	60 (15.9%)	110 (29.1%)	110 (29.1%)	63 (16.7%)	3	3	378

Descriptive statistics revealed that the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfews has contributed to shifts in the perpetrator demographic and patterns of criminal activity. Participants indicated moderate to great extent agreement that the curfew has led to changes in the demographic profile of criminals (median = 3, mode = 3, N = 378), with 60.9% reporting at least a moderate extent of change. Similarly, the emergence of new perpetrators in curfew-enforced areas was perceived as occurring to a moderate (31.7%) or great/very great extent (44.5%), yielding a median of 3 and mode of 4.

Perpetrator displacement was widely acknowledged, with 47.6% reporting moderate extent and an additional 36.6% indicating great or very great extent (median = 3, mode = 3). Regarding the recruitment of new offenders by experienced criminals, 34.4% reported moderate extent, 23.8% great extent, and 12.7% very great extent, resulting in a median and mode of 3. Finally, the inclusion of more first-time offenders in the criminal landscape was perceived to occur to at least a moderate extent by 74.9% of respondents, with 29.1% each reporting great or moderate extent and 16.7% indicating very great extent (median = 3, mode = 3). Overall, responses suggest that dusk-to-dawn curfews are associated with noticeable shifts in offender composition and the potential displacement of criminal activity through the emergence of new or younger offenders.

The obtained results correspond to those of a study by Rossmo and Summers (2021) who observed that crime displacement including perpetrator displacement was highly probable “suggesting that displacement is more prevalent than previously thought whether in urban or rural crime hotspots. Thus, displacement should be considered when designing crime control measures to help maximize their impact.”

In response to the question on the implication of dusk to dawn curfew on perpetrator crime displacement, the member of the county assembly responded that dusk to dawn curfew led to perpetrator displacement of crime. Perpetrators change due to this strategy for example from the younger offenders to older ones. Ward Commander B added that the change in criminals has led to emergence of new perpetrators in areas where there is the dusk to dawn curfew. The experienced offenders are the ones that mentor the new ones to continue with the criminal activities.

“...this thing is cyclic. It is cultural, and it is their norm. During rites of passage, the elders teach these things.” (Ward Commander B)

Chief B stated that the number of crimes before during and after the curfew was implemented remained the same. There was no reduction as the new criminals continued to perpetrate the offences through new and unfamiliar methods.

“...we cannot rule out learning. You know crime is learnt.” (Chief B)

According to Assistant Chief A, dusk-to-dawn curfew faces several challenges in its implementation such as shortage of police officers. Other officers also abuse their discretion to use excessive force and aggressive policing tactics on locals leading apathy and legitimacy concerns. This in turn undermine any effectiveness (absence of crime displacement) that may have been achieved given that crime control depends on the cooperation of locals.

4.6 Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya.

The third objective aimed to examine the effects of an increased presence of security agencies on crime displacement in the North Rift Counties of Kenya. The findings indicated a statistically significant association between the heightened presence of security agencies and crime displacement ($p = .0001$). A Chi-square analysis was subsequently conducted to assess how the increased security presence influenced the six forms of crime displacement across the region. The results are summarised in Table 37.

Table 37: Relationship between of Increased Presence of Security Agencies and Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

Variable	N	Chi-Square	df	P-Value
Relationship between increased presence of security agencies and Spatial crime displacement	378	2128.539 ^a	196	0.0001
Relationship between increased presence of security agencies and Temporal crime displacement	378	3275.401 ^a	168	0.0001
Relationship between increased presence of security agencies and Tactical crime displacement	378	1572.437 ^a	154	0.0001
Relationship between increased presence of security agencies and Target crime displacement	378	4742.294 ^a	196	0.0001
Relationship between increased presence of security agencies and Functional crime displacement	378	2194.994 ^a	210	0.0001
Relationship between increased presence of security agencies and perpetrator crime displacement	378	2511.414 ^a	168	0.0001

The findings show that increased presence of security agencies contributed to all the six types of crime displacement. Specifically, increased presence of security agencies showed a statistically significant relationship with spatial crime displacement (($p=.0001$); temporal crime displacement ($p=.0001$); tactical crime displacement ($p=.0001$); target crime displacement ($p=.0001$); functional crime displacement ($p=.0001$), and perpetrator crime displacement ($p=.0001$).

4.6.1 Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Spatial Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the increased presence of security agencies and spatial crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 38.

Table 38: Inferential Analysis of the Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Spatial Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2128.539 ^a	196	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	876.425	196	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	213.848	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.634		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.922		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.753		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 210 cells (93.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2128.539^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between increased presence of security agencies and spatial crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.634 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .753, p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 92.2% of the total variance in spatial crime displacement could be attributed to increased presence of security agencies.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of increased presence of security agencies has led to criminals relocating their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament measures. This finding concurs with the assertions of geometric theory of crime. As Brantingham and Brantingham (2017; 1998) argued, spatial crime displacement will almost always occur when criminals have demonstrated a clear grasp of the nodes, hills, and pathways in their operational areas. This is often the case with bandits and cattle rustlers of the North-Rift counties. Similarly, Guerette (2016) and Rosebaum (2006) forewarned that spatial crime displacement (and other forms of crime displacement) were almost inevitable when offenders demonstrate familiarity with crime locations. Such familiarity is evident when criminals readily spot entry and exit points that allow them to approach and leave crime scenes fast.

Therefore, while, this hotspot policing strategy may be effective in crime reduction, it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid crime displacement. According to Tregle et al., (2025) the geographic distribution of crime may change significantly

due to increased presence of law enforcement especially if it's not paired with a sustained resource commitment.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of increased presence of security agencies on spatial crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 39.

Table 39: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Spatial Crime Displacement

Statement	No extent	Little extent	Moderate extent	Great extent	Very great extent	Total (Valid %)	N	Median	Mode
Criminals have relocated to areas with low security presence	—	9 (2.4%)	55 (14.6%)	73 (19.3%)	241 (63.8%)	100.0%	378	5.00	5.00
Spatial crime displacement is due to increased security presence	—	9 (2.4%)	63 (16.7%)	225 (59.5%)	81 (21.4%)	100.0%	378	4.00	4.00
Geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly	—	37 (9.8%)	75 (19.8%)	220 (58.2%)	46 (12.2%)	100.0%	378	4.00	4.00
Crime hotspots have remained the same	84 (22.2%)	139 (36.8%)	36 (9.5%)	92 (24.3%)	27 (7.1%)	100.0%	378	2.00	2.00

The study examined the implications of increased presence of security agencies on spatial crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya. The descriptive statistics have shown that most respondents (63.3%, n = 241) agreed to a “great extent” that the strategy had led to relocation of criminals to low risk areas, with an additional 19.3% (n = 73) reporting “very great extent” agreement. The median and mode for this item were both 5.00, indicating general agreement. Regarding the statement “Spatial crime displacement is due to increased security presence”, 59.5.1% (n = 225) of participants agreed to “moderate extent” that criminals shifted due to increase presence of security agencies, while 21.4% (n = 81) agreed to a “very great extent”. Both the median and the mode were 4.00 suggesting a strong agreement with the statement.

The statement “Geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly” attracted 58.2% (n=220) “great extent” agreement while 12.2% (n=46) agreed to “Very Great Extent”. Combined, only a total of 29.6% showed agreement to “less extent and “moderate extent”. Both the median and mode were 4.00 showing a general agreement with the statement. In contrast, only a combined total of 31.4% (n = 119) reported a “great or very great extent” agreement with the statement “Crime hotspots have remained the same”. Both the mean and the mode were 2.00, indicating less agreement.

The results obtained from this study correspond with those obtained by Breetzke and Edelstein (2019) that, criminals have been able to manoeuvre away out the hotspots that attract security agencies (spatial displacement) and focus their crime activities on less detectible acts and locations. Moreover, Breetzke et al., (2014) add that increasing the presence of security agencies has been associated with the displacement of property crime from targeted areas to less targeted places. Dziwornu (2021) also argued that, spatial-temporal crime displacement, although unintended, is highly probable as a result of concentrating law enforcement efforts such as increasing their presence at a hotspot.

In response to the question on the implications of increased presence of security agencies on spatial crime displacement, Ward Commander B stated that spatial crime displacement is a direct consequence of increased presence of security agencies. Their increased presence in some areas has led to increase in crime in neighbouring areas.

“...you know we only need our jurisdiction to be safe and secure. The truth is, when GSU, RDU, ASTU, and KDF are here, our neighbours may suffer increased crime rates since criminals will definitely move.” (Ward Commander B).

Village Elder B stated that criminals have started carrying out their activities in the neighbouring regions where there are few security agencies. Assistant County Commissioner A stated that despite presence of security agents, the number of crimes has remained the same but within a different geographic region. Chief A stated that the security agencies are facing challenges such as poor roads, fear created by hostile bandit criminals, killing of security agencies by criminals, language barrier and lack of familiarity of the terrain.

“...the spatial displacement will happen. Responding to the spatial displacement is the challenge. Officers will not respond in time as quickly as the criminals move. How can you keep moving a whole platoon with weaponry so frequently? It is impossible. Further hindrance is provided by the terrain itself. Places like Marigat are generally safe but criminals running away from Suguta Valley and Kerio Valley seek refuge here. It takes another command altogether to get officers to be deployed to Marigat areas.” (Chief A)

According to business representative B, the presence of security agents in hotspot areas has led to spread of crime in other safe places e.g., across the North-Rift.

“...these criminals I think enjoy their activities. How they can attract attention sometimes of the President because of their crime here must really amaze them. There is no safe zone anymore here. They attack wherever, whenever.” (Business Representative B)

According to Chief C, increased risk in death by security officers, fear among the neighbouring communities, death of security agents and increase in crime in unprotected areas is a consequence of this hotspot policing strategies strategy. Ward Commander B stated that the agents need to build camps along the border of Marakwet, Samburu, Pokot, and Turkana, and adopt new strategies that criminals are not aware of exploit drone technology to better understand the terrain to enhance the effectiveness of the policing strategies in general.

4.6.2 Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Temporal Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the increased presence of security agencies and temporal crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 40.

Table 40: Inferential Analysis of the Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Temporal Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	3275.401 ^a	168	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	1338.301	168	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	353.725	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.850		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.947		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.969		0.000c
	N of Valid Cases	378		
		a. 178 cells (91.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.		

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 3275.401^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between increased presence of security agencies and temporal crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.850 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .969, p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 94.7% of the total variance in temporal crime displacement could be attributed to increased presence of security agencies.

This means that hotspot policing strategy of increased presence of security agencies has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities or the Criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when police hotspot policing strategies are relaxed. This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid crime displacement. According to Carvalho and Guerra (2025) and Makokha et al., (2024) hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to change the timing of their activities e.g., from daytime to night-time.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of increased presence of security agencies on temporal crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 41.

Table 41: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Temporal Crime Displacement

Statement	No extent	Little extent	Moderate extent	Great extent	Very great extent	Total (Valid %)	N	Median	Mode
Criminals changed timing of activities (e.g., daytime to night)	—	19 (5.0%)	18 (4.8%)	140 (37.0%)	201 (53.2%)	100.0%	378	5.00	5.00
Crime rates increased during low security presence	—	9 (2.4%)	45 (11.9%)	110 (29.1%)	214 (56.6%)	100.0%	378	5.00	5.00
Temporal displacement is noticeable outcome of security presence	—	9 (2.4%)	154 (40.7%)	122 (32.3%)	93 (24.6%)	100.0%	378	4.00	3.00
Criminals commit crimes when police presence is reduced	—	—	27 (7.1%)	147 (38.9%)	204 (54.0%)	100.0%	378	5.00	5.00
Shift in crime frequency due to increased security presence	—	9 (2.4%)	73 (19.3%)	176 (46.6%)	120 (31.7%)	100.0%	378	4.00	4.00
Crime times remain unchanged despite increased presence of security agencies	120 (31.7%)	121 (32.0%)	46 (12.2%)	72 (19.0%)	19 (5.0%)	100.0%	378	2.00	2.00

The study examined the implications of increased presence of security agencies on temporal crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya. Results showed that most respondents (53.2%, n = 201) agreed to a “very great extent” while 37.0% (n=140) agreed to a “great extent” that “Criminals changed timing of activities (e.g., daytime to night)”. Only a combined total of 9.8% (n=37) agreed to “moderate extent” and “less extent”. The median and mode for this item were both 5.00, indicating strong agreement that criminals temporally shift their crime activities.

Regarding the statement “crime rates increased during low security presence”, 56.6% (n = 214) of participants agreed to “very great extent” that crime rates increased during low security officers’ presence. Only a total combined 14.3% (n=82) agreed to “Moderate Extent” and “less extent”. Both the median and the mode were 4.00 and 3.00 respectively suggesting a moderate agreement with the statement. The statement “temporal displacement is noticeable outcome of security presence” attracted 40.7% (n=154) “moderate extent” agreement while only 2.4% (n=9) agreed to “less extent”. Generally, 32.3% (n=122) agreed to “great extent” while 24.6% agreed to “very great extent.” Both the median and mode were 4.00 showing a general agreement with the statement.

The statement “Criminals commit crimes when police presence is reduced” attracted the strongest consensus with all the respondents 100% (n=378) agreeing to a “moderate extent, great extent or very great extent”. This indicates that the respondents agreed that criminals commit offences when security agencies are reduced. Both the median and the mode were 5.00 confirming this strong view. There was high feedback on the statement “Shift in crime frequency due to increased security presence”. Majority of the respondents 46.6% (n=176) agreed to a “Great Extent” while 31.7% agreed to a “very great extent”. Only a combined total of 21.7% (n=82) agreed to a “moderate extent and less extent.” The median and mode was determined to be 4.00 still showing a general agreement with the statement.

Finally, the statement “crime times remain unchanged despite increased presence of security agencies” produced low levels of agreement with majority of the respondents 32.0% (n=121) agreeing to a “less extent” and 31.7% (n=120) agreeing to “no extent”. Only a combined total of 36.2% (n=137) agreed to a “moderate extent, great extent,

and very great extent.” Both the median and the mode were 2.00 confirming the weak association of the statement to temporal crime displacement.

The obtained results concur with the findings of Dau et al., (2023) who found out that across most urban places, increasing the presence of law enforcement reduced the cases of street crime but also led to shift into the time of commission of crime (temporal displacement). From the routine activity theory of crime, the confluence of time, place, and the perpetrator in the absence of a capable guardian increases criminal victimization (Cohen and Felson, 2015). Thus, the shift in time is indicative of the criminals selecting a timeframe they perceive to less likely have capable guardians (presence of security agencies) watching.

In response to the implications of increased presence of security agencies on temporal crime displacement, the member of the county assembly A stated that increased presence of security agencies led to temporal crime displacement. Criminals tend to change the time they commit this crime due to this strategy. Chief A stated that crime rates are high when there is low presence of security agencies. This is when criminals feel secure to carry out their crimes. This has caused a shift in the frequency of criminal activities. Assistant County Commissioner B also stated that criminals are able to identify and isolate times of reduced presence of security agencies.

“...these people monitor closely and collect sufficient intelligence about potential increased security presence. They can even come to the station to report fake cases just to monitor activities around. They know when security agents are highly active and when they are overwhelmed and understaffed.”
(Assistant County Commissioner B)

The representative of the business community B pointed out that increased presence of security agencies in the community lead to reduced economic growth.

“...people will just start to move away when they notice that security agencies are moving in. This is also dependent on the perception that locals have of police officers.” (Member of Business Community B)

Village Elder B stated that some security agencies faced hostile neighborhood community members and at times the bandits are more than the security personnel

which makes it easier to be overpowered. According to Assistant County Commissioner A, temporal displacement will occur due to lapse and overwhelming geography that officers must manage. Using the National Police Reservists may help boost the workforce and provide local indigenous knowledge of the terrain (Kenya, 2011).

4.6.3 Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Tactical Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the increased presence of security agencies and tactical crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 42.

Table 42: Inferential Analysis of the Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Tactical Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	1572.437 ^a	154	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	741.489	154	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	174.545	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.615		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.898		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.680		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 164 cells (91.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 1572.437^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between increased presence of security agencies and tactical crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.615 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .680$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 91.0% of the total variance in tactical crime displacement could be attributed to increased presence of security agencies.

Therefore, when increased presence of security agencies is enhanced the criminals may adopt new methods or tools to commit crimes for example non-firearm-related

crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects) to avoid detection after increased presence of security agencies. This means that hotspot policing strategy of increasing presence of security agencies has caused criminals to change the tactics of commission of crimes. This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid crime displacement. According to Das et al., (2025) and Amutabi et al., (2025), the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after increased presence of security agencies.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of increased presence of security agencies on tactical crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 43.

Table 43: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Tactical Crime Displacement

Variable	No extent	Little extent	Moderate extent	Great extent	Very great extent	Total (Valid %)	N	Median	Mode
Criminals adopted new methods/tools due to security presence	57 (15.1%)	83 (22.0%)	45 (11.9%)	166 (43.9%)	27 (7.1%)	100.0%	378	4.00	4.00
Increase in non-firearm crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects)	65 (17.2%)	203 (53.7%)	82 (21.7%)	18 (4.8%)	10 (2.6%)	100.0%	378	2.00	2.00
Tactical changes in behaviour due to security presence	10 (2.6%)	37 (9.8%)	209 (55.3%)	122 (32.3%)	—	100.0%	378	3.00	3.00
Criminals more innovative to avoid detection	10 (2.6%)	27 (7.1%)	38 (10.1%)	257 (68.0%)	46 (12.2%)	100.0%	378	4.00	4.00
Criminals use less detectable/traceable weapons	9 (2.4%)	104 (27.5%)	129 (34.1%)	91 (24.1%)	45 (11.9%)	100.0%	378	3.00	3.00
Criminal tactics remain unchanged despite increased security presence	64 (16.9%)	138 (36.5%)	10 (2.6%)	99 (26.2%)	67 (17.7%)	100.0%	378	2.00	2.00

The study examined the implications of increased presence of security agencies on tactical crime displacement in the North-Rift Counties of Kenya, with a sample size of 378 respondents. Results indicated that 43.9% (n=166) of respondents agreed to a great extent and 7.1% (n=27) to a very great extent that “Criminals adopted new methods/tools due to security presence”. (Median = 4, Mode = 4). Regarding the increase in non-firearm-related crimes, 53.7% (n=203) reported a less extent and 21.7% (n=82) a moderate extent, while 17.2% (n=65) and 4.8% (n=18) indicated no extent and great extent respectively. Only 2.6% (n=10) reported agreement to a very great extent. (Median = 2, Mode = 3).

Tactical changes in criminal behaviour as a direct result of curfew enforcement were acknowledged by the majority, with 55.3% (n=209) reporting a moderate extent and 32.3% a great extent (Median = 3, Mode = 3). Additionally, innovation by criminals to avoid detection during increased presence of security agencies was supported by 68.0% (n=257) to a great extent and 12.2% to a very great extent (Median = 4, Mode = 4). The use of less detectable weapons by criminals due to curfew enforcement was reported by 34.1% (n=129) to a moderate extent, 24.1% (n=91) to a great extent, and 11.9% (n=45) to a very great extent. Only a combined total of 29.9% (n=113) indicated little extent and no extent (Median = 3, Mode = 2). Finally, 36.5% (n=138) of respondents reported little and 16.9% (n=64) reported no extent. Only 2.65% (n=10), 26.2% (n=99), and 17.7% (n=67) reported moderate extent, great extent, and very great extents respectively (Median = 3, Mode = 2).

Curtice and Behlendorf, (2021) found that increased presence of security agencies leads to tactical crime displacement. Criminals are able to tactically displace their criminal activities to and to continue operating under the radar of security agencies undetected. While increasing the presence of security agencies as a strategy has generally led to restoration of order and public safety, criminals have been driven into residential places where break-ins and house burglary have been reported. Wa Teresia (2023) points out that within the slums, criminals displace their crime acts to new techniques such as using daggers, knives, muggings, etc. Similarly, Ali (2020) points out that criminals operating in urban towns in Kenya tactically organise their criminal activities to defeat the law enforcement strategy of increasing their presence in

neighbourhoods. Similar tactical manoeuvres can be executed by rural criminals such as bandits.

In response to the implications of increased presence of security agencies on tactical crime displacement, Ward Commander C stated that increased presence of security agencies led to tactical crime displacement. Criminals change the method of committing offences due to this strategy and come up with new methods.

“...today, bandits use motorbikes to outrun security agents. Their communication systems are also enhanced and rudimentary to ensure officers never decode the messages. The use of signals, symbols, and signs that have unique meaning are always used by these criminals.” (Ward Commander C)

Assistant County Commissioner A stated that criminals are familiar with the security agencies and the strategies used by them. They thus come up with new methods that are not easily detected. Chief B stated that criminals become more innovative in their activities to avoid being detected by the security agencies.

“...you they even use children to spy. You will think that this is just a child who is innocent but the child will relay information about the number of officers around, the nature of fire power there among other things. This kind of information is necessary for tactical change purposes.” (Chief B)

As Village Elder C stated, offenders have adopted skilful ways of reaching their target in fulfilling their desires and adopting other approaches to committing crime with great success.

“...they use hills as watchtowers and surveillance positions on police presence and presence of cattle. They do not attack blindly; they know the animals are there because they have observed them being grazed while they are on the hilltops. They are sure about it.” (Village elder C)

According to Assistant Chief A, increasing the presence of security agencies is one way of addressing the crime. However, to contain displacement, officers must be vigilant to notice any shift of strategy by criminals. Otherwise, this problem will always persist. This observation is in tandem with Rosenbaum (2006) finding that understanding the social structure of the criminal gangs is a better way of addressing

the crime problem than merely increasing the presence of security agencies. In the short-run, this strategy may work but only when an overall assessment is done can crime displacement be averted.

Tactical crime displacement concur with the geometric theory of crime's assertion that criminals who have deep knowledge of their environment are highly likely to remain sophisticated and use complex methods to defeat the strategy of increasing the presence of security agencies. While their area of operation may remain the same, Andresen, (2010) points out that rural criminals will out-manoeuvre security agencies by virtue of their experience in the area and other ingenious ways.

4.6.4 Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Target Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

Using chi-square, the relationship between the increased presence of security agencies and target crime displacement was determined. The results are shown in Table 44.

Table 44: Inferential Analysis of the Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Target Crime Displacement

	Inferential Tests	Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	4742.294 ^a	196	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	1524.840	196	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	371.836	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.947		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.962		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.993		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 208 cells (92.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 4742.294^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between increased presence of security agencies and target crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.947 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .993$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 96.2% of the total variance in target crime displacement could be attributed to increased presence of security agencies. Therefore, when increased presence of security agencies is enhanced the criminals

shift their focus to softer or less protected targets. The criminals may intensify their crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children, schools, health facilities etc.)

This finding depart from the assertions of Braga et al., (2019a) that hotspot policing strategies, including increasing police presence, do not lead to crime displacement. Braga et al., (2024) reached their conclusion relying on small urban locations and so their study was highly controlled within urban setups. This study, having been conducted in a rural setup, establishes that crime displacement in general, and target crime displacement is highly probable. This implies that increasing the presence of security agencies may be effective but should be conducted in conjunction with other crime control strategies for overall effectiveness (less target crime displacement) to be achieved.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of increased presence of security agencies on target crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 45.

Table 45: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Target Crime Displacement

Variable	No extent	Little extent	Moderate extent	Great extent	Very great extent	Total (Valid %)	N	Median	Mode
Criminals shifted focus to softer/less protected targets	9 (2.4%)	—	19 (5.0%)	250 (66.1%)	100 (26.5%)	100.0%	378	4.00	4.00
Increase in crimes against vulnerable populations	29 (7.7%)	112 (29.6%)	155 (41.0%)	73 (19.3%)	9 (2.4%)	100.0%	378	3.00	3.00
Target displacement is a key consequence of increased presence	—	19 (5.0%)	200 (52.9%)	131 (34.7%)	28 (7.4%)	100.0%	378	3.00	3.00
Criminals targeting properties instead of individuals	10 (2.6%)	150 (39.7%)	74 (19.6%)	99 (26.2%)	45 (11.9%)	100.0%	378	3.00	2.00
Change in types of victims targeted by criminals	56 (14.8%)	95 (25.1%)	90 (23.8%)	101 (26.7%)	36 (9.5%)	100.0%	378	3.00	4.00
Targets have remained unchanged despite increased security presence	46 (12.2%)	100 (26.5%)	45 (11.9%)	83 (22.0%)	104 (27.5%)	100.0%	378	3.00	5.00

The study assessed perceptions regarding the impact of increased presence of security agencies on target crime displacement. Results indicated that 66.10% (n=250) of respondents reported a great extent of “criminals shifted focus to softer/less protected targets” while 26.5% (n=100) reported very great extent. Only 2.4% (n=9) and 5.0% (n=19) indicating no extent and moderate extent respectively. The median and the mode both 4.00 showing a general agreement with the statement. When asked about increase in crimes against vulnerable populations, 41.0% (n=155), 29.6% (n=112), and 7.7% (n=29) reported moderate extent, little extent, and no extent respectively. Only 19.3% (n=73) and 2.4% (n=9) reported great extent and very great extent respectively (Median=3.00, Mode= 3.00).

Regarding target displacement as a consequence of increased security presence, 52.9% (n=200), 34.7% (n=131), 7.4% (n=28) reported moderate extent, great extent, and very great extent respectively. Only 5.0% (n=19) reported no extent. Both the median and the mode was 3.00 indicating a moderate view on the statement. When asked to respond to “criminals targeting properties instead of individuals”, 39.7% reported little extent, 26.2% great extent, and 2.6% no extent, with a median of 3 and mode of 2. Changes in the types of victims targeted by criminals due to security presence were reported as moderate by 23.8%, great by 26.7%, and no extent by 14.8%; the median was 3 and mode was 4. Finally, regarding whether criminal targets remained unchanged despite increased security presence, responses were more varied: 27.5% reported very great extent, 22.0% great extent, and 12.2% no extent; the median was 3 and mode was 5. Overall, these findings suggest a moderate perceived effect of increased security presence on target displacement and changes in victim profiles, though some respondents believed criminal targeting remained unchanged. These results correspond to those obtained in a study by Breetzke et al (2014) who found that increasing the presence of security agencies led to target crime displacement. For instance, criminals are able to displace their property crimes from targeted areas to less targeted areas.

In response to the implications of increased presence of security agencies on target crime displacement, Ward Commander B stated that target displacement is a consequence of increased presence of security agencies. Presence of security agencies has caused criminals to change the focus of their criminal activities. They

start to focus on less protected targets as compared to those around many security agencies.

“...this is always a diversionary tactic of harming schools, teachers and causing chaos all over the place.” (Ward Commander B)

Assistant Chief B stated that presence of security agencies has led to a change of type of victims and properties targeted. However, the number of criminal activities is still high. Chief A stated that target displacement is a challenge that security agencies continue to face while controlling criminal activities as it becomes difficult to identify the new targets.

“...you they can now attack anything and anybody including churches and schools.” (Chief A)

According to the member of county assembly B, target displacement occurs so that the criminals can overwhelm and exhaust the capacity of the law enforcement officers.

“...it is a form of divide and rule strategy. Attack a school here, attack a health facility there, injure some elderly people in another location, burn a shop there etc. Ultimately, the concentration of security agencies is eventually split as others are moved to contain the other situations that the criminals started precisely to dupe officers.” (Member of County Assembly B)

The challenge in containing target crime displacement as a result of increasing the presence of security agencies is political interference. The member of the county assembly B stated that in some areas it is difficult to control crimes due to political interference. He stated that the political involvement and commercialization of insecurity need to be addressed to restore security in much of the North-Rift bandit infested areas.

From a geometric theory of crime perspective, target crime displacement is yet another proof that the criminals have a deep-rooted understanding of their geographical environment. As Wortley and Townsley (2016) argued, awareness of location creates flexibility and comfort that is exhibited by the ability of the criminals to target other victims in their quest to disorient security operations from their main activity (cattle rustling) to less significant ones (such as protecting schools, health facilities, and government installations).

As for Bakker et al., (2016), target crime displacement reflects the perpetual state of struggle for control by both the state and the social group. On the one hand, the state's capacities and capabilities are evident through increasing the presence of security agencies in the hotspot to contain the insecurity. On the other hand, the state has been strained tremendously in their pursuit for enduring peace and security. The social control exercised by inhabitants in the regions have persistently demonstrated strength over and above state-initiated security operations. Target crime displacement is a perfect example.

4.6.5 Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Functional Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the increased presence of security agencies and functional crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 46.

Table 46: Inferential Analysis of the Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Functional Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2194.994 ^a	210	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	895.479	210	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	261.753	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.644		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.924		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.833		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 227 cells (94.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2194.994^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between increased presence of security agencies and functional crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.644 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .833$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 92.4% of the total variance in functional crime displacement could be attributed to increased presence of security agencies.

Therefore, when increased presence of security agencies is enhanced the criminals may diversify their illegal activities for example shift the types of crimes being

committed (e.g., from armed robbery to fraud). This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid functional crime displacement. According to Palma-Borda et al., (2025) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to transition to less risky forms of crime and diversify their illegal activities.

Akinteye et al., (2024) found a 25% drop in violent crime in targeted areas and no displacement- possibly slight spill over benefits in adjacent regions. Importantly however, this study was conducted in an exclusively urban location. Akoeda (2024) found that increased presence of security agencies cut violent crime by 35%, with temporary rebounds post-intervention-but no spatial displacement within 1.5 kms. However, functional displacement remained highly probable.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of increased presence of security agencies on functional crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 47.

Table 47: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Functional Crime Displacement

Statement	No extent	Little extent	Moderate extent	Great extent	Very great extent	Total (Valid %)	N	Median	Mode
Shift from violent to less direct crimes (e.g., fraud)	95 (25.1%)	57 (15.1%)	109 (28.8%)	108 (28.6%)	9 (2.4%)	100.0%	378	3.00	3.00
Diversification of criminal activities	—	46 (12.2%)	121 (32.0%)	156 (41.3%)	55 (14.6%)	100.0%	378	4.00	4.00
Functional displacement is a direct result of increased presence	20 (5.3%)	56 (14.8%)	137 (36.2%)	138 (36.5%)	27 (7.1%)	100.0%	378	3.00	4.00
Violent crimes have declined, non-violent increased	47 (12.4%)	141 (37.3%)	81 (21.4%)	82 (21.7%)	27 (7.1%)	100.0%	378	3.00	2.00
Criminals have shifted to less risky crimes	113 (29.9%)	91 (24.1%)	46 (12.2%)	92 (24.3%)	36 (9.5%)	100.0%	378	2.00	1.00
Same types of crimes persist despite increased presence	81 (21.4%)	93 (24.6%)	36 (9.5%)	149 (39.4%)	19 (5.0%)	100.0%	378	3.00	4.00

The results indicate that increasing the presence of security agencies has led to a noticeable shift in the types of crimes being committed, with 28.8% (n=109), 28.6% (n=108), and 9.4% (n=9) of the respondents reporting moderate extent, great extent, and very great extent respectively. Only a combined total of 40.2% (n=152) agreed to a little and no extent. (Median = 3, Mode = 4, n = 378). Regarding the statement “diversification of criminal activities”, 41.3% (n=156) and 14.6% (n=55) reported great and very great extent respectively. 36.2% (n=137) reported moderate extent while 14.8% (n=56) and 5.3% (n=20) reported little extent. (Median = 4, Mode = 4, n = 378).

As to whether functional crime displacement identified as a direct outcome of increasing the presence of security agencies, 36.2% (n=137) reported a moderate extent while 36.5% (n=138) reported great extent. Only a handful (7.1%, n=27) reported very great extent. 14.8% (n=56) and 5.3% (n=20) reported little and no extent respectively. The median was 3.00 while the mode was 4.00 indicating an average acceptance level.

Regarding the nature of crimes having declined as a result of increasing the presence of security agencies, there were mixed findings with 37.3% (n=141) reported to a little extent while 21.7% (n=82) reported great extent. Only 21.4% (n=81) reported moderate extent with 12.4% (n=47) and 7.1% (n=27) reporting no extent and very great extent respectively (Median = 3, Mode = 2, n = 378). Furthermore, 24.3% reported a great extent and 9.5% a very great extent transition by criminals to less risky forms of crime due increasing the presence of security agencies with 29.9% indicating no extent (Median = 3, Mode = 2, n = 378). Finally, the persistence of the same types of crimes despite increasing the presence of security agencies was noted by 39.4% (n=149) to a great extent, 5.0% (n=19) to a very great extent, and 9.5% (n=36) to a moderate extent (Median = 3, Mode = 4, n = 378). The findings collectively suggest that while the increasing the presence of security agencies has influenced crime patterns by causing shifts and diversification, certain crime types have persisted, indicating a complex and multifaceted impact of the strategy on criminal behaviour.

The findings correspond Dau et al., (2023) who found that across most cities, increasing the presence of law enforcement reduced the cases of street crime but also led to shift into other types of crimes (functional displacement). A study by Michael (2014) in Tanzania found that increasing the presence of security agencies led to functional crime displacement. Criminals are adoptive and thus able to shift to a different crime type that is less detectable in case of increased presence of security agencies.

On the question of the implications of increased presence of security agencies on functional crime displacement, Village Elder A stated that increased presence of security agencies led to functional crime displacement. Criminals in hotspots areas tend to change the type of offence they commit due to this strategy. According Chief B some criminals change from armed crimes to unharmed ones or violent crime to non-violent crimes. They find means to diversify their illegal activities due to increased security agencies. Village Elder B stated that criminals devise less risky forms of crime to avoid the security agencies and at the same time continue with their activities.

“...survival may sometime depend on how you can adopt to alternative crime acts. Thankfully, the cattle rustlers know that the law enforcement officers will soon leave once order has been restored. So, they do not need to continue to learn new crime acts. They will just resort back their cattle rustling and bandit ways.” (Village Elder B)

Assistant County Commissioner A stated that functional displacement though possible, was rarely evident given that the criminals that roam the place were largely interested in cattle.

“...you bandits rarely change to other crimes. They do not know how to commit those other crimes. They either steal cattle or cause mayhem of burning, violence, and destruction of property. If these also constitute functional displacement, then we can say they can functionally displace their crime acts.” (Assistant County Commissioner A)

Ward Commander B further pointed out other challenges that face security agencies that may work to the advantage of the criminals such as hostile community reception, lack of security gadgets such as drones, geographical know how, among others.

4.6.6 Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Perpetrator Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya

The study used chi-square to determine whether there was relationship between the increased presence of security agencies and perpetrator crime displacement. The results are shown in Table 48.

Table 48: Inferential Analysis of the Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Perpetrator Crime Displacement

		Inferential Tests		
		Value	df	P-Value
Chi-Square Tests	Pearson Chi-Square	2511.414 ^a	168	0.0001
	Likelihood Ratio	1081.903	168	0.0001
	Linear-by-Linear Association	308.842	1	0.0001
Symmetric Measures	Cramer's V	0.744		0.0001
	Contingency Coefficient	0.932		0.0001
	Pearson's R	0.905		0.000 ^c
	N of Valid Cases	378		

a. 180 cells (92.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

Chi square results $X^2 (2) = 2511.414^a$, $p = 0.0001 < 0.05$ showed the relationship between increased presence of security agencies and perpetrator crime displacement was statistically significant. Cramer's V value was $.744 > 0.50$ which denoted a very strong relationship between the variables. The Pearson's R obtained was ($r = .905$, $p = 0.000 < 0.05$) implying that the two variables are positively and significantly correlated. This was confirmed by the Contingency Coefficient measure of Association (CC) which revealed that 93.2% of the total variance in perpetrator crime displacement could be attributed to increased presence of security agencies.

Therefore, when increased presence of security agencies is enhanced the criminals may shift the demographic profile of criminals may shift (e.g., younger offenders). Also new perpetrators emerge in the area and experienced criminals recruit or mentor new offenders. This implies that hotspot policing remains an effective crime reduction strategy however it should be dispersed rather than concentrated to avoid perpetrator crime displacement. According to Braga et al., (2024) the hotspot policing strategies may cause criminals to change their demographic profiles including the criminal landscape may shift to include more first-time offenders. Alemika (2018) suggests a

strategic shift; long-term crime reduction needs preventive and community-based measures, not just saturation patrols.

Descriptive analysis of responses on implications of increased presence of security agencies on perpetrator crime displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya was also conducted using median, mode, frequencies, and percentages. The results are presented in Table 49.

Table 49: Descriptive Statistics of Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Perpetrator Crime Displacement

Statement	No extent	Little extent	Moderate extent	Great extent	Very great extent	Total (Valid %)	N	Median	Mode
Demographic shift in criminals (e.g., younger offenders)	124 (32.8%)	18 (4.8%)	99 (26.2%)	128 (33.9%)	9 (2.4%)	100.0%	378	3.00	4.00
Emergence of new perpetrators in high-security areas	9 (2.4%)	45 (11.9%)	195 (51.6%)	102 (27.0%)	27 (7.1%)	100.0%	378	3.00	3.00
Perpetrator displacement as a result of security presence	—	37 (9.8%)	194 (51.3%)	128 (33.9%)	19 (5.0%)	100.0%	378	3.00	3.00
Experienced criminals mentoring/recruiting new offenders	47 (12.4%)	112 (29.6%)	102 (27.0%)	99 (26.2%)	18 (4.8%)	100.0%	378	3.00	2.00
Increase in first-time offenders in the criminal landscape	130 (34.4%)	130 (34.4%)	46 (12.2%)	45 (11.9%)	27 (7.1%)	100.0%	378	2.00	1.00*

Descriptive statistics revealed that increasing the presence of security agencies has contributed to shifts in the perpetrator demographic and patterns of criminal activity. Participants indicated to a great extent and moderate extent agreement that the strategy has led to changes in the demographic profile of criminals (Median = 3, Mode = 4, N = 378), with a combined total of 60.1% (n=227) reporting at least a moderate extent of change. Similarly, the emergence of new perpetrators was perceived as occurring to a moderate (51.6%, n=195) or great/very great extent (34.1%, n=129), yielding a median of 3 and mode of 3.

Perpetrator displacement was widely acknowledged, with 51.3% (n=194) reporting moderate extent and an additional total of 38.9% (n=147) indicating great or very great extent (median = 3, mode = 3). Regarding the recruitment of new offenders by experienced criminals, 34.4% reported moderate extent, 29.6% (n=112) indicated less extent while a total of 58% (n=219) reported moderate extent, great extent, very great extent resulting in a median 3 and mode of 2. Finally, the increase in more first-time offenders in the criminal landscape was perceived to occur to at no and less extent (68.8% n=260). A combined total of 31.2% (n=118) reported moderate extent, great extent and very great extent respectively resulting to a median of 2.00 and a mode of 1.00. Overall, responses suggest that increasing the presence of security agencies is associated with noticeable shifts in offender composition and the potential displacement of criminal activity through the emergence of new or younger offenders. Ltipalei et al., (2019) found that increased presence of security agencies led to perpetrator crime displacement. Despite officers being deployed in the North-Rift, criminals and crimes have persisted. Criminals continue to roam across the region able to displace their crime across the expansive area and avoid the places that are experiencing increased presence of law enforcement agencies.

Drawing from Brantingham and Brantingham's (2017; 1998) geometric theory of crime, perpetrators of banditry and cattle rustling in the North-Rift counties are a product of ingenuity emanating both from knowledge of their operational environment and apprenticeships from "retired" bandits. This further concurs with the routine activity theory of crime; that crime does not simply occur randomly in time and space. Rather, it is a result of several calculable options including offender dexterity and strength (Cohen and Felson, 2015).

In response to the implications of increased presence of security agencies on perpetrator crime displacement, Ward Commander B stated that perpetrator displacement is an effect of increased presence of security agencies. According to the representative of the business community, increased presence of security agencies led to replacement of old perpetrators of crimes. It led to a shift from old to young perpetrators or young to old perpetrators and new first offenders emerged.

“...the old ones may give way to tactical and agile young criminals whose energy may match that of the security agents. Alternatively, the young may give way to the old ones who are better experienced to face off with the security agents.” (Member of Business Community).

The new perpetrators are trained by the old ones. The Assistant County Commissioner B stated that criminals do not fear the presence of security agencies and the bandits are ready to kill officers. According to Village Elder B, the criminals are constantly present suggesting that perpetrator displacing is highly likely the case.

“...the death of bandits is replenished by emergence of new ones.” (Assistant County Commissioner B)

These sentiments concur with Joel Migdal’s state society relations theory; weak states, strong societies (Migdal, 2018). Migdal argued that traditional practices endure. Societal groups; ethnic, cultural, or local, are constantly moulding themselves even as the state attempts to mould them. Migdal adds that state-led disruptions (such as increasing police presence, disarmaments, and curfews) may create fragmentations only for a little while. In the end, the social organization always seeks to establish their control by providing survival strategies (including recruitment of new members) to continually compete for control. This can explain the constant existence of the criminals in the region.

Therefore, perpetrators will always exist among the kraals. Meanwhile, security agencies are facing a challenge due to death, inaccessibility of some areas, hostilities, lack of adequate resources, lack of awareness of the local landscape and hideouts, The Assistant County Commissioner B stated that criminals have discovered the plethora of weaknesses exhibited by security agencies trend of the security agencies and have found ways to outnumber them by increasingly adding and training new young offenders.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the Findings

This section provides a summary of the findings in relation to the research objectives of the study. The purpose of the study was to establish implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya. The summary is in accordance with the findings of each objective and a conclusion on the key findings. Recommendations have been made based on the findings.

The first objective was to evaluate the implications of disarmament on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya. This objective established that disarmament contributed to different forms of crime displacement. The responses from the interviewees also indicated that disarmament led to crime displacement. As a result of disarmament, perpetrators find other ways using different weapons to continue committing crimes. Disarmament led to changes in time of commission of crime (temporal crime displacement), change of place (spatial crime displacement), change of method (tactical crime displacement), change of target (target crime displacement), change of the form of crime (functional crime displacement), and change of offenders' demographic profile (perpetrator crime displacement).

The crimes continued to exist despite employing the disarmament strategy in hotspot areas. The study established that the disarmament process faced challenges such as hostile community members, inadequate knowledge on the terrain and language barrier. The inferential test results further established that there was an association between disarmament and all forms of crime displacement. Therefore, disarmament significantly contributed to all the six forms of crime displacement.

The second objective of the study was to determine the implications of dusk-to-dawn curfews on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya. The obtained results showed that dusk to dawn curfew led to crime displacement. It led to temporal crime displacement to a great extent. This means that criminals changed the time of committing crimes due to dusk to dawn curfew. This strategy also led to spatial, tactical, target, functional and perpetrator crime displacement to a moderate extent. The responses from the interviewees also indicated that dusk to dawn curfew led to

crime displacement. Due to dusk to dawn curfew perpetrators find other ways to continue committing crimes. The inferential test results determined that there was an association between dusk to dawn curfew and all forms of crime displacement. Therefore, dusk to dawn curfew significantly contributed to all the six forms of crime displacement.

The third objective of the study was to investigate the implications of the continued increased presence of security agencies on crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya. This strategy led to displacement of crime in the hotspot areas. The displacement caused was mostly to a moderate extent though still significant. The respondents also stated that the strategy led to displacement of crimes especially due to challenges such as killing of security agents, higher number of criminals with few security agents, unfamiliar terrain among others. The responses from the interviewees also indicated that increased presence of security agencies led to increased crime displacement. Due to increased presence of security agencies perpetrators find other ways, places, and durations to continue committing crimes. The inferential test results determined that there was an association between increased presence of security agencies and all forms of crime displacement. Overall, increased presence of security agencies significantly contributed to all forms of crime displacement in the North-Rift.

5.2 Conclusion to the Study

Based on the findings of the first objective that there is an association between disarmament and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya, the study concludes that an increase in disarmament would lead to spatial, temporal, tactical, target, functional and perpetrator crime displacement. Thus, the null hypothesis stated there is no statistically significant relationship between disarmament programs and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya was rejected.

Based on the findings of the second objective that there is an association between dusk to dawn curfew and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya, the study concludes that increase in dusk to dawn curfew would lead to spatial, temporal, tactical, target, functional and perpetrator crime displacement. Thus, the null

hypothesis stated that there is no statistically significant relationship between dusk-to-dawn curfews and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya was rejected.

Based on the findings of the third objective that there is an association between presence of security agencies and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya, the study concludes that increase in presence of security agencies would lead to spatial, temporal, tactical, target, functional and perpetrator crime displacement. Thus, the null hypothesis stated that there is no statistically significant relationship between presence of security agencies and crime displacement in North-Rift counties of Kenya was rejected.

The employed strategies mostly affected spatial and temporal crimes to a great extent. Tactical, target, functional and perpetrator crime displacement occurred but mainly to a moderate extent. Criminals are easily able to change the timing and place of their criminal activities to avoid disarmament, security agents and the curfew. Better strategies that criminals are not familiar with need to be employed to prevent crimes without leading to displacement. Some of the common challenges were unfamiliar terrains, hostile communities, death of security agents, language barrier, lack of adequate resources and effects to the economic growth within the regions. Means to counter these challenges need to be identified and employed for better results.

5.3 Recommendations

From the results of the study and conclusions, this study makes the following recommendations:

- i. Integrate disarmament with other community centered crime prevention and control strategies. To address the issue of crime displacement community centered strategies such as community policing, evidence-based policing, legitimacy policing, and proactive policing should be utilized alongside hotspot policing strategies.
- ii. Educate community on the importance of the strategies and the risks of not agreeing to them. In addition, porous borders should be addressed to prevent inflow of small arms and light weapons.

- iii. Adopt a targeted and flexible curfew system. Use curfews selectively and adjust curfew hours based on the occurrences of the crimes to reduce predictability. Increasing surveillance using surveillance drones and attack drones during non-curfew hours will also reduce the ability of the criminals to predict security agencies action plans.
- iv. Strengthen the safety of security agents and effectiveness of their actions. This can be achieved by increasing the number of trained agents and providing them with enough equipment. Training of officers from the area or engaging members who understand the terrains within the hotspot areas might also enhance the effectiveness of the presence of security agencies such as the National Police Reservists (NPRs)
- v. There is need to implement socio-economic development agenda across the North-Rift Region. Emphasis should consider having additional police posts along the borderlines of the communities of the North-Rift. Decentralizing administrative units has been a welcome move but there is need to particularly have adequate administrative and security personnel to handle North-Rift matters.
- vi. Branding or tagging animals can assist in controlling the theft of cattle. Each County may design their label and tag their animals. Chipping the animals with a trackable device can also assist. This way, the movement of the animals is always traceable. Chipping uses technology to constantly monitor a particular animal. It may be cheaper as the government do not have to chip all of them but a few that can be followed as part of the herd.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research

This study has several suggestions for possible areas for further research:

- i. The current study found that hot spot policing strategies lead to crime displacement across the six dimensions. This does not mean that the net gains from hotspot police interventions are minimal, therefore future studies should assess the influence of police perpetrator profiles, and hotspot policing strategies on crime rates and offence categories.
- ii. The study has shown how hotspot policing strategies affect crime displacement. Of fundamental concern is that such strategies affect both criminals and non-criminals. Future research should be conducted to

determine the implications of the hotspot policing strategies on non-criminals such as residents.

- iii. The current study has established that the “*kraal*” is at the centre of cattle rustling and banditry in the study areas. This “novel” concept among the pastoral communities of the North-Rift should be explored and investigated further to determine how it contributes to crime across the regions.
- iv. The current study used cross sectional data and adopted a descriptive approach to test the hypotheses about relationships of causality. The study recommends that future studies use alternative empirical measuring and testing methods. Due to the dynamic nature of hotspot policing and crime, it is necessary for future studies to resort to panel data, case studies or mixed research methodologies.

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Appendix I: Research Questionnaire
(To be administered to the Primary Respondents)

I am a PhD student at Chuka University undertaking a study on **Implications of Hotspot Policing Strategies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift of Kenya.**

Kindly fill this questionnaire after reading and consenting to the following:

Benefits

Your participation in this study may not confer any direct benefit to you. However, your contribution will help enhance policing efforts and improve security in this area and across Kenya.

Confidentiality and Risks


Your participation in this study does not confer any risks whatsoever to you or any other party to whom you are associated. Your responses will be kept confidential and analysed only for the purpose of this study. Unique codes will be used to analyse the data and your anonymity shall be guaranteed throughout the study.

Voluntary Participation

Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may opt out of the study at any time.

I agree to participate in this study:

Sign.....Date.....



Pavel Okoth Sigu
Name of researcher
.....

Signature of researcher

Date

SECTION A: Background Information

A1: What is your gender?

a) Male ☐

b) Female ☐

A2: What is your age bracket?

a) Below 30 years ☐

b) 31-40 years ☐

c) 41-50 years ☐

d) Above 51 years ☐

A3: What is your highest education level?

a) Primary ☐

b) Secondary ☐

c) College ☐

d) University ☐

A4: What is your marital status?

a) Married ☐

b) Single ☐

c) Divorced/Separated ☐

d) Widowed ☐

A5: What is your occupation?

SECTION B: This part is designed to evaluate the Implications of Disarmament on Crime Displacement in North-Rift of Kenya.

On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1=no extent, 2=little extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent, 5=very great extent indicate by ticking the appropriate box your level of agreement with the following statements

Disarmament	1	2	3	4	5
There are no illegal weapons used to perpetrate crime in this area/region					
Insecurity in the region is not fuelled by illegal arms					
Illegal arms problem in the area has decreased					
Banditry and cattle rustling has reduced in areas without illegal arms					
Government has conducted disarmament exercises in this area/region					
State of security has increased after disarmament					
Disarmament has been effective strategy of addressing crime challenges					

Use [what extent] On each of the following statements indicate by ticking the appropriate box your level of agreement based on your knowledge, observation, or experience. Use the scale; 1 = no extent (NE), or 2 = little extent (LE), or 3 = moderate extent (ME), or 4 = great extent (GE), or 5= very great extent (VGE).

B1. Spatial Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Disarmament in hotspot areas has led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions.					
Criminals have relocated their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament measures.					
Spatial crime displacement is a direct consequence of disarmament efforts in hotspot zones.					
Disarmament has shifted crime from urban centres to rural or suburban areas.					
The geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly due to disarmament policies.					
Crime hotspots have generally remained the same despite disarmament strategies being implemented.					

B2. Temporal Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Disarmament has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities (e.g., from daytime to night-time).					
Crime rates have increased during periods when disarmament enforcement is relaxed					
Temporal displacement of crime is a noticeable outcome of disarmament strategies.					
Criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when police presence is reduced.					
Disarmament has led to a shift in the frequency of criminal activities over time.					
Crime times have generally remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies being implemented.					

B3. Tactical Crime Displacement.

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Criminals have adopted new methods or tools to commit crimes following disarmament.					
Disarmament has led to an increase in non-firearm-related crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects).					
Tactical changes in criminal behaviour are a direct result of disarmament efforts.					
Criminals have become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after disarmament.					
Disarmament has forced criminals to use less detectable or traceable weapons.					
Criminal tactics have remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies.					

B4. Target Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Disarmament has caused criminals to shift their focus to softer or less protected targets.					
There has been an increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children) due to disarmament.					
Target displacement is a significant consequence of disarmament strategies.					
Criminals are now targeting properties instead of individuals due to disarmament.					
Disarmament has led to a change in the types of victims targeted by criminals.					
Criminal targets have remained unchanged despite disarmament strategies.					

B5. Functional Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Disarmament has led to a shift in the types of crimes being committed (e.g., from armed robbery to fraud).					
Criminals have diversified their illegal activities as a result of disarmament.					
Functional displacement of crime is a direct outcome of disarmament strategies.					
Disarmament has caused a decline in violent crimes but an increase in non-violent crimes.					
Criminals have transitioned to less risky forms of crime due to disarmament.					
The same types of crimes have endured despite disarmament strategies.					

B6. Perpetrator Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Disarmament has led to a change in the demographic profile of criminals (e.g., younger offenders).					
New perpetrators have emerged in areas where disarmament has been implemented.					
Perpetrator displacement is a noticeable effect of disarmament policies.					
Disarmament has caused experienced criminals to recruit or mentor new offenders.					
The criminal landscape has shifted to include more first-time offenders due to disarmament.					

SECTION C: This section is designed to determine the Implications of Dusk-to-Dawn Curfew on Crime Displacement in North-Rift of Kenya.

B3. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1=no extent, 2=little extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent, 5=very great extent indicate by ticking the appropriate box your level of agreement with the following statements

Dusk-To-Dawn Curfews	1	2	3	4	5
Government has enforced dusk-to-dawn curfew in this area					
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has been an effective strategy of addressing crime challenges					
State of security has improved after the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew					

On each of the following statements indicate by ticking the appropriate box your level of agreement based on your knowledge, observation, or experience. Use the scale; 1 = no extent (NE), or 2 = little extent (LE), or 3 = moderate extent (ME), or 4 = great extent (GE), or 5= very great extent (VGE).

C1. Spatial Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Dusk-to-dawn curfew in hotspot areas has led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions.					
Criminals have relocated their activities to areas with less stringent dusk-to-dawn curfew measures.					
Spatial crime displacement is a direct consequence of dusk-to-dawn curfew imposition in hotspot zones.					
Due to dusk-to-dawn curfew, crime has shifted from urban centres to rural or suburban areas.					
The geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly due to dusk-to-dawn policies.					
Crime hotspots have generally remained the same despite implementation of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					

C2. Temporal Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Due to dusk-to-dawn curfew, criminals have changed the timing of their activities (e.g., from daytime to night-time or night to day).					
Crime rates have increased during periods when dusk-to-dawn curfew enforcement have been relaxed.					
Temporal displacement of crime is a noticeable outcome of dusk-to-dawn curfew strategy.					
Criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when dusk-to-dawn curfew efforts have been reduced.					
Enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a shift in the frequency of criminal activities over time.					
Crime times have generally remained unchanged despite enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					

C3. Tactical Crime Displacement.

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Criminals have adopted new methods or tools to commit crimes following during dusk-to-dawn curfew					
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to an increase in non-firearm-related crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects).					
Tactical changes in criminal behaviour are a direct result of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew					
Criminals have become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after during enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					
Due to dusk-to-dawn curfew criminals have been forced to use less detectable or traceable weapons.					
Criminal tactics have remained unchanged despite the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					

C4. Target Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has caused criminals to shift their focus to softer or less protected targets.					
There has been an increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children) during the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					
Target displacement is a significant consequence of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew strategy.					
Criminals are now targeting properties instead of individuals due dusk-to-dawn curfew.					
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a change in the types of victims targeted by criminals.					
Criminal targets have remained unchanged despite enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					

C5. Functional Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a shift in the types of crimes being committed (e.g., from armed robbery to fraud).					
Criminals have diversified their illegal activities as a result of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					
Functional displacement of crime is a direct outcome of dusk-to-dawn curfew strategy.					
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has caused a decline in violent crimes but an increase in non-violent crimes.					
Criminals have transitioned to less risky forms of crime due to the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					
The same types of crimes have endured despite the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					

C6. Perpetrator Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has led to a change in the demographic profile of criminals (e.g., younger offenders).					
New perpetrators have emerged in areas where dusk-to-dawn curfew has been enforced.					
Perpetrator displacement is a noticeable effect of the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					
Dusk-to-dawn curfew has caused experienced criminals to recruit or mentor new offenders.					
The criminal landscape has shifted to include more first-time offenders due to the enforcement of dusk-to-dawn curfew.					

SECTION D: This section is designed to investigate the Implications of Increased Presence of Security Agencies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift of Kenya.

On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1=no extent, 2=little extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent, 5=very great extent indicate by ticking the appropriate box your level of agreement with the following statements

Continued Increased Presence of Security Agencies	1	2	3	4	5
Government ever increased the number of security personnel in this area/region					
Continued increased presence of security agencies has been an effective strategy of addressing crime challenges					
Criminals lack resources to perpetrate crime due to the increased presence of security personnel.					
Security personnel are geographically familiar with hiding places of criminals					

On each of the following statements indicate by ticking the appropriate box your level of agreement based on your knowledge, observation, or experience. Use the scale; 1 = no extent (NE), or 2 = little extent (LE), or 3 = moderate extent (ME), or 4 = great extent (GE), or 5= very great extent (VGE).

D1. Spatial Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Presence of security agencies in hotspot areas has led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions.					
Criminals have relocated their activities to areas with low presence of security agencies.					
Spatial crime displacement is a direct consequence of increased presence of security agencies.					
Presence of security agencies crime has shifted from urban centres to rural or suburban areas.					
The geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly due to increase security agencies.					
Crime hotspots have generally remained the same despite increased the presence of security agencies.					

D2. Temporal Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Increased presence of security agencies has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities (e.g., from daytime to night-time).					
Crime rates have increased during periods when there is low presence of security agencies.					
Temporal displacement of crime is a noticeable outcome of increased presence of security agencies.					
Criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when police presence is reduced.					
Increased presence of security agencies has led to a shift in the frequency of criminal activities over time.					
Crime times have generally remained unchanged the increased presence of security agencies.					

D3. Tactical Crime Displacement.

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Criminals have adopted new methods or tools to commit crimes following increased presence of security agencies.					
Increased presence of security agencies has led to an increase in non-firearm-related crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects).					
Tactical changes in criminal behaviour are a direct result of increased presence of security agencies.					
Criminals have become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after increased presence of security agencies					
Increased presence of security agencies has forced criminals to use less detectable or traceable weapons.					
Criminal tactics have remained unchanged despite increased presence of security agencies.					

D4. Target Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Presence of security agencies has caused criminals to shift their focus to softer or less protected targets.					
There has been an increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children) due to increased presence of security agencies.					
Target displacement is a significant consequence of increased presence of security agencies.					
Criminals are now targeting properties instead of individuals					
Increased presence of security agencies has led to a change in the types of victims targeted by criminals.					
Criminal targets have remained unchanged despite increased presence of security agencies.					

D5. Functional Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Increased presence of security agencies has led to a shift in the types of crimes being committed (e.g., from armed robbery to fraud).					
Criminals have diversified their illegal activities as a result of increased presence of security agencies.					
Functional displacement of crime is a direct outcome of increased presence of security agencies.					
Increased presence of security agencies has caused a decline in violent crimes but an increase in non-violent crimes.					
Criminals have transitioned to less risky forms of crime due to increased presence of security agencies.					
The same types of crimes have endured despite increased presence of security agencies.					

D6. Perpetrator Crime Displacement

Statements	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Increased presence of security agencies has led to a change in the demographic profile of criminals (e.g., younger offenders).					
New perpetrators have emerged in areas where the presence of security agencies have been increased.					
Perpetrator displacement is a noticeable effect of increased presence of security agencies.					
Increased presence of security agencies has caused experienced criminals to recruit or mentor new offenders.					
The criminal landscape has shifted to include more first-time offenders due to increased presence of security agencies.					

31. What challenges arise in ensuring that disarmament, dusk-to-dawn curfew, and increased presence of security agencies do not lead to crime displacement?

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Crime Displacement

B3. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1=no extent, 2=little extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent, 5=very great extent indicate by ticking the appropriate box your level of agreement with the following statements

Crime Displacement	NE	LE	ME	GE	VGE
Spatial Crime Displacement					
Hotspot policing strategies has led to an increase in crime in neighbouring regions.					
Criminals have relocated their activities to areas with less stringent disarmament measures.					
Hotspot policing strategies has shifted crime from urban centres to rural or suburban areas.					
The geographic distribution of crime has changed significantly due to disarmament policies.					
Temporal Crime Displacement					
Hotspot policing strategies has caused criminals to change the timing of their activities (e.g., from daytime to night-time).					
Criminals have adapted by committing crimes during times when police hotspot policing strategies are relaxed.					
Crime times have generally changed					
Tactical Crime Displacement					
Criminals have adopted new crime methods or tools					
There is an increase in non-firearm-related crimes (e.g., knives, blunt objects).					
Criminals have become more innovative in their approaches to avoid detection after disarmament.					
Target Crime Displacement					
Criminals have shifted their focus to softer or less protected targets.					
There has been an increase in crimes against vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, children).					
Criminals are now targeting properties instead of individuals					
Criminals have changed the types of victims targeted					
Functional Crime Displacement					
Types of crimes being committed (e.g., from armed robbery to fraud) has shifted					
Criminals have diversified their illegal activities					
There is a reduction in violent crimes but an increase in non-violent crimes.					
Criminals have transitioned to less risky forms of crime					
The same types of crimes have endured					
Perpetrator Crime Displacement					
The demographic profile of criminals has shifted (e.g., younger offenders).					
New perpetrators have emerged in these area					
Hotspot policing strategies has caused experienced criminals to recruit or mentor new offenders.					
The criminal landscape has shifted to include more first-time offenders					

Appendix II: Focus Group Discussion Guide
(To be administered to selected focus respondents)

I am PhD student at Chuka University undertaking a study on **Implications of Hotspot Policing Strategies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift of Kenya**. You have been selected to take part in a voluntary Focus Group Discussion (FGD) which will take about one hour. Your responses will be used for research purposes only and your identity kept confidential and anonymous.



Thank you for agreeing to participate,

Pavel Okoth Sigu,
Chuka University

Date	
Venue	
Name of Interviewer	

Part I: Demographic Information of participants

S/NO	Name(coded)	Age	Gender	Marital status	Education level	Occupation
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						

Hotspot Policing Strategy on Crime Displacement in North-Rift Kenya.

i. How has disarmament contributed to crime displacement?

[Probe; how has disarmament contributed to spatial crime displacement]

[Probe; how has disarmament contributed to temporal crime displacement]

[Probe; how has disarmament Contributed to tactical crime displacement]

[Probe; how has disarmament contributed to target crime displacement]

[Probe; how has disarmament contributed to functional crime displacement]

[Probe; how has disarmament contributed to perpetrator crime displacement]

[Probe; how has disarmament contributed to temporal crime displacement]

ii. How has dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to crime displacement?

[Probe; how has dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to spatial crime displacement]

[Probe; how has dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to temporal crime displacement]

[Probe; how has dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to tactical crime displacement]

[Probe; how has dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to target crime displacement]

[Probe; how has dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to functional crime displacement]

[Probe; how has dusk-to-dawn curfew contributed to perpetrator crime displacement]

iii. How has increased presence of security agencies contributed to crime displacement?

[Probe; how has increased presence of security agencies contributed to spatial crime displacement]

[Probe; how has increased presence of security agencies contributed to temporal crime displacement]

[Probe; how has increased presence of security agencies Contributed to tactical crime displacement]

[Probe; how has increased presence of security agencies contributed to target crime displacement]

[Probe; how has increased presence of security agencies contributed to functional crime displacement]

[Probe; how has increased presence of security agencies contributed to perpetrator crime displacement]

[Probe; how has increased presence of security agencies contributed to temporal crime displacement]

- iv. What is the number of crime incidences reported in this area (before, during, after) the hotspot policing intervention?
- v. What knowledge/skill/experience and resources do the criminals possess that allow them to manoeuvre and sustain their illicit acts in the region?
- vi. What challenges are the security agencies faced with as they implement hotspot policing strategies?
- vii. What challenges exist in addressing crime displacement and insecurity in the region?
- viii. What strategies should be adopted to address crime displacement and restore security in the region?

Appendix III: Table For Determining Sample Size For A Finite Population

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	346
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	26	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	354
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	191	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	170	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	180	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	190	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	200	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	370
65	56	210	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	220	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	230	144	550	226	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	240	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	250	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	260	154	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	254	2600	335	100000	384

Note: N is population size; S is Sample Size
Source: Krejcie & Morgan 1970

Appendix IV: Chuka University Ethics Committee Approval


CHUKA UNIVERSITY
Knowledge is Wealth (*Sapientia divitia est*) Akili ni Mali

CHUKA UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

Telephones: 020-2318512/18
Direct Line: 0772894438
Email: info@chuka.ac.ke,
P. O. Box 109-60400, Chuka
Website: www.chuka.ac.ke

25th April, 2025

REF: CUIERC/ NACOSTI/720
TO: Pavel Okoth Sigu


RE: Implications of Hotspot Policing Strategies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift of Kenya

This is to inform you that *Chuka University IERC* has reviewed and approved your above research proposal. Your application approval number is *NACOSTI/NBC/AC-0812*. The approval period is 25th April, 2025 – 25th April, 2026.

This approval is subject to compliance with the following requirements;

- i. Only approved documents including (informed consents, study instruments, MTA) will be used
- ii. All changes including (amendments, deviations, and violations) are submitted for review and approval by *Chuka University IERC*.
- iii. Death and life threatening problems and serious adverse events or unexpected adverse events whether related or unrelated to the study must be reported to *Chuka University IERC* within 72 hours of notification
- iv. Any changes, anticipated or otherwise that may increase the risks or affected safety or welfare of study participants and others or affect the integrity of the research must be reported to *Chuka University IERC* within 72 hours
- v. Clearance for export of biological specimens must be obtained from relevant institutions.
- vi. Submission of a request for renewal of approval at least 60 days prior to expiry of the approval period. Attach a comprehensive progress report to support the renewal.
- vii. Submission of an executive summary report within 90 days upon completion of the study to *Chuka University IERC*.

Prior to commencing your study, you will be expected to obtain a research license from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) <https://oris.nacosti.go.ke> and also obtain other clearances needed.

Yours sincerely

Dr. Benjamin Kanga
SECRETARY



Appendix V: Board of Postgraduate Studies Approval


CHUKA UNIVERSITY
Knowledge is Wealth (*Sapientia divitia est*) Akili ni Mali

**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
BOARD OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES**

Telephones: 020-2310512/18
Direct Line: 020-268 7625
Email: postgraduate@chuka.ac.ke
P. O. Box 109-60400, Chuka
Website: www.chuka.ac.ke

AD17/580073/22 2nd May, 2025

To
National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation
Off Waiyaki Way, Upper Kabete
P O Box 30623, 00100
Nairobi

Dear Sir/ Madam,

PAVEL OKOTH SIGU

The above named person is a bona fide student of Chuka University pursuing a Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology and Security Studies, proposal titled: Implications of Hotspot Policing Strategies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties, Kenya

Mr. Okoth has defended at Faculty level, and is now expected to conduct research. Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.


Yours sincerely,
Prof. Moses Murage
DIRECTOR
BOARD OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
MM/kk

Appendix VI : NACOSTI Research Permit

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION	NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
Ref No: 973220	Date of Issue: 23/May/2025
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
This is to Certify that Mr., Sign Okoth Pavel of Chuka University, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Baringo, Turkana, Westpokot on the topic: IMPLICATIONS OF HOTSPOT POLICING STRATEGIES ON CRIME DISPLACEMENT IN NORTH-RIFT COUNTIES OF KENYA for the period ending : 23/May/2026.	
License No: NACOSTI/P/25/4173826	
973220	
Applicant Identification Number	Deputy Director NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
Verification QR Code	
	
NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.	
See overleaf for conditions	

Appendix VII: Baringo County Research Authorization



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Telephone: 053-21285
Fax: (053)-21285
E-Mail: baringocountycommissioner@gmail.com
When replying please quote:

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
BARINGO COUNTY,
P.O. BOX 1 - 30400
KABARNET.

REF.NO.ADM.18/2 VOL.IV/56

28TH MAY, 2025

Deputy County Commissioners

- Marigat Sub-County
- Mukutani Sub County
- Baringo West Sub County
- Baringo North Sub County

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Reference is made to Research Licence No.NACOSTI/P/25/4173826 dated 23/5/2025 from NACOSTI on the above subject matter.

This is to confirm that **Mr. Sigu Okoth** ID NO. **28583138** of University of Chuka has been authorized to carry out research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in your Sub Counties on the topic **"implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement in North Rift Counties of Kenya** for the period ending **23 /5/ 2026**.

Please accord him necessary support.


S.N WASIKE
For: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
BARINGO COUNTY



CC:

Mr. Mr.Sigu Akoth
ID/NO.28583138

Appendix VIII: Baringo West Sub-County Research Authorization



**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION**

Email: decbaringowest@gmail.com

DEPUTY COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
BARINGO WEST SUB-COUNTY,
P.O. BOX 100-30401,
KABARTONJO.

28ND MAY, 2025.

ASSISTANT COUNTY COMMISSIONERS:

- BARWESSA DIVISION.
- BARTABWA DIVISION.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Reference is made to letter Ref No; ADM18/2 VOL W/56 dated 28th May 2025 from the county commissioner on the above subject matter.

This is to confirm that Mr. Sign Okoth ID NO 28583138 of University of Chuka has been authorised to carry out research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act 2013 [Rev.2014] in this Subcounty on the topic 'Implications of hotspot policing strategies on crime displacement in North Rift Counties of Kenya for the period ending 23rd may 2026.

Please accord him necessary support.

DOMINIC MUTIE
DEPUTY COUNTY COMMISSIONER
BARINGO WEST SUB-COUNTY.



Appendix IX: West Pokot County Research Authorization



**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION**

Telegrams: "DISTRICTER"
COUNTY COMMISSIONER
Telephone
Email: ccwestpokot@gmail.com

County Commissioner,
West Pokot County,
P.O BOX 1-30600,
KAPENGURIA.

REF: OOP.CC.ADM.15/14VOL.II/156

30TH MARCH, 2025

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION
MR. SIGU OKOTH PAVEL LICENCE NO. NACOSTI/25/4173826

Reference is made to letter **No.973220** dated 23rd May, 2025 from the National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation on the above subject.

This is to inform you that the above named person from **Chuka University**, has been duly authorized to carry out research in this County as per the provisions of the National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) under the topic: "IMPLICATIONS OF HOTSPOT POLICING STRATEGIES ON CRIME DISPLACEMENT IN NORTH-RIFT COUNTIES OF KENYA" for a period ending **23rd May, 2026**.

The purpose of this letter therefore, is to request you to accord him your cooperation, guidance and necessary assistance he may require during his research tour.

COUNTY COMMISSIONER
WEST POKOT COUNTY

KHALIF D. ABDULLAHI
COUNTY COMMISSIONER
WEST POKOT COUNTY

C.C.
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
WEST POKOT COUNTY

Appendix X: Turkana County Research Authorization



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION

Telegraphic address "COMMISSIONER" LODWAR

Telephone: LODWAR

Telex:

Fax:

E-mail: ccommissionerturkana@gmail.com

REF: ADM.15/29 VOL.IV / (26)

COUNTY COMMISSIONER

TURKANA COUNTY

P.O BOX 1-30500

LODWAR.

3RD JUNE, 2025

DEPUTY COUNTY COMMISSIONER.

AROO SUB COUNTY.

DEPUTY COUNTY COMMISSIONER.

SUGUTA SUB COUNTY.

DEPUTY COUNTY COMMISSIONER.

TURKANA EAST SUB COUNTY

DEPUTY COUNTY COMMISSIONER.

LOIMA SUB COUNTY.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION: MR..SIGU OKOTH PAVEL.

LICENCE NO: NACOSTI/P/25/4173826

The above mentioned person is from Chuka University of Science and Technology, he has been authorized to carry out research on "Implications of Hotspot Policing Strategies on Crime Displacement in North-Rift Counties of Kenya in Turkana County". The research period ends on 23rd May, 2026.

Any assistance accorded to him will be appreciated.


PATRICK ILAIKA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
TURKANA COUNTY

Copy to:

The Director of Education

TURKANA COUNTY.

MR..SIGU OKOTH PAVEL.

Appendix XI: Legal Notice No. 9 of 2023

SPECIAL ISSUE

63

Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 12

13th February, 2023

(Legislative Supplement No. 5)

LEGAL NOTICE No. 9

THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT

(Cap. 56)

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) CURFEW ORDER, No. 1 of 2023

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred on me by section 8(1) of the Public Order Act, read together with Sections 11 and 106(1) of the National Police Service Act No. 11A and in view of the serious threat posed to National security, public order and safety arising from the disturbances occurring in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration makes the following Curfew Order-

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) CURFEW ORDER, No. 1 of 2023

Citation

1. This Order may be cited as the Public Order Curfew (Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties) Order, 2023.

Application

2. This Order shall apply in the following specified areas in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties.

1. TURKANA COUNTY – Turkana South, Turkana East and Loima Sub-counties
2. WEST POKOT COUNTY – Pokot North and Sigor Sub-counties (along the river Turkwel Escarpment)
3. ELGEYO MARAKWET COUNTY -Marakwet East and Marakwet West Sub-counties
4. BARINGO COUNTY – Mukutani, Muchongoi, Bartabwa, Tiaty East and Tiaty West Sub-counties.
5. LAIKIPIA COUNTY- Olmoran, Ng'arua, and Mukogodo Divisions
6. SAMBURU COUNTY - Loroki and Kirisia Divisions

Curfew Period

3. This Order shall apply during the hours of darkness with effect from 14th February, 2023 and shall remain in effect for a period of thirty (30) days.

64

Kenya Subsidiary Legislation, 2023

Restriction

4. Under this Order, there shall be no public gatherings, processions or movement, either alone or as a group during the period of the curfew except as has been permitted in writing by the Inspector-General of the National Police Service.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Order, the Order shall not apply to the services, personnel or workers specified in the Schedule hereto.

SCHEDULE

1. Medical professionals and health workers.
2. National security, administration and co-ordination of national government officers.
3. Public health and sanitation officers in the County Governments.
4. Licensed pharmaceuticals companies, pharmacies and drug stores.
5. Licensed broadcasters and media houses.
6. Kenya Revenue Authority.
7. Kenya Airports Authority and licensed Civil Aviation Service Providers.
8. Kenya Civil Aviation Authority.
9. Kenya Airports PLC.
10. Kenya Ports Authority and Licensed Port Operators.
11. Power production and distribution Companies.
12. Kenya Railways Corporation.
13. Kenya Pipeline Company.
14. Water service providers.
15. Food and farm produce processors, distributors, dealers, wholesalers and transporters.
16. Licensed supermarkets, minimarkets and hypermarkets.
17. Licensed distributors and retailers of petroleum and oil products and lubricants.
18. Licensed telecommunications operators and service providers.
19. Licensed banks, financial institutions and payment service providers.
20. Fire brigade and emergency response services.
21. Licensed security firms.
22. Postal and Courier services.
23. Advocates of the High Court of Kenya.

Dated the 13th February, 2023.

KITHURE KINDEKI,
Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration

Appendix XII: Legal Notice No. 10 of 2023

Kenya Subsidiary Legislation, 2023

65

LEGAL NOTICE No. 10

THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT

(Cap. 56)

THE PUBLIC ORDER DECLARATION OF DISTURBED AND DANGEROUS AREAS (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) ORDER, No. 2 of 2023

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred on me by section 8(1) of the Public Order Act, read together with Sections 11 and 106(1) of the National Police Service Act No. 11A and in view of the serious threat posed to National security and public order arising from the disturbances occurring in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration makes the following Order-

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) ORDER, No. 2 of 2023

Citation

1. This Order may be cited as the Declaration of disturbed and dangerous areas (Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties) Order, 2023.

Application

2. This Order shall apply in the following specified areas in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties.

1. TURKANA COUNTY – Turkana South, Turkana East and Loima Sub-counties
2. WEST POKOT COUNTY – Pokot North and Sigor sub Counties (along the river Turkwel Escarpment)
3. ELGEYO MARAKWET COUNTY -Marakwet East and Marakwet West Sub-counties
4. BARINGO COUNTY – Mukutani, Muchongoi, Bartabwa, Tiaty East and Tiaty West Sub-counties.
5. LAIKIPIA COUNTY- Olmoran, Ng'arua, and Mukogodo Divisions
6. SAMBURU COUNTY - Loroki and Kirisia Divisions

Declaration Period

3. This Order shall apply with effect from 14th February, 2023 and shall remain in effect for a period of thirty (30) days.

Restriction

4. Under this Order, there shall be no public gatherings, processions or movement, either alone or as a group during the period of the curfew except as has been permitted in writing by the Inspector-General of the National Police Service.

Dated the 13th February, 2023.

KITHURE KINDIKI,

Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration.

Appendix XIII: Legal Notice No. 11 of 2023

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Kenya Subsidiary Legislation, 2023

LEGAL NOTICE No. 11

THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE ACT

(No. 11A of 2011)

THE PUBLIC (NOTIFICATION ON PROHIBITION, POSSESSION OF ARMS AND SURRENDER OF SUCH ARMS) (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) ORDER, No. 1 of 2023

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred by section 106(2) (a) of the National Police Service Act No. 11A and in view of the serious threat posed to National security public order and safety arising from the disturbances occurring in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties, the Inspector General, National Police Service makes the following Order-

THE PUBLIC (NOTIFICATION ON PROHIBITION, POSSESSION OF ARMS AND SURRENDER OF SUCH ARMS) (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) ORDER, No. 1 of 2023

Citation

1. This Order may be cited as the Public (Notification on Prohibition, Possession of Arms and Surrender of such arms) (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU) (TURKANA, WEST POKOT COUNTY, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, LAIKIPIA AND SAMBURU COUNTIES) Order, 2023.

Application

2. This Order shall apply in the following specified areas in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties.

1. TURKANA COUNTY – Turkana South, Turkana East and Loima sub-counties
2. WEST POKOT COUNTY – Pokot North and Sigor sub-counties (along the river Turkwel Escarpment)
3. ELGEYO MARAKWET COUNTY– Marakwet East and Marakwet West Sub-counties
4. BARINGO COUNTY – Mukutani, Muchongoi, Bartabwa, Tiaty East and Tiaty West Sub-counties.
5. LAIKIPIA COUNTY- Olmorani, Ng'arua, and Mukogodo Divisions
6. SAMBURU COUNTY - Loroki and Kirsia Divisions

3. This Order shall apply with effect from 14th February, 2023 and remain in effect for a period of Thirty (30) days.

Restriction

4. Under this Order, there shall be no public gatherings, processions or movement, either alone or as a group during the period of the Notification except as has been permitted in writing by the Inspector-General of the National Police Service.

Dated the 13th February, 2023.

JAPHET KOOME,
Inspector-General of the National Police Services.

Appendix XIIV: Legal Notice 12 of 2023

SPECIAL ISSUE

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Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 13

14th February, 2023

(Legislative Supplement No. 6)

LEGAL NOTICE No. 12

THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT

(Cap. 56)

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) CURFEW ORDER, No. 1 of 2023

CORRIGENDUM

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) ORDER, No. 2 of 2023

IT IS notified for information of the public that:

The Order shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to following additional areas in Samburu and Laikipia Counties.

1. SAMBURU COUNTY

Samburu North Sub County

(a) Baragoi Division

Samburu East Sub County

(a) Wamba Division

2. SAMBURU COUNTY

Samburu Central Sub County

(a) Malaso Division

3. LAIKIPIA COUNTY

Kirima Sub County

(a) Sipili Division

4. This order excludes Kirsia Division in Samburu Central Sub County.

Curfew Period

For avoidance of doubt, this Order shall apply during the hours of darkness between Six O'clock in the evening and Six O'clock in the morning with effect from 14th February, 2023 and shall remain in effect for a period of Thirty (30) days.

Restriction

Under this Order, there shall be no public gatherings, processions or movement, either alone or as a group during the period of the curfew except as has been permitted in writing by the Inspector General of the National Police Service.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Order, the Order shall not apply to the services, personnel or workers specified in the Schedule hereto.

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SCHEDULE

1. Medical professionals and health workers.
2. National Security, Administration and Co-ordination of National Government officers.
3. Public health and sanitation officers in the County Governments.
4. Licensed pharmaceuticals companies, pharmacies and drug stores.
5. Licensed broadcasters and media houses.
6. Kenya Revenue Authority.
7. Kenya Airports Authority and licensed Civil Aviation Service Providers.
8. Kenya Civil Aviation Authority.
9. Kenya Airports PLC.
10. Kenya Ports Authority and Licensed Port Operators.
11. Power production and distribution companies.
12. Kenya Railways Corporation.
13. Kenya Pipeline Company.
14. Water service providers.
15. Food and farm produce processors, distributors, dealers, wholesalers and transporters.
16. Veterinary services.
17. Licensed distributors and retailers of petroleum and oil products and lubricants.
18. Licensed telecommunications operators and service providers.
19. Licensed banks, financial institutions and payment service providers.
20. Fire brigade and emergency response services.
21. Licensed security firms.
22. Postal and Courier services.
23. Advocates of the High Court of Kenya.

Dated the 14th February, 2023.

KITHURE KINDIKI,

Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration.

Appendix XV: Subsequent Extensions Vide Legal Notice No. 167

SPECIAL ISSUE

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Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 201

26th October, 2023

(Legislative Supplement No. 73)

LEGAL NOTICE NO. 167

THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT

(Cap. 56)

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) CURFEW

EXTENSION ORDER, No. 10 OF 2023

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred on me by section 8(1) of the Public Order Act, read together with sections 11 and 106(1) of the National Police Service Act, No. 11A of 2011, and in view of the serious threat posed to National security and public order arising from the disturbances occurring in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration makes the following Order—

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) CURFEW EXTENSION ORDER, No. 10 OF 2023

Citation

1. This Order may be cited as the Public Order and Curfew Extension (Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties) Extension Order, 2023.

Application

2. This Extension Order shall apply in the following specified areas in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties:

- (a) **TURKANA COUNTY**—Turkana South, Turkana East and Loima Sub-Counties.
- (b) **WEST POKOT COUNTY**—Pokot North and Sigor Sub-Counties (along the River Turkwel Escarpment).
- (c) **ELGEYO MARAKWET COUNTY**—Marakwet East and Marakwet West Sub-Counties.
- (d) **BARINGO COUNTY**—Mukutani, Muchongoi, Bartabwa, Tiaty East and Tiaty West Sub-Counties.
- (e) **LAIKIPIA COUNTY**—Olmoran, Ng'arua, Mukogodo and Sipili Divisions.
- (f) **SAMBURU COUNTY**—Loroki, Baragoi, Wamba (except Wamba Town) and Malaso Divisions (except Suguta Marmar Town).

Curfew Period

3. This Extension Order shall apply during the hours of darkness between Six O'clock in the evening and Six O'clock in the morning with effect from 17th October, 2023 and shall remain in effect for a further period of thirty (30) days.

Restriction

4. Under this Extension Order, there shall be no public gatherings, processions or movement, either alone or as a group during the period of the curfew except as has been permitted in writing by the Inspector-General of the National Police Service.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Order, the Order shall not apply to the services, personnel or workers specified in the Schedule hereto.

SCHEDULE

1. Medical professionals and health workers.
2. National security, administration and co-ordination of national government officers.
3. Public health and sanitation officers in the County Governments.
4. Licensed pharmaceuticals companies, pharmacies and drug stores.
5. Licensed broadcasters and media houses.
6. Kenya Revenue Authority.
7. Kenya Airports Authority and licensed Civil Aviation Service Providers.
8. Kenya Civil Aviation Authority.
9. Kenya Airports PLC.
10. Kenya Ports Authority and licensed Port Operators.
11. Power production and distribution companies.
12. Kenya Railways Corporation.
13. Kenya Pipeline Company.
14. Water service providers.
15. Food and farm produce processors, distributors, dealers, wholesalers and transporters.
16. Licensed supermarkets, minimarkets and hypermarkets.
17. Licensed distributors and retailers of petroleum and oil products and lubricants.
18. Licensed telecommunications operators and service providers.
19. Licensed banks, financial institutions and payment service providers.
20. Fire brigade and emergency response services.
21. Licensed security firms.

KITHURE KINDIKI,

Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration.

Appendix XVI: Subsequent Extensions Vide Legal Notice No. 168

LEGAL NOTICE NO. 168

THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT

(Cap. 56)

THE PUBLIC ORDER DECLARATION OF DISTURBED AND DANGEROUS AREAS (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES)

EXTENSION ORDER, No. 10 OF 2023

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred on me by section 8(1) of the Public Order Act, read together with sections 11 and 106(1) of the National Police Service Act, No. 11A of 2011, and in view of the serious threat posed to National security and public order arising from the disturbances occurring in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration makes the following Order—

THE PUBLIC ORDER (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) EXTENSION ORDER, No. 10 OF 2023

Citation

1. This Order may be cited as the Declaration of Disturbed and Dangerous Areas (Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties) Extension Order, 2023.

Application

2. This Extended Order shall apply in the following specified areas in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties:

- (a) TURKANA COUNTY—Turkana South, Turkana East Sub-Counties (Loima Sub-County is exempted).
- (b) WEST POKOT COUNTY—Pokot North and Sigor Sub-Counties (along the River Turkwel Escarpment).
- (c) ELGEYO MARAKWET COUNTY—Marakwet East and Marakwet West Sub-Counties.
- (d) BARINGO COUNTY—Mukutani, Muchongoi, Bartabwa, Tiaty East and Tiaty West Sub-Counties.
- (e) LAIKIPIA COUNTY—Olmoran, Ng'arua, Mukogodo and Sipili Divisions.

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- (f) SAMBURU COUNTY—Loroki, Baragoi, Wamba (except Wamba Town) and Malaso Divisions (except Suguta Marmar Town).

Declaration Period

3. This Extended Order shall apply during the hours of darkness between Six O'clock in the evening and Six O'clock in the morning with effect from the 17th October, 2023 and shall remain in effect for a further period of thirty (30) days.

Restriction

4. Under this Extended Order, there shall be no public gatherings, processions or movement, either alone or as a group during the period of the curfew except as has been permitted in writing by the Inspector-General of the National Police Service.

Dated the 13th October, 2023.

KITHURE KINDIKI,

Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration.

Appendix XVII: Subsequent Extensions Vide Legal Notice No. 169

LEGAL NOTICE No. 169

THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE ACT

(No 11A of 2011)

THE PUBLIC (NOTIFICATION ON PROHIBITION, POSSESSION OF ARMS AND SURRENDER OF SUCH ARMS) (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES)

EXTENSION ORDER, No. 9 OF 2023

IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred by section 106(2) (a) of the National Police Service Act, No. 11A of 2011, and in view of the serious threat posed to National security public order and safety arising from the disturbances occurring in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties, the Inspector-General, National Police Service makes the following Extension Order—

THE PUBLIC (NOTIFICATION ON PROHIBITION, POSSESSION OF ARMS AND SURRENDER OF SUCH ARMS) (TURKANA, ELGEYO MARAKWET, BARINGO, WEST POKOT, SAMBURU AND LAIKIPIA COUNTIES) EXTENSION ORDER, No. 9 OF 2023

Citation

1. This Order may be cited as the Public (Notification on Prohibition, Possession of Arms and Surrender of such Arms) (Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties) Extension Order, No. 9 of 2023.

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Application

2. This Extension Order shall apply in the following specified areas in Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia Counties:

- (a) TURKANA COUNTY—Turkana South, Turkana East and Loima Sub-Counties.
- (b) WEST POKOT COUNTY—Pokot North and Sigor Sub-Counties (along the River Turkwel Escarpment).
- (c) ELGEYO MARAKWET COUNTY—Marakwet East and Marakwet West Sub-Counties.
- (d) BARINGO COUNTY—Mukutani, Muchongoi, Bartabwa, Tiaty East and Tiaty West Sub-Counties.
- (e) LAIKIPIA COUNTY—Olmoran, Ng'arua, Mukogodo and Sipili Divisions.
- (f) SAMBURU COUNTY—Loroki, Baragoi, Wamba (except Wamba Town) and Malaso Divisions (except Suguta Marmar Town).

Declaration Period

3. This Order shall apply with effect from the 17th October, 2023 and remain in effect for a period of thirty (30) days.

Restriction

4. Under this Extension Order, there shall be no public gatherings, processions or movement, either alone or as a group during the period of the Extended Notification except as has been permitted in writing by the Inspector-General of the National Police Service.

Dated the 13th October, 2023.

JAPHET KOOME,
Inspector-General of the National Police Service.